As a leading member of the Vienna Circle, Rudolph Carnap's aim was to bring about a "unified science" by applying a method of logical analysis to the empirical data of all the sciences. This work, first published in English in 1934, endeavors to work out a way in which the observation statements required for verification are not private to the observer. The work shows the strong influence of Wittgenstein, Russell, and Frege.

In the spring of 1937, the University of Chicago Press mailed hundreds of subscription forms for its latest enterprise – a projected series of twenty short monographs by various philosophers and scientists. Together the monographs were to form the first section of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Included in each mailing was an introductory prospectus which began:Recent years have witnessed a striking growth of interest in the scientific enterprise as a whole and especially in the unity of science. The (...) concern throughout the world for the logic of science, the history of science, and the sociology of science reveals a comprehensive international movement interested in considering science as a whole in terms of the scientific temper itself. A science of science is appearing. The extreme specialization within science demands as its corrective an interest in the scientific edifice in its entirety. This is especially necessary if science is to satisfy its inherent urge for the systematization of its results and methods and if science is to perform adequately its educational role in the modern world. Science is gradually rousing itself for the performance of its total task. (shrink)

Four distinguished authors have been brought together to produce this elegant study of a much-neglected figure. The book is divided into three sections: Neurath's biographical background and the economic and social context of his ideas; his theory of science; and the development of his role in debates on Marxist concepts of history and his own conception of science. Coinciding with the emerging serious interest in logical positivism, this timely publication will redress a current imbalance in the history and philosophy of (...) science. (shrink)

The movement for the Unity of Science has been making headway for a number of years, and each year more workers in the various scientific domains have expressed their interest in it by participating in the discussion of its aims and its specific problems. A characteristic feature of this movement which explains this growing interest is that it does not propose a “super-science” which is to legislate to the special sciences. Its proposal of a Unity of Science is of a (...) different kind, not based upon some grand metaphysical view of any sort. Those who are active within this movement are emphatic in their insistence that instead of aiming at a synthesis of the different sciences on the basis of a prior and independent philosophy, the special sciences will themselves supply their own synthesizing glue. For appreciating the significance of this movement it is therefore necessary to keep in mind that its tendency is toward a unified science, departmentalized into special sciences, and not toward an artificial and speculative juxtaposition of an autonomous philosophy and an autonomous group of sciences. (shrink)

The classic logical positivist account of historical explanation, putting forward what is variously called the "regularity interpretation" (#Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation), the "covering law model" (#Dray, Laws and Explanation in History), or the "deductive model" (Michael #Scriven, "Truisms as Grounds for Historical Explanations"). See also #Danto, Narration and Knowledge, for further criticisms of the model. Hempel formalizes historical explanation as involving (a) statements of determining (initial and boundary) conditions for the event to be explained, and (b) statements of (...) general laws that imply that whenever events of the kind described in (a) occur, an event of the kind to be explained will take place. He admits that in practice historians rarely explain historical events in this way, but instead give only fragmentary "explanation sketches." Such sketches can, however, be "scientifically acceptable," providing it points to where "more specific statements" are to be found (351). An interesting aspect of the article is its "late" positivist, proto‑Kuhnian assertion that "the separation of 'pure description' and 'hypothetical generalization and theory construction' in empirical science is unwarranted" (356). But Hempel does not work out the wider implications of this important conclusion. It is also worth noting that he himself was not much interested in the philosophy of history; other authors took up his model and discussed it within that context. Usefully discussed by #Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 1:112‑17. (shrink)

L’École de Vienne distingue les problèmes scientifiques et les problèmes philosophiques : les premiers sont relatifs à la vérité ou à la fausseté de propositions ; les seconds sont relatifs au sens des propositions, c’est-à-dire aux moyens de les vérifier ou de les infirmer, un problème étant vide de senssion n’a aucun moyen de répondre par oui ou par non à la question qu’il formule. А ce titre, Socrate apparaît comme le père de la philosophie, et l’erreur de la métaphysique (...) a consisté ä confondre les problèmes de sens avec les problèmes de vérité. Si les disciples de l'Éсоlе de Vienne se sont surtout appliqués а l'élаboration des concepts utilisés dans les sciences formelles et les sciences physiques, leur but le plus élevé reste l’elaboration des concepts moraux ; et, là encore, Socrate montre la voie. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell is concerned in this book with the foundations of knowledge. He approaches his subject through a discussion of language, the relationships of truth to experience and an investigation into how knowledge of the structure of language helps our understanding of the structure of the world. This edition includes a new introduction by Thomas Baldwin, Clare College, Cambridge.

