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  1. Well-being and death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Well-Being and Death addresses philosophical questions about death and the good life: what makes a life go well? Is death bad for the one who dies? How is this possible if we go out of existence when we die? Is it worse to die as an infant or as a young adult? Is it bad for animals and fetuses to die? Can the dead be harmed? Is there any way to make death less bad for us? Ben Bradley defends the (...)
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  • Dispositional properties and counterfactual conditionals.Sungho Choi - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):795-841.
    For the last several decades, dispositional properties have been one of the main topics in metaphysics. Still, however, there is little agreement among contemporary metaphysicians on the nature of dispositional properties. Apparently, though, the majority of them have reached the consensus that dispositional ascriptions cannot be analysed in terms of simple counterfactual conditionals. In this paper it will be brought to light that this consensus is wrong. Specifically, I will argue that the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, which is generally (...)
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  • The metaphysics of harm.Matthew Hanser - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):421-450.
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  • Mortal harm.Steven Luper - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):239–251.
    The harm thesis says that death may harm the individual who dies. The posthumous harm thesis says that posthumous events may harm those who die. Epicurus rejects both theses, claiming that there is no subject who is harmed, no clear harm which is received, and no clear time when any harm is received. Feldman rescues the harm thesis with solutions to Epicurus' three puzzles based on his own version of the deprivation account of harm. But many critics, among them Lamont, (...)
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  • When is death bad for the one who dies?Ben Bradley - 2004 - Noûs 38 (1):1–28.
    Epicurus seems to have thought that death is not bad for the one who dies, since its badness cannot be located in time. I show that Epicurus’ argument presupposes Presentism, and I argue that death is bad for its victim at all and only those times when the person would have been living a life worth living had she not died when she did. I argue that my account is superior to competing accounts given by Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman and (...)
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  • Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.
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  • The semantics and ontology of dispositions.D. H. Mellor - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):757--780.
    The paper looks at the semantics and ontology of dispositions in the light of recent work on the subject. Objections to the simple conditionals apparently entailed by disposition statements are met by replacing them with so-called 'reduction sentences' and some implications of this are explored. The usual distinction between categorical and dispositional properties is criticised and the relation between dispositions and their bases examined. Applying this discussion to two typical cases leads to the conclusion that fragility is not a real (...)
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  • Finkish dispositions.David Kellogg Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
    Many years ago, C.B. Martin drew our attention to the possibility of ‘finkish’ dispositions: dispositions which, if put to the test would not be manifested, but rather would disappear. Thus if x if finkishly disposed to give response r to stimulus s, it is not so that if x were subjected to stimulus r, x would give response z; so finkish dispositions afford a counter‐example to the simplest conditional analysis of dispositions. Martin went on to suggest that finkish dispositions required (...)
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  • Can we harm and benefit in creating?Elizabeth Harman - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):89–113.
    The non-identity problem concerns actions that affect who exists in the future. If such an action is performed, certain people will exist in the future who would not otherwise have existed: they are not identical to any of the people who would have existed if the action had not been performed. Some of these actions seem to be wrong, and they seem to be wrong in virtue of harming the very future individuals whose existence is dependent on their having been (...)
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  • The Benefits of Coming into Existence.Krister Bykvist - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):335-362.
    This paper argues that we can benefit or harm people by creating them, but only in the sense that we can create things that are good or bad for them. What we cannot do is to confer comparative benefits and harms to people by creating them or failing to create them. You are not better off (or worse off) created than you would have been had you not been created, for nothing has value for you if you do not exist, (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death.Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Death has long been a pre-occupation of philosophers, and this is especially so today. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death collects 21 newly commissioned essays that cover current philosophical thinking of death-related topics across the entire range of the discipline. These include metaphysical topics--such as the nature of death, the possibility of an afterlife, the nature of persons, and how our thinking about time affects what we think about death--as well as axiological topics, such as whether death is bad (...)
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  • Whole-Life Welfarism.Ben Bramble - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):63-74.
    In this paper, I set out and defend a new theory of value, whole-life welfarism. According to this theory, something is good only if it makes somebody better off in some way in his life considered as a whole. By focusing on lifetime, rather than momentary, well-being, a welfarist can solve two of the most vexing puzzles in value theory, The Badness of Death and The Problem of Additive Aggregation.
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  • Doing Away with Harm.Ben Bradley - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):390-412.
    I argue that extant accounts of harm all fail to account for important desiderata, and that we should therefore jettison the concept when doing moral philosophy.
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  • Death and Well-Being.John Bigelow, John Campbell & Robert Pargetter - 1990 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):119-40.
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  • The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life.Jeff McMahan - 2002 - New York, US: OUP Usa.
    A comprehensive study of the ethics of killing in cases in which the metaphysical or moral status of the individual killed is uncertain or controversial. Among those beings whose status is questionable or marginal in this way are human embryos and fetuses, newborn infants, animals, anencephalic infants, human beings with severe congenital and cognitive impairments, and human beings who have become severely demented or irreversibly comatose. In an effort to understand the moral status of these beings, this book develops and (...)
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  • A solution to the puzzle of when death Harms its victims.Julian Lamont - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):198 – 212.
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  • On the value of coming into existence.Nils Holtug - 2001 - The Journal of Ethics 5 (4):361-384.
