- The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.details
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"What Is Knowledge?".Linda Zagzebski - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 92-116.details
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The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues.Alvin I. Goldman - 2002 - In Pathways to knowledge: private and public. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 51-72.details
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(2 other versions)The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):12-28.details
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Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-41.details
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Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Intellectual Virtues.Heather Battaly - 2009 - International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):136-139.details
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(1 other version)Considered Judgment.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1996 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.details
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(1 other version)Considered Judgment.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1999 - Princeton University Press.details
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Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5515-5528.details
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True Enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2017 - Cambridge: MIT Press.details
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Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge.Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - 1996 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism.Jeffrey Dunn - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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``The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist".Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 89-112.details
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``Is Understanding Factive?".Catherine Z. Elgin - 2009 - In ``Is Understanding Factive?". Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 322--30.details
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True enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.details
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Recent work on epistemic value.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):85 - 110.details
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Veritism and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and his Critics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 200–218.details
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Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:19-43.details
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Seeing it for oneself: Perceptual knowledge, understanding, and intellectual autonomy.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):29-42.details
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What is the swamping problem?Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Epistemic Axiology.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 407-422.details
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Reliabilism, veritism, and epistemic consequentialism.Alvin I. Goldman - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):131-143.details
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Epistemic Axiology.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 407-422.details
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