- Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference.Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.details
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Immunity to error through misidentification: some trends.Annalisa Coliva & Michele Palmira - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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In Defense of Introspective Affordances.David Miguel Gray - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.details
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Thinking in schizophrenia and the social phenomenology of thought insertion.Pablo López-Silva - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments.Víctor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Between scientific and empathetic understanding: The case of auditory verbal hallucination.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.details
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Thought insertion without thought.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.details
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De se names.Maite Ezcurdia & Carla Merino-Rajme - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):726-750.details
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Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.details
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Understanding Delusions: Evidence, Reason, and Experience.Chenwei Nie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Warwickdetails
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Questions of Reference and the Reflexivity of First-Person Thought.Michele Palmira - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):628-640.details
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¿Hemos respondido la pregunta "¿Puede pensar una máquina?"?Gonzalez Rodrigo - 2019 - In Discusiones Fundamentales en Filosofía de la Mente: Voces Locales. Valparaíso: Universidad de Valparaíso. pp. 71-95.details
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Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
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Madness, virtue, and ecology: A classical Indian approach to psychiatric disturbance.Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad - 2022 - History of the Human Sciences 35 (1):3-31.details
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Atribuciones de agencia mental Y el desafío desde la psicopatología.Pablo López-Silva - 2020 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 61 (147):835-850.details
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Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution.Miguel Angel Sebastian - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-27.details
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Me and I are not friends, just Acquaintances: On thought Insertion and Self-Awareness.Pablo López-Silva - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):319-335.details
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Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
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The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error.Joel Smith - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (49):141-167.details
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Bodily Ownership, Psychological Ownership, and Psychopathology.José Luis Bermúdez - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):263-280.details
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Which-Object Misidentification.Max Seeger - 2014 - Abstracta 8 (1):75-82.details
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The paradoxical self: Awareness, solipsism and first-rank symptoms in schizophrenia.Clara S. Humpston - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):210-231.details
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Remembering as a mental action.Santiago Arango-Munoz & Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 75-96.details
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Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Epistemological Problem of Other Minds and the Knowledge Asymmetry.Michael Sollberger - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1476-1495.details
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Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control.Shaun Gallagher - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):865-879.details
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Failing to Self-Ascribe Thought and Motion: Towards a Three-Factor Account of Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia.David Miguel Gray - 2014 - Schizophrenia Research 152 (1):28-32.details
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Identity, control and responsibility: The case of Dissociative Identity Disorder.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):509-526.details
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For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 36-53.details
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What are cognitive processes? An example-based approach.Albert Newen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4251-4268.details
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Inner Speech, Imagined Speech, and Auditory Verbal Hallucinations.Daniel Gregory - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):653-673.details
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On Thought Insertion.Rachel Gunn - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):559-575.details
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Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness.Johannes Roessler - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):541-557.details
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Agentive awareness is not sensory awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.details
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Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54.details
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Thinking in the Cloud: The Cognitive Incorporation of Cloud-Based Technology.Robert Clowes - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (2):261-296.details
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Sources of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Simon Prosser - 2012 - In Simon Prosser Francois Recanati (ed.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 158-179.details
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First-Person Perspective and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 245-272.details
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Introspective misidentification.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1737-1758.details
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Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.Shaun Gallagher & Francisco J. Varela - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement):93-132.details
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The comparator account on thought insertion, alien voices and inner speech: some open questions.Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.details
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Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences.Jakob Hohwy & Vivek Rajan - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):5-11.details
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Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion.Alexandre Billon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.details
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Can “I” prevent you from entering my mind?Marc Champagne - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):145-162.details
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Schizophrenia and the Epistemology of Self-Knowledge.Hanna Pickard - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (1):55 - 74.details
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A neural plasticity perspective on the schizophrenic condition.Yossi Guterman - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):400-420.details
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A model of the synchronic self.Glenn Carruthers - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):533-550.details
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Wegner on hallucinations, inconsistency, and the illusion of free will. Some critical remarks.Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):359-372.details
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Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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