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Rules of Use.Indrek Reiland - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):566-583.details
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*Perception* (2021, preview).Adam Pautz - 2021 - In Perception.details
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Linguistic convention and worldly fact: Prospects for a naturalist theory of the a priori.Brett Topey - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1725-1752.details
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Nominalizations: The Case of Nominalizations of Modal Predicates.Friederike Moltmann - 2020 - In Lisa Matthewson, Cécile Meier, Hotze Rullman & Thomas Ede Zimmermann (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Semantics. Wiley.details
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Truth Predicates, Truth Bearers, and their Variants.Friederike Moltmann - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 2):1-28.details
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Abstract Objects and the Core-Periphery Distinction in the Ontological and the Conceptual Domain of Natural Language.Friederike Moltmann - 2020 - In José Luis Falguera & Concha Martínez-Vida (eds.), Abstract Objects: For and Against. Springer. pp. 255-276.details
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The edenic theory of reference.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):276-308.details
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On creeping minimalism and the nature of minimal entities.Luca Moretti - 2009 - In Heather Dyke (ed.), From Truth to Reality (Routledge).details
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Hopes, Fears, and Other Grammatical Scarecrows.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):63-105.details
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Vagueness and the Philosophy of Perception.Ryan Perkins - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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Propositions, attitudinal objects, and the distinction between actions and products.Friederike Moltmann - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume on Propositions, Edited by G. Rattan and D. Hunter 43 (5-6):679-701.details
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Logical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - unknown - In Filippo Ferrari, Elke Brendel, Massimiliano Carrara, Ole Hjortland, Gil Sagi, Gila Sher & Florian Steinberger (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes?Sean Crawford - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.details
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The Situational Structure of Primate Beliefs.Tony Cheng - 2016 - Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):50-57.details
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Concept Designation.Arvid Båve - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):331-344.details
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A Deflationist Error Theory of Properties.Arvid Båve - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):23-59.details
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Asymmetry cannot solve the circularity/regress problem of property structuralism.Ralf Busse - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10685-10720.details
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Are truth and reference quasi-disquotational?Ray Buchanan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (1):43 - 75.details
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A puzzle about meaning and communication.Ray Buchanan - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):340-371.details
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Hume’s principle: a plea for austerity.Kai Michael Büttner - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3759-3781.details
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Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap?Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):93-118.details
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Analysing attitudes: How cognitive realists meet Felappi’s challenge to propositionalism.Brigham Daniel - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):498-501.details
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Names of Truth Bearers, and “That”‐Clauses: A Dilemma for Millians.Paolo Bonardi - 2017 - Theoria 83 (3):175-184.details
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Counterfactual Attitudes and the Relational Analysis.Kyle Blumberg - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):521-546.details
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Ontological disagreements, reference, and charity: A challenge for Hirsch's deflationism.Delia Belleri - 2022 - Theoria 88 (5):982-996.details
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Vagueness in sparseness: A study in property ontology.Elizabeth Barnes - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):315–321.details
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Ontic Vagueness: A Guide for the Perplexed.Elizabeth Barnes - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):601-627.details
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Husserl, Model Theory, and Formal Essences.Kyle Banick - 2020 - Husserl Studies 37 (2):103-125.details
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Two-dimensionalism and the social character of meaning.Derek Ball - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):567-595.details
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The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism.Nicholas Baima - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):593-605.details
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Paradoxes of Logical Equivalence and Identity.Andrew Bacon - 2013 - Topoi (1):1-10.details
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Something is true.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):687-705.details
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Truth : a concept unlike any other.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Supplement issue 2):S605-S630.details
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The Story About Propositions.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):635-674.details
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Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness.Michael V. Antony - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.details
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Not All Attitudes are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.details
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Getting what you want.Lyndal Grant & Milo Phillips-Brown - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1791-1810.details
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A fictionalist theory of universals.Tim Button & Robert Trueman - 2024 - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.details
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Truth, Paradox, and Ineffable Propositions.James R. Shaw - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):64-104.details
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Logical information and epistemic space.Mark Jago - 2009 - Synthese 167 (2):327 - 341.details
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Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge?David Barnett - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):22 - 45.details
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Meaning and Metaphysical Necessity.Tristan Grotvedt Haze - 2022 - New York: Routledge.details
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Vagueness.Roy Sorensen - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Identity Physicalism vs Ground Physicalism about Consciousness.Adam Pautz - forthcoming - In G. Rabin (ed.), Grounding and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.details
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Concepts, Belief, and Perception.Alex Byrne - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schroder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering.Patrick Greenough - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Objects and Attitudes.Friederike Moltmann - forthcoming - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Pleonastic possible worlds.Alexander Steinberg - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):767-789.details
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Truth via Sentential Quantification.Mark Textor - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (3):539-550.details
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