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The things we mean.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Fictionalism.Matti Eklund - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Mind 94 (373):76-100.details
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Intentional systems theory, mental causation and empathic resonance.Marc V. P. Slors - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):321-336.details
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In defense of folk psychology.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (1):31-54.details
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(1 other version)Real patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.details
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A Dispositional Approach to the Attitudes.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - In Nikolaj Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure. New York: Palgrave. pp. 75-99.details
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Interventionism for the Intentional Stance: True Believers and Their Brains.Markus I. Eronen - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):45-55.details
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Mental Fictionalism.Tamás Demeter - 2013 - The Monist 96 (4):483-504.details
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Fictionalism and the folk.Adam Toon - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):280-295.details
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(1 other version)Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.details
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Saving Mental Fictionalism from Cognitive Collapse.Meg Wallace - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (2):405-424.details
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Ontology Made Easy.Amie Lynn Thomasson - 2014 - New York: Oup Usa.details
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Fictionalism about Folk Psychology.Daniel Hutto - 2013 - The Monist 96 (4):582-604.details
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Dennett's little grains of salt.Gregory McCulloch - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):1-12.details
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The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Stephen Schiffer, The Things We Mean. [REVIEW]Robert J. Stainton - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (1):124-127.details
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The Intentional Stance.Patricia Kitcher - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):126.details
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Groups as Agents.Deborah Tollefsen - 2015 - Malden, MA: Polity.details
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(2 other versions)Problems in the explanation of action.Donald Davidson - 1987 - In John Jamieson Carswell Smart, Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & Jean Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart. New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.details
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(1 other version)Folk belief and commonplace belief.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):298-305.details
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Mind Ascribed. An elaboration and defence of interpretivism.Bruno Mölder - 2010 - John Benjamins.details
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Pleonastic Explanations. [REVIEW]Mark Sainsbury - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):97-111.details
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Interpretation: Its Scope and Limits.U. Kriegel - 2010 - In Allan Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics. Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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(4 other versions)Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In Lawrence Foster & Joe William Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. London, England: Humanities Press.details
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Mind Re-ascribed.Bruno Mölder - 2017 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 10 (2):55-104.details
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(2 other versions)Problems in the Explanation of Action.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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