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  1. (2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
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  • (1 other version)Reason, Truth and History.Kathleen Okruhlik - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):692-694.
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  • Computation and Consciousness.Tim Maudlin - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (8):407.
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  • Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach.Georges Rey - 1997 - Cambridge, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
    This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires.
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  • Physical Realization.Sydney Shoemaker - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker considers the question of how physicalism can be true: how can all facts about the world, including mental ones, be constituted by facts about the distribution in the world of physical properties? Physicalism requires that the mental properties of a person are 'realized in' the physical properties of that person, and that all instantiations of properties in macroscopic objects are realized in microphysical states of affairs. Shoemaker offers an account of both these sorts of realization, (...)
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  • Against the Necessity of Functional Roles for Conscious Experience: Reviving and Revising a Neglected Argument.Gary Bartlett - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):33-53.
    While the claim that certain functional states are sufficient for conscious experience has received substantial critical attention, the claim that functional states are necessary is rarely addressed. Yet the latter claim is perhaps now more common than the former. I aim to revive and revise a neglected argument against the necessity claim, by Michael Antony. The argument involves manipulating a conscious subject's brain so as to cancel a disposition which is supposedly crucial to the realization of an experience that the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Brains in a Vat.Hilary Putnam - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.
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  • Naturalist Theories of Meaning.David Papineau - 2005 - In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-188.
    To begin with the former, representation is as familiar as it is puzzling. The English sentence ‘ Santiago is east of Sacramento’ represents the world as being a certain way. So does my belief that Santiago is east of Sacramento. In these examples, one item—a sentence or a belief—lays claim to something else, a state of affairs, which may be far removed in space and time. This is the phenomenon that naturalist theories of meaning aim to explain. How is it (...)
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  • Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.Jerry A. Fodor - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Jerry A. Fodor.
    Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Causality and properties.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. D. Reidel. pp. 109-35.
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  • The teleological notion of 'function'.Karen Neander - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):454 – 468.
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  • A case for extrinsic dispositions.Jennifer McKitrick - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):155 – 174.
    Many philosophers think that dispositions are necessarily intrinsic. However, there are no good positive arguments for this view. Furthermore, many properties (such as weight, visibility, and vulnerability) are dispositional but are not necessarily shared by perfect duplicates. So, some dispositions are extrinsic. I consider three main objections to the possibility of extrinsic dispositions: the Objection from Relationally Specified Properties, the Objection from Underlying Intrinsic Properties, and the Objection from Natural Properties. These objections ultimately fail.
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  • (1 other version)Defining 'intrinsic'.Rae Langton & David Lewis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
    Something could be round even if it were the only thing in the universe, unaccompanied by anything distinct from itself. Jaegwon Kim once suggested that we define an intrinsic property as one that can belong to something unaccompanied. Wrong: unaccompaniment itself is not intrinsic, yet it can belong to something unaccompanied. But there is a better Kim-style definition. Say that P is independent of accompaniment iff four different cases are possible: something accompanied may have P or lack P, something unaccompanied (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1994 - MIT Press.
    This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus.
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  • Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Jesse J. Prinz - 2002 - MIT Press.
    In Furnishing the Mind, Jesse Prinz attempts to swing the pendulum back toward empiricism.
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  • How to acquire a concept.Eric Margolis - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):347-369.
    In this paper, I develop a novel account of concept acquisition for an atomistic theory of concepts. Conceptual atomism is rarely explored in cognitive science because of the feeling that atomistic treatments of concepts are inherently nativistic. My model illustrates, on the contrary, that atomism does not preclude the learning of a concept.
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  • Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred I. Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  • (1 other version)The case for phenomenal externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-35.
    Since Twin Earth was discovered by American philosophical-space explorers in the 1970s, the domain of.
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  • (1 other version)Mental paint.Ned Block - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 165--200.
    The greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind--maybe even all of philosophy-- divides two perspectives on consciousness. The two perspectives differ on whether there is anything in the phenomenal character of conscious experience that goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive and the functional. A convenient terminological handle on the dispute is whether there are.
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
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  • (2 other versions)Causality and Properties.Sidney Shoemaker - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)Brains in a Vat.Hilary Putnam - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a contemporary reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Critical Notice.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.
