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  1. (1 other version)Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Ignorance of ignorance.Kit Fine - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4031-4045.
    I discuss the question of when knowledge of higher order ignorance is possible and show in particular that, under quite plausible assumptions, knowledge of second order ignorance is impossible.
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  • (5 other versions)Minds, Machines and Gödel.John R. Lucas - 1961 - Philosophy 36 (137):112-127.
    Gödei's Theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met. This I attempt to do.
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  • Ignorance and Incompetence.Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - In Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Igorance. Cambridge University Press.
    On an initially plausible view of ignorance, ignorance is equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge-that. I argue that this view is incorrect, as lack of sufficient justification for one's true belief or lack of belief doesn't necessarily amount to ignorance. My argument rests on linguistic considerations of common uses of 'ignorant' and its cognates. The phrase 'is ignorant of', I argue, functions differently grammatically and semantically from the phrase 'does not know', when the latter is used propositionally. 'Is (...)
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  • (5 other versions)Minds, Machines and Gödel.J. R. Lucas - 1961 - Etica E Politica 5 (1):1.
    In this article, Lucas maintains the falseness of Mechanism - the attempt to explain minds as machines - by means of Incompleteness Theorem of Gödel. Gödel’s theorem shows that in any system consistent and adequate for simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot be proved in the system but that human minds can recognize as true; Lucas points out in his turn that Gödel’s theorem applies to machines because a machine is the concrete instantiation of a formal system: therefore, for (...)
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  • Epistemic Logic: A Survey of the Logic of Knowledge.Nicholas Rescher - 2005 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Epistemic logic is the branch of philosophical thought that seeks to formalize the discourse about knowledge. Its object is to articulate and clarify the general principles of reasoning about claims to and attributions of knowledge. This comprehensive survey of the topic offers the first systematic account of the subject as it has developed in the journal literature over recent decades. Rescher gives an overview of the discipline by setting out the general principles for reasoning about such matters as propositional knowledge (...)
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  • Unknowability: An Inquiry Into the Limits of Knowledge.Nicholas Rescher - 2009 - Lexington Books.
    This philosophically rich volume examines the limits of human knowledge and considers their implications.
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  • The New View on Ignorance Undefeated.Rik Peels - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):741-750.
    In this paper, I provide a defence of the New View, on which ignorance is lack of true belief rather than lack of knowledge. Pierre Le Morvan has argued that the New View is untenable, partly because it fails to take into account the distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. I argue that propositional ignorance is just a subspecies of factive ignorance and that all the work that needs to be done can be done by using the concept of factive (...)
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  • Closure on knowability.Mark Jago - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):648-659.
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  • .Joe Salerno - 2008 - In New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
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  • What is ignorance?Rik Peels - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):57-67.
    This article offers an analysis of ignorance. After a couple of preliminary remarks, I endeavor to show that, contrary to what one might expect and to what nearly all philosophers assume, being ignorant is not equivalent to failing to know, at least not on one of the stronger senses of knowledge. Subsequently, I offer two definitions of ignorance and argue that one’s definition of ignorance crucially depends on one’s account of belief. Finally, I illustrate the relevance of my analysis by (...)
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  • (1 other version)On the paradox of knowability.Timothy Williamson - 1987 - Mind 96 (382):256-261.
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  • Knowledge and necessity.W. D. Hart & Colin McGinn - 1976 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (2):205 - 208.
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  • (1 other version)A logical analysis of some value concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
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  • (1 other version)Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
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  • (1 other version)The emperor’s new mind.Roger Penrose - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
    Winner of the Wolf Prize for his contribution to our understanding of the universe, Penrose takes on the question of whether artificial intelligence will ever ...
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  • Williamson’s Woes.Neil Tennant - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):9-23.
    This is a reply to Timothy Williamson ’s paper ‘Tennant’s Troubles’. It defends against Williamson ’s objections the anti-realist’s knowability principle based on the author’s ‘local’ restriction strategy involving Cartesian propositions, set out in The Taming of the True. Williamson ’s purported Fitchian reductio, involving the unknown number of books on his table, is analyzed in detail and shown to be fallacious. Williamson ’s attempt to cause problems for the anti-realist by means of a supposed rigid designator generates a contradiction (...)
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  • Two deflationary approaches to fitch-style reasoning.Christoph9 Kelp & Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 324--338.
    This paper considers two deflationary responses to the Fitch argument on behalf of the semantic anti-realistthat is, two responses which aim to evade the conclusion of that argument by, on a principled basis, weakening one of the principles essentially employed. The first deflationary approach that is consideredwhich proceeds by weakening the factivity principle for knowledgeis shown to be ultimately unpromising, but a second approachwhich proceeds by weakening the knowability principle that is at the heart of semantic anti-realismis shown to have (...)
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  • (1 other version)The paradox of knowability.Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Mind 94 (376):557-568.
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  • Possible knowledge of unknown truth.Dorothy Edgington - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):41 - 52.
    Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p , there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual (...)
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  • Clues to the paradoxes of knowability: reply to Dummett and Tennant.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):143-150.
    Tr(A) iff ‡K(A) To remedy the error, Dummett’s proposes the following inductive characterization of truth: (i) Tr(A) iff ‡K(A), if A is a basic statement; (ii) Tr(A and B) iff Tr(A) & Tr(B); (iii) Tr(A or B) iff Tr(A) v Tr(B); (iv) Tr(if A, then B) iff (Tr(A) Æ Tr(B)); (v) Tr(it is not the case that A) iff ¬Tr(A), where the logical constant on the right-hand side of each biconditional clause is understood as subject to the laws of intuitionistic (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
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  • The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, andthe Laws of Physics.Roger Penrose - 1989 - Science and Society 54 (4):484-487.
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  • Knowability Noir: 1945-1963.Joe Salerno - 2008 - In New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
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  • Ignorance: (On the Wider Implications of Deficient Knowledge).Nicholas Rescher - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Historically, there has been great deliberation about the limits of human knowledge. Isaac Newton, recognizing his own shortcomings, once described himself as “a boy standing on the seashore... whilst the great ocean of truth lay all underscored before me.” In _Ignorance,_ Nicholas Rescher presents a broad-ranging study that examines the manifestations, consequences, and occasional benefits of ignorance in areas of philosophy, scientific endeavor, and ordinary life. Citing philosophers, theologians, and scientists from Socrates to Steven Hawking, Rescher seeks to uncover the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Epistemic Logic.Nicholas Rescher - 2006 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (3):644-646.
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  • Knowability and a modal closure principle.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):261-270.
    Does a factive conception of knowability figure in ordinary use? There is some reason to think so. ‘Knowable’ and related terms such as ‘discoverable’, ‘observable’, and ‘verifiable’ all seem to operate factively in ordinary discourse. Consider the following example, a dialog between colleagues A and B: A: We could be discovered. B: Discovered doing what? A: Someone might discover that we're having an affair. B: But we are not having an affair! A: I didn’t say that we were. A’s remarks (...)
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