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Perceiving Intentions

In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press (2003)

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  1. The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
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  • (1 other version)A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
    Breaking new ground in the debate about the relation of mind and body, David Armstrong's classic text - first published in 1968 - remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In the preface to this new edition, the author reflects on the book's impact and considers it in the light of subsequent developments. He also provides a bibliography of all the key writings to have appeared in the materialist debate.
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  • A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - MIT Press.
    Philosophers from Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein to the recent realists and antirealists have sought to answer the question, What are concepts? This book provides a detailed, systematic, and accessible introduction to an original philosophical theory of concepts that Christopher Peacocke has developed in recent years to explain facts about the nature of thought, including its systematic character, its relations to truth and reference, and its normative dimension. Particular concepts are also treated within the general framework: perceptual concepts, logical concepts, and (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
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  • (2 other versions)Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
    How do rational minds make contact with the world? The empiricist tradition sees a gap between mind and world, and takes sensory experience, fallible as it is, to provide our only bridge across that gap. In its crudest form, for example, the traditional idea is that our minds consult an inner realm of sensory experience, which provides us with evidence about the nature of external reality. Notoriously, however, it turns out to be far from clear that there is any viable (...)
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  • The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
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  • (2 other versions)Mind and World.John McDowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.
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  • Mindblindness. An essay on autism and theory of mind, Cambridge, Mass, MITPTCSS, tradiit. Dautismo e la lettura della mente, Roma.S. Baron-Cohen - forthcoming - Astrolabio.
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  • A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - Studia Logica 54 (1):132-133.
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  • Objects of thought.Arthur Norman Prior - 1971 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press. Edited by P. T. Geach & Anthony Kenny.
    Divided into two parts, the first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The second part examines theories of intentionality and discusses the relationship between different theories of naming and different accounts of belief.
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  • The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Nonconceptual Content of Experience.Tim Crane - 1992 - In The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-57.
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...)
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  • Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age.György Gergely, Zoltán Nádasdy, Gergely Csibra & Szilvia Bíró - 1995 - Cognition 56 (2):165-193.
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  • The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2):378-378.
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  • Schizophrenia, the space of reasons, and thinking as a motor process.John Campbell - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):609-625.
    Ordinarily, if you say something like “I see a comet,” you might make a mistake about whether it is a comet that you see, but you could not be right about whether it is a comet but wrong about who is seeing it. There cannot be an “error of identification” in this case. In making a judgement like, “I see a comet,” there are not two steps, finding out who is seeing the thing and finding out what it is that (...)
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  • How to build a baby: II. Conceptual primitives.Jean M. Mandler - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (4):587-604.
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  • Sensory feedback to the cerebral cortex during voluntary movement in man.P. E. Roland - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (1):129-147.
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  • Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: Abnormalities in the awareness of action.Christopher D. Frith, S. J. Blakemore & D. Wolpert - 2000 - Brain Research Reviews 31 (2):357-363.
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  • Vision and intentional content.Tyler Burge - 1991 - In Ernest Lepore (ed.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 195-214.
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  • Scenarios, concepts, and perception.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  • Objects of Thought.T. R. Baldwin - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (87):174-175.
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  • (1 other version)Awareness of agency: Three levels of analysis.Joelle Proust - 2000 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press. pp. 307--24.
    This paper discusses the content of agency awareness. It contrast three elements in content: what the goal is, how it is to be reached, and who is having the goal/performing the action ? Marc Jeannerod's claim that goal representations are self-other neutral is discussed. If goal representations are essentially sharable, then we do not understand other people by projecting a piece of internal knowledge on to them, as often assumed. The problem which our brain has to solve is the converse (...)
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  • D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind[REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (22):812-818.
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  • Can Nonhuman Primates Read Minds?Joëlle Proust - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 27 (1):203-232.
    Granted that a given species is able to entertain beliefs and desires, i.e. to have (epistemic and motivational) internal states with semantically evaluable contents, one can raise the question of whether the species under investigation is, in addition, able to represent properties and events that are not only perceptual or physical, but mental, and use the latter to guide their actions, not only as reliable cues for achieving some output, but as mental cues (that is: whether it can 'read minds'). (...)
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  • (1 other version)Objects of Thought. [REVIEW]Pierre Dubois - 1971 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 165 (1):85-86.
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