    In 1995, in my book, Ten Problems of Consciousness, I proposed a version of the theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. The present book, in part, consists of a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. It is also concerned with two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness: the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In addition, it connects representationalism with two more general issues: the nature of color and the location of (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):17-35.
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  • (1 other version)The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1995 - MIT Press.
    Written in a highly readable, irreverent style, The Elm and the Expert provides a lively discussion of semantic issues about mental representation, with special attention to issues raised by Frege's problem, Twin cases, and the putative indeterminacy of reference. Bound to be widely read and much discussed, The Elm and the Expert, written in Jerry Fodor's usual highly readable, irreverent style, provides a lively discussion of semantic issues about mental representation, with special attention to issues raised by Frege's problem, Twin (...)
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  • The propensity interpretation of fitness.Susan K. Mills & John H. Beatty - 1979 - Philosophy of Science 46 (2):263-286.
    The concept of "fitness" is a notion of central importance to evolutionary theory. Yet the interpretation of this concept and its role in explanations of evolutionary phenomena have remained obscure. We provide a propensity interpretation of fitness, which we argue captures the intended reference of this term as it is used by evolutionary theorists. Using the propensity interpretation of fitness, we provide a Hempelian reconstruction of explanations of evolutionary phenomena, and we show why charges of circularity which have been levelled (...)
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  • Dispositional Implementation Solves the Superfluous Structure Problem.Colin Klein - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):141 - 153.
    Consciousness supervenes on activity; computation supervenes on structure. Because of this, some argue, conscious states cannot supervene on computational ones. If true, this would present serious difficulties for computationalist analyses of consciousness (or, indeed, of any domain with properties that supervene on actual activity). I argue that the computationalist can avoid the Superfluous Structure Problem (SSP) by moving to a dispositional theory of implementation. On a dispositional theory, the activity of computation depends entirely on changes in the intrinsic properties of (...)
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  • Experience as representation.Fred Dretske - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.
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  • Against functionalist theories of consciousness.Michael V. Antony - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):105-23.
    The paper contains an argument against functionalist theories of consciousness. The argument exploits an intuition to the effect that parts of an individual's brain that are not in use at a time t, can have no bearing on whether that individual is conscious at t. After presenting the argument, I defend it against two possible objections, and then distinguish it from two arguments to which it appears, on the surface to be similar.
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  • Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..
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  • Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach.Georges Rey - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):246-250.
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  • Language and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of language.Michael Devitt & Kim Sterelny - 1999 - Cambridge: MIT Press. Edited by Kim Sterelny.
    Completely revised and updated in its Second Edition, Language and Reality provides students, philosophers and cognitive scientists with a lucid and provocative introduction to the philosophy of language.
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  • Noncausal connections.Jaegwon Kim - 1974 - Noûs 8 (1):41-52.
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  • (2 other versions)Causality and Properties.Sydney Shoemaker - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.
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  • (2 other versions)Knowledge and the flow of information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.
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  • God and the soul.Peter Thomas Geach - 2000 - London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    This collection of nine papers brings together Many of Geach's thoughts on such wide topics as resurrection, deductive proof of the existence of God, God's role in ethics, materialism, and the relation of time and prayer. The first three papers are concerned with the survival of death and what form such a survival might take. This includes Geach's argument against materialism in "What Do We Think With?" Two further papers are concerned with arguments about existence, and the remaining papers concern (...)
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  • (1 other version)Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.
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  • Psychosemantics, or, where do truth conditions come from?Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and cognition: a reader. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
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  • A theory of content II.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In A theory of content I. MIT Press.
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  • Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Andrew Woodfield - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):210-214.
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  • Absent Qualia and Categorical Properties.Brendan O’Sullivan - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):353-371.
    Qualia have proved difficult to integrate into a broadly physicalistic worldview. In this paper, I argue that despite popular wisdom in the philosophy of mind, qualia’s intrinsicality is not sufficient for their non-reducibility. Second, I diagnose why philosophers mistakenly focused on intrinsicality. I then proceed to argue that qualia are categorical and end with some reflections on how the conceptual territory looks when we keep our focus on categoricity.
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  • Theories of.David Papineau - 2005 - In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 175.
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