- A Minimalist Threshold for Epistemically Irrational Beliefs.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.details
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Imaginative Beliefs.Joshua Myers - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.details
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From Altered States to Metaphysics: The Epistemic Status of Psychedelic-induced Metaphysical Beliefs.Paweł Gładziejewski - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.details
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A Planning Theory of Incoherence in Belief.Sara Aronowitz - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), The Nature of Belief. Oxford University Press.details
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Do you believe in Deep Down? On two conceptions of valuing.Marcel Jahn & Lukas Beck - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-27.details
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Why beliefs are not dispositional stereotypes.Andrew Garford Moore & George Botterill - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):483-494.details
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Morgan’s Quaker gun and the species of belief.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):119-144.details
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The origins of mindreading: how interpretive socio-cognitive practices get off the ground.Marco Fenici & Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2021 - Synthese 198 (9):8365-8387.details
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Toward a Post-Kantian Constructivism.Jack Samuel - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (53):1449–1484.details
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The Limited Phenomenal Infallibility Thesis.Christopher Stratman - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Affectivism about intuitions.Slawa Loev - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-24.details
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Creencias conspirativas. Aspectos formales y generales de un fenómeno antiguo (Conspiracy beliefs. Formal and general aspects of an ancient phenomenon).Pietro Montanari - 2022 - Protrepsis 11 (22):273-304.details
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Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
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Memes, Misinformation, and Political Meaning.Michael P. Lynch - 2022 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):38-56.details
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Longings in Limbo: A New Defence of I-Desires.Luke Roelofs - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (8):3331-3355.details
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The Limits of the Doxastic.Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. OUP. pp. 36-57.details
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The Communicative Significance of Beliefs and Desires.Uku Tooming - 2014 - Dissertation, Universitatis Tartunesisdetails
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The ins and outs of conscious belief.Sam Coleman - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):517-548.details
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An Argument Against Fodorian Inner Sentence Theories of Belief and Desire.Adam Pautz - manuscriptdetails
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The Point of Political Belief.Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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The origins of mindreading: how interpretive socio-cognitive practices get off the ground.Marco Fenici & Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2020 - Synthese (9):1-23.details
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Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Greco - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 84-104.details
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Is Epistemology Autonomous?Daniel Greco - 2018 - In Conor Mchugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal dispositions.Henry Ian Schiller - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):3969-3980.details
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A Dispositional Account of Aversive Racism.Carole J. Lee - 2018 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Cognitive Science Society.details
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Collective Implicit Attitudes: A Stakeholder Conception of Implicit Bias.Carole J. Lee - 2018 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Cognitive Science Society.details
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Promote Scientific Integrity via Journal Peer Review Data.Carole J. Lee - 2017 - Science 357 (6348):256-257.details
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If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2018 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.details
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Intending, believing, and supposing at will.Joshua Shepherd - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):321-330.details
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You meta believe it.Neil Levy - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):814-826.details
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An Account of Practical Decisions.Patrick Fleming - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1):121-139.details
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Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Lisa Bortolotti - 2017 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 153-73.details
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Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science.Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2353-2372.details
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Can Dispositionalism About Belief Vindicate Doxasticism About Delusion?José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (3):379-404.details
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Knowing Your Own Beliefs.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):41-62.details
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On the Relationship between Speech Acts and Psychological States.Seungbae Park - 2014 - Pragmatics and Cognition 22 (3):430-351.details
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How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):732-742.details
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Common-sense functionalism and the extended mind.Jack Wadham - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):136-151.details
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Against Motivational Efficacy of Beliefs.Seungbae Park - 2015 - Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija 23 (1):86-95.details
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Managing Mismatch Between Belief and Behavior.Maura Tumulty - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):261-292.details
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When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):1-18.details
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Belief through Thick and Thin.Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):748-775.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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A Dispositional Theory of Love.Hichem Naar - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):342-357.details
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Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.details
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Knowledge entails dispositional belief.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50.details
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Comments on Gendler’s, “the epistemic costs of implicit bias”.Andy Egan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):65-79.details
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Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-doxastic Acceptances.Keith Frankish - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27.details
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