This paper embeds the core part of Discourse Representation Theory in the classical theory of types plus a few simple axioms that allow the theory to express key facts about variables and assignments on the object level of the logic. It is shown how the embedding can be used to combine core analyses of natural language phenomena in Discourse Representation Theory with analyses that can be obtained in Montague Semantics.

Guarded fragments of first-order logic were recently introduced by Andreka, van Benthem and Nemeti; they consist of relational first-order formulae whose quantifiers are appropriately relativized by atoms. These fragments are interesting because they extend in a natural way many propositional modal logics, because they have useful model-theoretic properties and especially because they are decidable classes that avoid the usual syntactic restrictions (on the arity of relation symbols, the quantifier pattern or the number of variables) of almost all other known decidable (...) fragments of first-order logic. Here, we investigate the computational complexity of these fragments. We prove that the satisfiability problems for the guarded fragment (GF) and the loosely guarded fragment (LGF) of first-order logic are complete for deterministic double exponential time. For the subfragments that have only a bounded number of variables or only relation symbols of bounded arity, satisfiability is EXPTIME-complete. We further establish a tree model property for both the guarded fragment and the loosely guarded fragment, and give a proof of the finite model property of the guarded fragment. It is also shown that some natural, modest extensions of the guarded fragments are undecidable. (shrink)

What precisely are fragments of classical first-order logic showing “modal” behaviour? Perhaps the most influential answer is that of Gabbay 1981, which identifies them with so-called “finite-variable fragments”, using only some fixed finite number of variables (free or bound). This view-point has been endorsed by many authors (cf. van Benthem 1991). We will investigate these fragments, and find that, illuminating and interesting though they are, they lack the required nice behaviour in our sense. (Several new negative results support this claim.) (...) As a counterproposal, then, we define a large fragment of predicate logic characterized by its use of only bounded quantification. This so-called guarded fragment enjoys the above nice properties, including decidability, through an effectively bounded finite model property. (These are new results, obtained by generalizing notions and techniques from modal logic.) Moreover, its own internal finite variable hierarchy turns out to work well. Finally, we shall make another move. The above analogy works both ways. Modal operators are like quantifiers, but quantifiers are also like modal operators. This observation inspires a generalized semantics for first-order predicate logic with accessibility constraints on available assignments (cf. N´emeti 1986, 1992) which moves the earlier quantifier restrictions into the semantics. This provides a fresh look at the landscape of possible predicate logics, including candidates sharing various desirable features with basic modal logic – in particular, its decidability. (shrink)

The perfect fit of syntactic derivability and logical consequence in first-order logic is one of the most celebrated facts of modern logic. In the present flurry of attention given to the semantics of natural language, surprisingly little effort has been focused on the problem of logical inference in natural language and the possibility of its completeness. Even the traditional theory of the syllogism does not give a thorough analysis of the restricted syntax it uses.My objective is to show how a (...) theory of inference may be formulated for a fragment of English that includes a good deal more than the classical syllogism. The syntax and semantics are made as formal and as explicit as is customary for artificial formal languages. The fragment chosen is not maximal but is restricted severely in order to provide a clear overview of the method without the cluttering details that seem to be an inevitable part of any grammar covering a substantial fragment of a natural language. (Some readers may feel the details given here are too onerous.). (shrink)

A system of natural deduction rules is proposed for an idealized form of English. The rules presuppose a sharp distinction between proper names and such expressions as the c, a (an) c, some c, any c, and every c, where c represents a common noun. These latter expressions are called quantifiers, and other expressions of the form that c or that c itself, are called quantified terms. Introduction and elimination rules are presented for any, every, some, a (an), and the, (...) and also for any which, every which, and so on, as well as rules for some other concepts. One outcome of these rules is that Every man loves some woman is implied by, but does not imply, Some woman is loved by every man, since the latter is taken to mean the same as Some woman is loved by all men. Also, Jack knows which woman came is implied by Some woman is known by Jack to have come, but not by Jack knows that some woman came. (shrink)