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  1. Well-being: its meaning, measurement, and moral importance.James Griffin - 1986 - Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press.
    "Well-being," "welfare," "utility," and "quality of life," all closely related concepts, are at the center of morality, politics, law, and economics. Griffin's book, while primarily a volume of moral philosophy, is relevant to all of these subjects. Griffin offers answers to three central questions about well-being: what is the best way to understand it, can it be measured, and where should it fit in moral and political thought. With its breadth of investigation and depth of insight, this work holds significance (...)
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  • The possibility of parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
    This paper argues for the existence of a fourth positive generic value relation that can hold between two items beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’: namely ‘on a par’.
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  • VII*—Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86 (1):117-134.
    Joseph Raz; VII*—Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 117–134, https://.
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  • Incommensurable values.John Broome - 2000 - In Roger Crisp & Brad Hooker (eds.), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. New York: Clarendon Press. pp. 21--38.
    Two options are incommensurate in value if neither is better than the other, and if a small improvement or worsening of one does not necessarily make it determinately better or worse than the other. If a person faces a sequence of choices between incommensurate options, she may end up with a worse options than she could have had, even though none of her choices are irrational. Yet it seems that rationality should save her from this bad outcome. This is the (...)
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  • Is Incommensurability Vagueness?John Broome - 1997 - In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.
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  • Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy.Cristian Constantinescu - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):57-70.
    Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations ( better than , worse than , and equally good ): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V , (ii) it is false that x (...)
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  • (2 other versions)On modelling vagueness—and on not modelling incommensurability.Robert Sugden - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):95-113.
    This paper defines and analyses the concept of a 'ranking problem'. In a ranking problem, a set of objects, each of which possesses some common property P to some degree, are ranked by P-ness. I argue that every eligible answer to a ranking problem can be expressed as a complete and transitive 'is at least as P as' relation. Vagueness is expressed as a multiplicity of eligible rankings. Incommensurability, properly understood, is the absence of a common property P. Trying to (...)
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  • Incommensurability and vagueness.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.
    This paper casts doubts on John Broome's view that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability in value. It shows how vagueness can be imposed on a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the ‘fitting attitudes’ analysis of value.
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  • (2 other versions)II—Robert Sugden: On Modelling Vagueness—and on not Modelling Incommensurability.Robert Sugden - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):95-113.
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  • (1 other version)John Broome, Weighing Lives. [REVIEW]Jacob Ross - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):663-666.
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  • Weighing Lives.Daniel M. Hausman - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):718-722.
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  • (4 other versions)Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance.James Griffin & Richard Warner - 1989 - Ethics 99 (3):625-636.
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  • (2 other versions)II—O n M odelling V agueness—and on not M odelling I ncommensurability.Robert Sugden - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):95-113.
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