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  1. Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment.Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman (eds.) - 2002 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Is our case strong enough to go to trial? Will interest rates go up? Can I trust this person? Such questions - and the judgments required to answer them - are woven into the fabric of everyday experience. This book, first published in 2002, examines how people make such judgments. The study of human judgment was transformed in the 1970s, when Kahneman and Tversky introduced their 'heuristics and biases' approach and challenged the dominance of strictly rational models. Their work highlighted (...)
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  • The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of the Economics Profession.Colander David - 2009 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 21 (2):249-267.
    Economists not only failed to anticipate the financial crisis; they may have contributed to it—with risk and derivatives models that, through spurious precision and untested theoretical assumptions, encouraged policy makers and market participants to see more stability and risk sharing than was actually present. Moreover, once the crisis occurred, it was met with incomprehension by most economists because of models that, on the one hand, downplay the possibility that economic actors may exhibit highly interactive behavior; and, on the other, assume (...)
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  • Causes of the Financial Crisis‗.Jeffrey Friedman - forthcoming - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society.
    The financial crisis was caused by the complex, constantly growing web of regulations designed to constrain and redirect modern capitalism. This complexity made investors, bankers, and perhaps regulators themselves ignorant of regulations previously promulgated across decades and in different “fields” of regulation. These regulations interacted with each other to foster the issuance and securitization of subprime mortgages; their rating as AA or AAA; and their concentration on the balance sheets (and off the balance sheets) of many commercial and investment banks. (...)
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  • Have the experts been weighed, measured, and found wanting?Bryan Caplan - 2007 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 19 (1):81-91.
    ABSTRACT Tetlock's Expert Political Judgment is a creative, careful, and mostly convincing study of the predictive accuracy of political experts. My only major complaints are that Tetlock (1) understates the predictive accuracy of experts, and (2) does too little to discourage demagogues from misinterpreting his work as a vindication of the wisdom of the average citizen. Experts have much to learn from Tetlock's epistemological audit, but there is still ample evidence that, compared to laymen, experts are very good.
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  • The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of the Economics Profession.David Colander, Michael Goldberg, Armin Haas, Katarina Juselius, Alan Kirman, Thomas Lux & Brigitte Sloth - 2009 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 21 (2-3):249-267.
    ABSTRACT Economists not only failed to anticipate the financial crisis; they may have contributed to it—with risk and derivatives models that, through spurious precision and untested theoretical assumptions, encouraged policy makers and market participants to see more stability and risk sharing than was actually present. Moreover, once the crisis occurred, it was met with incomprehension by most economists because of models that, on the one hand, downplay the possibility that economic actors may exhibit highly interactive behavior; and, on the other, (...)
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  • The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments.Maya Bar-Hillel - 1980 - Acta Psychologica 44 (3):211-233.
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