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Form as Structure: It's not so Simple

Ratio 31 (1):20-36 (2016)

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  1. Things and Their Parts.Kit Fine - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):61-74.
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  • Against ontological fundamentalism.Ned Markosian - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):69-83.
    Suppose you are asked to be the substitute teacher for a high school physics class. Suppose part of your assignment is to explain to the students all about the subatomic structure of a typical macroscopic object, such as a wooden table. Here is a speech that you are likely to find yourself making at some point during your lesson.
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  • Is there a fundamental level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.
    ‘‘Thus I believe that there is no part of matter which is not—I do not say divisible—but actually divided; and consequently the least particle ought to be considered as a world full of an infinity of different creatures.’’ (Leibniz, letter to Foucher).
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  • Theories of masses and problems of constitution.Dean W. Zimmerman - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):53-110.
    The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
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  • Extended simples.Kris McDaniel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):131 - 141.
    I argue that extended simples are possible. The argument given here parallels an argument given elsewhere for the claim that the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, not intrinsic as is commonly supposed. In the final section of the paper, I show that if the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, the most popular argument against extended simples fails.
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  • Simples.Ned Markosian - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):213 – 228.
    Since the publication of Peter van Inwagen's book, Material Beings,1 there has been a growing body of philosophical literature on the topic of composition. The main question addressed in both van Inwagen's book and subsequent discussions of the topic is a question that van Inwagen calls "the Special Composition Question." The Special Composition Question is, roughly, the question Under what circumstances do several things compose, or add up to, or form, a single object? For the purposes of formulating a more (...)
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  • Hylomorphism.Mark Johnston - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (12):652-698.
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  • Turtles all the way down: Regress, priority and fundamentality.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):1-14.
    I address an intuition commonly endorsed by metaphysicians, that there must be a fundamental layer of reality, i.e., that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss applications of this intuition with reference to Bradley’s regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intui- tion, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, (...)
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  • .Anna Marmodoro - unknown
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  • Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
    According to Peter van Inwagen, visible inanimate objects do not, strictly speaking, exist. In defending this controversial thesis, he offers fresh insights on such topics as personal identity, commonsense belief, existence over time, the phenomenon of vagueness, and the relation between metaphysics and ordinary language.
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  • The physics of extended simples.D. Braddon-Mitchell & K. Miller - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):222-226.
    The idea that there could be spatially extended mereological simples has recently been defended by a number of metaphysicians (Markosian 1998, 2004; Simons 2004; Parsons (2000) also takes the idea seriously). Peter Simons (2004) goes further, arguing not only that spatially extended mereological simples (henceforth just extended simples) are possible, but that it is more plausible that our world is composed of such simples, than that it is composed of either point-sized simples, or of atomless gunk. The difficulty for these (...)
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  • Real Essentialism.David S. Oderberg - 2007 - New York: Routledge.
    _Real Essentialism_ presents a comprehensive defence of neo-Aristotelian essentialism. Do objects have essences? Must they be the kinds of things they are in spite of the changes they undergo? Can we know what things are really like – can we define and classify reality? Many, if not most, philosophers doubt this, influenced by centuries of empiricism, and by the anti-essentialism of Wittgenstein, Quine, Popper, and other thinkers. _Real Essentialism_ reinvigorates the tradition of realist, essentialist metaphysics, defending the reality and knowability (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Time, Creation and the Continuum.Richard Sorabji - 1985 - Philosophy 60 (231):136-138.
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  • Hylomorphism and the Metaphysics of Structure.William Jaworski - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (2):179-201.
    Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle; it accounts for what things are and what they can do. My goal is to articulate a metaphysic of hylomorphic structure different from those currently on offer. It is based on a substance-attribute ontology that takes properties to be powers and tropes. Hylomorphic structures emerge, on this account, as powers to configure the materials that compose individuals.
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  • Staunch vs. Faint-hearted Hylomorphism: Toward an Aristotelian Account of Composition.Robert Koons - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (2):151-177.
    A staunch hylomorphism involves a commitment to a sparse theory of universals and a sparse theory of composite material objects, as well as to an ontology of fundamental causal powers. Faint-hearted hylomorphism, in contrast, lacks one or more of these elements. On the staunch version of HM, a substantial form is not merely some structural property of a set of elements—it is rather a power conferred on those elements by that structure, a power that is the cause of the generation (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Aristotle: Metaphysics.Michael Loux - forthcoming - Ancient Philosophy.
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  • Aristotle's hylomorphism without reconditioning.Anna Marmodoro - 2013 - Philosophical Inquiry 37 (1-2):5-22.
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  • Simples, Stuff, and Simple People.Ned Markosian - 2004 - The Monist 87 (3):405-428.
    Here is a question about mereological simples that I raised in a recent paper.