Metaphysics and science stand opposed in modern times. In the average mind, aspects of each exist side by side without real unity. Philosophers have for centuries struggled to resolve the contradictions and to give the intelligible universe a true unity. The modern school of „logical empiricism“ seeks to achieve harmony by attributing validity only to the physical sciences. All statements that cannot be reduced to the concepts and judgments of the specialized disciplines are devoid of meaning for this school.Each of (...) the two components of this philosophy, namely, a certain form of logic and empiricism, contains errors. Traditional empiricism maintained that all knowledge is compounded from isolated perceptions. The new doctrine, however, holds that science has no immediate concern with perceptions, but that the statements of observers announcing such perceptions — „protocol statements“ as they are called — constitute its only subject matter. The task of science is to organize this material in such a way that predictions may be made from it. The author attempts to show that this description holds only for a particular function of knowledge, which, to be sure, is highly significant for industry and technology. To the extent that thought is not limited to these ends, it performs other functions. Thought plays a particularly important role in establishing perceptions and in constructing a theoretical reflection of living reality. Empiricism totally ignores thought, together with all the intellectual factors which, bound up with definite interests, sketch a living picture of reality. The concept of history, which is only intelligible from subjectively determined goals, belongs among those concepts which logical empiricism must inevitably misconstrue because of its behavioristic theory of man.Logistics, which modern empiricism adopts, is basically nothing but the old formal logic, enriched by a few theories and symbolic techniques. In the author’s opinion, the separation of the form and content of knowledge, which is fundamental for logistics, has dubious validity. Confronted with more complex structures of knowledge, comprehensible only in their totality, logistics reveals its impotence. Furthermore, logistics conflicts with empiricism itself. Having derived their propositions from limited material, the empiricists should claim only limited validity for logistics, if they are consistent in their doctrine. But in setting itself up as a norm for criticizing metaphysical statements, logistics shows that it contradicts a doctrine which has use for facts alone.Thus, logical empiricism does not destroy metaphysics. Since it subsumes under the term metaphysics all thought which transcends the special disciplines, romantic illusions as well as dialectical theories, it misunderstands the decisive contradictions of the present situation. In fact, it contributes to the general confusion, to a large extent. However important the achievements of the logical empiricists may be in special fields, they have failed to work out a clear philosophy. Métaphysique et science s’opposent dans les temps modernes. Des éléments empruntés aux deux modes de pensée se juxtaposent sans s’unir dans la conscience moyenne. Depuis des siècles, les philosophes s’efforcent de résoudre les contradictions et de donner à l’univers de notre intelligence une unité véritable. L’école moderne de „l’empirisme logique“ veut arriver à cette harmonie en ne reconnaissant de valeur qu’aux sciences positives. Dans la mesure où des opinions ne se laissent pas réduire aux concepts et aux jugements des disciplines spécialisées, elles passent pour dénuées de signification.Les deux composants de cette philosophie, une certaine forme de la logique et l’empirisme, contiennent l’un et l’autre des erreurs. L’ancien empirisme soutient que toute connaissance se ramène à des perceptions isolées. D’après la doctrine nouvelle, la science n’a pas affaire immédiatement à des perceptions ; cependant, les propositions d’observateurs qui constatent des perceptions, ce qu’on appelle les protocoles (Protokollsätze), constituent leur matière exclusive. La science aurait pour tâche d’ordonner cette matière de telle sorte que des prévisions soient toujours possibles. H. essaye de montrer que cette description ne vaut que pour une fonction spéciale de la connaissance, qui, il est vrai, a une signification particulière pour l’industrie et la technique. Dans la mesure où la pensée ne se limite pas à ces buts, elle exerce d’autres fonctions. Avant tout, la pensée joue un rôle de premier plan lorsqu’il s’agit d’ordonner les perceptions en une structure qui corresponde à l’ensemble du réel. L’empirisme ignore totalement la pensée, unité de tous les facteurs intellectuels, qui, liés sans doute à certains intérêts pratiques, permettent d’esquisser un tableau vivant de la réalité. Le concept de tendance historique, compréhensible seulement à partir de buts subjectivement déterminés, appartient au nombre de ceux que l’empirisme logique, par sa théorie behavioriste de l’homme, est inévitablement conduit à méconnaître.La logistique, à laquelle l’empirisme moderne s’est uni, n’est au fond que la vieille logique formaliste, enrichie de quelques théories et de quelques procédés symboliques. La distinction de la forme et du contenu de la connaissance, qui se trouve à la base de la logique, apparaît à H. très suspecte. Lorsqu’on arrive à des connaissances complexes, compréhensibles seulement dans leur totalité, elle se révèle impuissante. De plus, la logique entre en conflit avec l’empirisme lui-même. Car, comme la logique a tiré ses propositions d’un matériel très restreint, elle n’a le droit de revendiquer qu’une modalité hypothétique, comme c’est le cas, d’après l’empirisme, pour les autres propositions générales. Mais en s’érigeant en norme vis-à-vis des opinions métaphysiques et en passant à la critique, elle montre qu’elle contredit une doctrine qui ne reconnaît que les faits.Ainsi l’empirisme logique ne dépasse pas la métaphysique. Comme il embrasse sous le terme de métaphysique toute pensée qui va au delà des disciplines spéciales, les illusions romantiques aussi bien que les théories dialectiques, il méconnaît les contradictions décisives de la situation actuelle, et il contribue pour sa bonne part à la confusion générale. Quelque importants que soient, dans des domaines spécialisés, les travaux des partisans de l’empirisme logique, en tout cas, une claire philosophie leur fait défaut*. (shrink)