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Hume on sympathy and agreeable qualities

British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (6):1136-1156 (2016)

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Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy.Nicholas Capaldi - 1989 - Peter Lang.details Eighteenth century British moral philosophy focused on three issues: moral apprehension; moral motivation; and the relationship of moral apprehension to moral motivation. Hume resolved these issues by a Copernican revolution in which the basic perspective is that of an engaged and socially responsible agent as opposed to the classic philosophical perspective of the disengaged theoretician. As a consequence he could distinguish clearly the cognitive from the affective elements in moral apprehension, identify the non-moral origins of moral motivation, and account for (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 10 citations
.Christia Mercer (ed.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press.details Download Export citation Bookmark 21 citations
The Common Point of View in Hume’s Ethics.Rachel Cohon - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):827-850.details Hume's moral philosophy makes sentiment essential to moral judgment. But there is more individual consistency and interpersonal agreement in moral judgment than in private emotional reactions. Hume accounts for this by saying that our moral judgments do not manifest our approval or disapproval of character traits and persons "only as they appear from [our] peculiar point of view..." Rather, "we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 17 citations
Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume's Moral Psychology.Rico Vitz - 2004 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (3):261-275.details In this paper, I argue that Hume’s account of sympathy is substantially unchanged from the Treatise to the second Enquiry. I show that Hume uses the term ‘sympathy’ to refer to three different mental phenomena (a psychological mechanism or principle, a sentiment, and a conversion process) and that he consistently refers to sympathy as a cause of benevolent motivation. I attempt to resolve an apparent difficulty regarding sympathy and humanity by explaining how each is an ‘original principle’ in Hume’s sense. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 12 citations
Hume's Artificial and Natural Virtues.Rachel Cohon - 2006 - In Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 256–275.details This chapter contains section titled: The Moral Sentiments Sympathy The Distinction between Natural and Artificial Virtues Honesty with Respect to Property Fidelity to Promises The Natural Virtues and Sympathy The Common Point of View Specific Natural Virtues Conclusion: Sympathy and Justification References Further reading. Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Sympathy and the project of Hume's second enquiry.Kate Abramson - 2001 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (1):45-80.details More than two hundred years after its publication, David Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is still widely regarded as either a footnote to the more philosophically interesting third book of the Treatise, or an abbreviated, more stylish, version of that earlier work. These standard interpretations are rather difficult to square with Hume's own assessment of the second Enquiry. Are we to think that Hume called the EPM “incomparably the best” of all his writings only because he preferred that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 16 citations

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