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  • Gunky Objects in a Simple World.Kris McDaniel - 2006 - Philo 9 (1):39-46.
    Suppose that a material object is gunky: all of its parts are located in space, and each of its parts has a proper part. Does it follow from this hypothesis that the space in which that object resides must itself be gunky? I argue that it does not. There is room for gunky objects in a space that decomposes without remainder into mereological simples.
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  • (2 other versions)Time, Creation, and the Continuum.Richard Sorabji - 1985 - Religious Studies 21 (1):100-103.
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  • (2 other versions)Time, Creation and the Continuum.Richard Sorabji - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):473-475.
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  • Hylomorphism reconditioned.Michael C. Rea - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):341-358.
    My goal in this paper is to provide characterizations of matter, form and constituency in a way that avoids what I take to be the three main drawbacks of other hylomorphic theories: (i) commitment to the universal-particular distinction; (ii) commitment to a primitive or problematic notion of inherence or constituency; (iii) inability to identify viable candidates for matter and form in nature, or to characterize them in terms of primitives widely regarded to be intelligible.
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  • Extended Simples.Peter Simons - 2004 - The Monist 87 (3):371-384.
    I argue that the assumptions that physically basic things are either mereologically atomic, or that they are continuous and there are no atoms, both face difficult conceptual problems. Both views tend to presuppose a largely unquestioned assumption, that things have parts corresponding to the geometric parts of the regions they occupy. To avoid these problems I propose a third view, that physically simple things occupy a finite volume without themselves having parts. This view is examined enough to tease out some (...)
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  • Emergent substance.Patrick Toner - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):281 - 297.
    In this paper, I develop an ontological position according to which substances such as you and I have no substantial parts. The claim is not that we are immaterial souls. Nor is the claim that we are “human atoms” co-located with human organisms. It is, rather, that we are macrophysical objects that are, in the relevant sense, simple. I contend that despite initial appearances, this claim is not obviously false, and I defend it by showing how much work it can (...)
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  • Substance and Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics.Theodore Scaltsas & Lynne Spellman - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189):536-539.
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  • (1 other version)8. Aristotle's Constituent Ontology.Michael Loux - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:207.
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  • Material Beings.Harold W. Noonan - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):239.
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  • A Small Discovery: Avicenna’s Theory of Minima Naturalia.Jon McGinnis - 2015 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (1):1-24.
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  • Substances and universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics.Theodore Scaltsas - 1994 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    The Theme A substance is a composite particular. If it is composed of further particulars, will the substance itself be one or many? ...
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  • Against maxcon simples.Kris McDaniel - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):265 – 275.
    In a recent paper titled ' Simples ', Ned Markosian asks and answers the Simple Question, which is, 'under what circumstances is it true of some object that it has no proper parts?' Markosian 's answer to the simple question is MaxCon, which states that an object is a simple if and only if it is a maximally continuous object. I present several arguments against MaxCon.
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  • A theory of aggregates.Tyler Burge - 1977 - Noûs 11 (2):97-117.
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  • Atoms vs. Extended Simples: Towards a Dispositionalist Reconciliation.Travis Dumsday - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1023-1033.
    There are four main theories concerning the ultimate constitution of matter: atomism version 1, atomism version 2, the theory of gunk, and the theory of extended simples. These four theories are usually seen as diametrically opposed. Here I take a stab at ecumenism, and argue that atomism version 1 and the theory of extended simples can be reconciled and rendered compatible by reference to the reality of dispositions.
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  • On Aristotelianism and Structures as Parts.Patrick Toner - 2012 - Ratio 26 (2):148-161.
    Aristotelian substance theory tells us that substances have structures (read: forms) as proper parts. This claim has recently been defended by Kathrin Koslicki who dubbed it the ‘Neo-Aristotelian Thesis.’ Strangely, Aristotelianism has not yet been universally embraced by philosophers – partly because some of its claims, such as the Neo-Aristotelian Thesis – are viewed by some as counterintuitive at best. In this paper, I argue for Aristotelianism by showing its philosophical usefulness: specifically, I put it to use in saving the (...)
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  • Some Ontological Consequences of Atomism.Travis Dumsday - 2014 - Ratio 28 (2):119-134.
    Is there a fundamental layer of objects in nature? And if so what sorts of things populate it? Among those who answer ‘yes’ to the first question, a common answer to the second is ‘atoms,’ where an atom is understood in the original sense of an object that is spatially unextended, indivisible, and wholly lacking in proper parts. Here I explore some of the ontological consequences of atomism. First, if atoms are real, then whatever motion they appear to undergo must (...)
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  • The De anima of Alexander of Aphrodiasias: a translation and commentary.Athanasios P. Fotinis - 1979 - Washington, D.C.: University Press of America. Edited by Alexander.
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