- For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 36-53.details
|
|
Me and I are not friends, just Acquaintances: On thought Insertion and Self-Awareness.Pablo Lopez-Silva - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):319-335.details
|
|
Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54.details
|
|
Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion.Alexandre Billon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.details
|
|
Thinking in schizophrenia and the social phenomenology of thought insertion.Pablo López-Silva - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
|
|
Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution.Miguel Angel Sebastian - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-27.details
|
|
Understanding Delusions: Evidence, Reason, and Experience.Chenwei Nie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Warwickdetails
|
|
Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.details
|
|
Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.details
|
|
First-Person Perspective and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 245-272.details
|
|
Kant and the phenomenon of inserted thoughts.Garry Young - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.details
|
|
A neural plasticity perspective on the schizophrenic condition.Yossi Guterman - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):400-420.details
|
|
The pre-reflective experience of “I” as a continuously existing being: The role of temporal functional binding.Peter A. White - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 31:98-114.details
|
|
Grounding Action Representations.Arne M. Weber & Gottfried Vosgerau - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):53-69.details
|
|
Personal Identity, Agency and the Multiplicity Thesis.Dave Ward - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (4):497-515.details
|
|
Thoughts, motor actions, and the self.Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):22–43.details
|
|
Authorship and Control over Thoughts.Gottfried Vosgerau & Martin Voss - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):534-565.details
|
|
The comparator account on thought insertion, alien voices and inner speech: some open questions.Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.details
|
|
On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments.Víctor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
|
|
crítica desde la fenomenología al análisis de la inserción de pensamiento de John Campbell.Federico Andrés Tovar Avendaño - 2022 - Humanitas Hodie 4 (1):H41a5.details
|
|
Beyond the comparator model: A multi-factorial two-step account of agency.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.details
|
|
What can self-disorders in schizophrenia tell us about the nature of subjectivity? A psychopathological investigation.Helene Stephensen & Josef Parnas - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):629-642.details
|
|
The Epistemological Problem of Other Minds and the Knowledge Asymmetry.Michael Sollberger - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1476-1495.details
|
|
Making Sense of an Endorsement Model of Thought‐Insertion.Michael Sollberger - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):590-612.details
|
|
The Role of Emotions in Delusion Formation.Adrianna Smurzyńska - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 48 (1):253-263.details
|
|
Which immunity to error?Joel Smith - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):273-83.details
|
|
The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error.Joel Smith - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (49):141-167.details
|
|
Authorship of thoughts in thought insertion: What is it for a thought to be one's own?Max Seeger - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):837-855.details
|
|
A Modified Self-Knowledge Model of Thought Insertion.Sruthi Rothenfluch - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):157-181.details
|
|
Consciousness, the self and bodily location.David M. Rosenthal - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):270-276.details
|
|
Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness.Johannes Roessler - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):541-557.details
|
|
How anxiety induces verbal hallucinations.Matthew Ratcliffe & Sam Wilkinson - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 39:48-58.details
|
|
Madness, virtue, and ecology: A classical Indian approach to psychiatric disturbance.Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad - 2022 - History of the Human Sciences 35 (1):3-31.details
|
|
Thinking of oneself as the same.Joëlle Proust - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):495-509.details
|
|
A critical review of G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham's when self-consciousness breaks. [REVIEW]Joëlle Proust - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):543 – 550.details
|
|
Affordances from a control viewpoint.Joëlle Proust - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
|
|
Grounding Procedural and Declarative Knowledge in Sensorimotor Anticipation.Giovanni Pezzulo - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (1):78-114.details
|
|
Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
|
|
Thought insertion without thought.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.details
|
|
Between scientific and empathetic understanding: The case of auditory verbal hallucination.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
|
|
Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion.Matthew Parrott - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (1):39-64.details
|
|
Questions of Reference and the Reflexivity of First-Person Thought.Michele Palmira - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):628-640.details
|
|
Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
|
|
Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control?Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Tim Bayne - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.details
|
|
Self-knowledge, agency and inner voices.L. O'Brien - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):93-108.details
|
|
‘Obsessive Thoughts and Inner Voices’.Lucy O'Brien - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):93-108.details
|
|
What are cognitive processes? An example-based approach.Albert Newen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4251-4268.details
|
|
Agentive awareness is not sensory awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.details
|
|
Thinking about the body as subject.Daniel Morgan - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):435-457.details
|
|