- How to Know That You’re Not a Zombie.Brentyn J. Ramm - 2024 - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
|
|
Familiar Properties and Phenomenal Properties.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - Analytic Philosophy (2):274-300.details
|
|
Hemispherectomies and Independently Conscious Brain Regions.James Blackmon - 2016 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (4).details
|
|
Internal constraints for phenomenal externalists: a structure matching theory.Bryce Dalbey & Bradford Saad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-29.details
|
|
On Being Internally the Same.Anil Gomes & Matthew Parrott - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. OUP.details
|
|
Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):602-627.details
|
|
The Price of Twin Earth.Brandon James Ashby - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):689-710.details
|
|
Derivatives and Consciousness.David Builes - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):87-103.details
|
|
Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
|
|
Is mental time travel real time travel?Michael Barkasi & Melanie G. Rosen - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-27.details
|
|
How Does Colour Experience Represent the World?Adam Pautz - 2017 - In Derek Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Experiments in Visual Perspective: Size Experience.Brentyn Ramm - 2020 - Argumenta 5 (5):263-278.details
|
|
Which Moral Properties Are Eligible for Perceptual Awareness?Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (3):290-319.details
|
|
Introduction: Perception Without Representation.Keith A. Wilson & Roberta Locatelli - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):197-212.details
|
|
Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 137-166.details
|
|
Visual Acquaintance, Action & The Explanatory Gap.Thomas Raleigh - 2021 - Synthese:1-26.details
|
|
No Pain, No Gain (in Darwinian Fitness): A Representational Account of Affective Experience.Benjamin Kozuch - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):693-714.details
|
|
Externalism and Internalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Robert A. Wilson - 2017 - Oxford Bibliographies.details
|
|
The significance argument for the irreducibility of consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):349-407.details
|
|
Selfless experience.Geoffrey Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):207-243.details
|
|
(1 other version)Husserl, impure intentionalism, and sensory awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.details
|
|
Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2017 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.details
|
|
Colour hallucination: A new problem for externalist representationalism.Laura Gow - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):695-704.details
|
|
Shape Perception in a Relativistic Universe.Peter Fisher Epstein - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):339-379.details
|
|
Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents.Corijn van Mazijk - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):499-517.details
|
|
The Three Circles of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2023 - In M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 169-191.details
|
|
Semantic Inferentialism as (a Form of) Active Externalism.J. Adam Carter, James Henry Collin & S. Orestis Palermos - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.details
|
|
The Goldilocks Problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content.Robert Schroer - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):476-495.details
|
|
The real trouble for phenomenal externalists: New empirical evidence (with reply by Klein&Hilbert).Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Dordrecht: Springer Studies in Brain and Mind. pp. 237-298.details
|
|
Varieties of externalism.J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):63-109.details
|
|
Space Perception, Visual Dissonance and the Fate of Standard Representationalism.Farid Masrour - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):565-593.details
|
|
The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.details
|
|
Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of mind: the key thinkers. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 209-235.details
|
|
The significance of high-level content.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.details
|
|
Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics.Angela Mendelovici - 2010 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
|
|
The geometry of visual space and the nature of visual experience.Farid Masrour - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1813-1832.details
|
|
Affordances and Phenomenal Character in Spatial Perception.Simon Prosser - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):475-513.details
|
|
The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.details
|
|
Attention and mental paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.details
|
|
Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'.Nicholas Silins - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):329-367.details
|
|
Perception, Color, and Realism.Wayne Wright - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (1):19 - 40.details
|
|
The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.details
|
|
Understanding the internalism-externalism debate: What is the boundary of the thinker?Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):51-75.details
|
|
An externalist's guide to inner experience.Benj Hellie - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 97–145.details
|
|
An empirical case against materialism.Andrew Clifton - 2004details
|
|
Humeans Aren’t Out of their Minds.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):529–535.details
|
|
Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.details
|
|
Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details
|
|
Colors as Properties of the Special Sciences.Kent Johnson & Wayne Wright - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (2):139 - 168.details
|
|
Why nothing mental is just in the head.Justin C. Fisher - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):318-334.details
|
|