- Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54.details
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Perceiving Intentions.Joelle Proust - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Making Sense of an Endorsement Model of Thought‐Insertion.Michael Sollberger - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):590-612.details
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Don't Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis.Roland Bluhm - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 7-15.details
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Introspective misidentification.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1737-1758.details
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The comparator account on thought insertion, alien voices and inner speech: some open questions.Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.details
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Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences.Jakob Hohwy & Vivek Rajan - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):5-11.details
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Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion.Alexandre Billon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.details
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Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.details
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Thinking of oneself as the same.Joëlle Proust - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):495-509.details
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Psychological immunity, bodily ownership, and vice versa.Carlota Serrahima - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Against the Pathology Argument for Self-Acquaintance.Adam Bradley - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (3):641-657.details
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(1 other version)Immunity to error through misidentification: some trends.Annalisa Coliva & Michele Palmira - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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In Defense of Introspective Affordances.David Miguel Gray - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.details
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Current Themes in the Philosophy of Psychiatry.Federico Burdman - 2024 - Critica 56 (167):5-16.details
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On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments.Víctor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Affordances from a control viewpoint.Joëlle Proust - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (7):1590-1614.details
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Between scientific and empathetic understanding: The case of auditory verbal hallucination.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Thought insertion without thought.Shivam Patel - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (3):955-973.details
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De se names.Maite Ezcurdia & Carla Merino-Rajme - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):726-750.details
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Accounting for Doxastic Agency: Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-24.details
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(1 other version)Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.details
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Understanding Delusions: Evidence, Reason, and Experience.Chenwei Nie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Warwickdetails
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Questions of Reference and the Reflexivity of First-Person Thought.Michele Palmira - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):628-640.details
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Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
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Guarantee and Reflexivity.Santiago Echeverri - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (9):473-500.details
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Me and I are not friends, just Acquaintances: On thought Insertion and Self-Awareness.Pablo López-Silva - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):319-335.details
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Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
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The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error.Joel Smith - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (49):141-167.details
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Bodily Ownership, Psychological Ownership, and Psychopathology.José Luis Bermúdez - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):263-280.details
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Thinking about the body as subject.Daniel Morgan - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):435-457.details
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Remembering as a mental action.Santiago Arango-Munoz & Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 75-96.details
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What can self-disorders in schizophrenia tell us about the nature of subjectivity? A psychopathological investigation.Helene Stephensen & Josef Parnas - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):629-642.details
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Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Combining Minds: A Defence of the Possibility of Experiential Combination.Luke Roelofs - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
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(2 other versions)Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.Shaun Gallagher & Francisco J. Varela - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):93-132.details
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Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control.Shaun Gallagher - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):865-879.details
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Failing to Self-Ascribe Thought and Motion: Towards a Three-Factor Account of Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia.David Miguel Gray - 2014 - Schizophrenia Research 152 (1):28-32.details
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How anxiety induces verbal hallucinations.Matthew Ratcliffe & Sam Wilkinson - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 39:48-58.details
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For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - In Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou & Walter Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 36-53.details
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Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion.Matthew Parrott - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (1):39-64.details
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The pre-reflective experience of “I” as a continuously existing being: The role of temporal functional binding.Peter A. White - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 31:98-114.details
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What are cognitive processes? An example-based approach.Albert Newen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4251-4268.details
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On Thought Insertion.Rachel Gunn - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):559-575.details
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Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness.Johannes Roessler - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):541-557.details
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Agentive awareness is not sensory awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.details
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Sources of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Simon Prosser - 2012 - In Simon Prosser Francois Recanati (ed.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 158-179.details
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(1 other version)Self-knowledge, agency and inner voices.L. O'Brien - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):93-108.details
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Personal Identity, Agency and the Multiplicity Thesis.Dave Ward - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (4):497-515.details
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Can “I” prevent you from entering my mind?Marc Champagne - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):145-162.details
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