    In this paper I argue that coming into existence can benefit (or harm) aperson. My argument incorporates the comparative claim that existence canbe better (or worse) for a person than never existing. Since these claimsare highly controversial, I consider and reject a number of objectionswhich threaten them. These objections raise various semantic, logical,metaphysical and value-theoretical issues. I then suggest that there is animportant sense in which it can harm (or benefit) a person not to comeinto existence. Again, I consider and (...)
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  • (1 other version)Some puzzles about the evil of death.Fred Feldman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):205-227.
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  • How to solve the non-identity problem.David Boonin - 2008 - Public Affairs Quarterly 22 (2):129-159.
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  • Less good but not bad: In defense of epicureanism about death.Aaron Smuts - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):197-227.
    In this article I defend innocuousism– a weak form of Epicureanism about the putative badness of death. I argue that if we assume both mental statism about wellbeing and that death is an experiential blank, it follows that death is not bad for the one who dies. I defend innocuousism against the deprivation account of the badness of death. I argue that something is extrinsically bad if and only if it leads to states that are intrinsically bad. On my view, (...)
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  • Dispositions and habituals.Michael Fara - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):43–82.
    Objects have dispositions. As Nelson Goodman put it, “a thing is full of threats and promises”. But sometimes those threats go unfulfilled, and the promises unkept. Sometimes the dispositions of objects fail to manifest themselves, even when their conditions of manifestation obtain. Pieces of wood, disposed to burn when heated, do not burn when heated in a vacuum chamber. And pastries, disposed to go bad when left lying around too long, won’t do so if coated with lacquer and put on (...)
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  • The wrongness of killing and the badness of death.Matthew Hanser - 2013 - In Fred Feldman Ben Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. Oxford University Press. pp. 391.
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  • (1 other version)Basic intrinsic value.F. Feldman - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 379--400.
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  • A Defense of the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm.Justin Klocksiem - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):285 – 300.
    Although the counterfactual comparative account of harm, according to which someone is harmed when things go worse for her than they otherwise would have, is intuitively plausible, it has recently come under attack. There are five serious objections in the literature: some philosophers argue that the counterfactual account makes it hard to see how we could harm someone in the course of benefitting that person; others argue that Parfit’s non-identity problem is particularly problematic; another objection claims that the account forces (...)
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  • (1 other version)Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm.Seana Shiffrin - 1999 - Legal Theory 5 (2):117-148.
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  • Still More on the Metaphysics of Harm.Matthew Hanser - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):459-469.
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  • On linking dispositions and conditionals.David Manley & Ryan Wasserman - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):59-84.
    Analyses of dispositional ascriptions in terms of conditional statements famously confront the problems of finks and masks. We argue that conditional analyses of dispositions, even those tailored to avoid finks and masks, face five further problems. These are the problems of: (i) Achilles' heels, (ii) accidental closeness, (iii) comparatives, (iv) explaining context sensitivity, and (v) absent stimulus conditions. We conclude by offering a proposal that avoids all seven of these problems.
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  • In defence of the conditional account of dispositions.Lars Gundersen - 2002 - Synthese 130 (3):389-411.
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  • The evil of death revisited.Harry S. Silverstein - 2000 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):116–134.
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  • The intractability of the nonidentity problem.David Heyd - 2009 - In David Wasserman & Melinda Roberts (eds.), Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem. Springer. pp. 3--25.
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  • More On The Metaphysics of Harm.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):436-458.
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  • The termination thesis.Fred Feldman - 2000 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):98–115.
    The Termination Thesis (or “TT”) is the view that people go out of existence when they die. Lots of philosophers seem to believe it. Epicurus, for example, apparently makes use of TT in his efforts to show that it is irrational to fear death. He says, “as long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist.”1 Lucretius says pretty much the same thing, but in many more words and more poetically: “Death (...)
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  • (1 other version)Basic intrinsic value.Fred Feldman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (3):319-346.
    Hedonism: the view that (i) pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically good, and (ii) pain is the only thing that is intrinsically bad; furthermore, the view that (iii) a complex thing such as a life, a possible world, or a total consequence of an action is intrinsically good iff it contains more pleasure than pain.
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  • The Simple Vs. Reformed Conditional Analysis of Dispositions.Sungho Choi - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):369-379.
    Lewis claims that Martin’s cases indeed refute the simple conditional analysis of dispositions and proposes the reformed conditional analysis that is purported to overcome them. In this paper I will first argue that Lewis’s defense of the reformed analysis can be understood to invoke the concepts of disposition-specific stimulus and manifestation. I will go on to argue that advocates of the simple analysis, just like Lewis, can also defend their analysis from alleged counterexamples including Martin’s cases by invoking the concepts (...)
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  • Harm to Others. [REVIEW]Martin P. Golding - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):295-298.
    This first volume in the four-volume series The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law focuses on the "harm principle," the commonsense view that prevention of harm to persons other than the perpetrator is a legitimate purpose of criminal legislation. Feinberg presents a detailed analysis of the concept and definition of harm and applies it to a host of practical and theoretical issues, showing how the harm principle must be interpreted if it is to be a plausible guide to the lawmaker.
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  • The Time of Death’s Misfortune.Neil Feit - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):359–383.
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  • Critical Notice. Eric Olson, the human animal (new York: Oxford university press, l997).Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Noûs 33 (3):496–504.
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  • A More Palatable Epicureanism.David B. Hershenov - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):171 - 180.
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