Are incorrect judgments on false belief tasks better explained within the framework of a conceptual change theory or a bias theory? Conceptual change theory posits a change in the form of reasoning from 3 to 4 years old while bias theory posits that processing factors are responsible for errors among younger children. The results from three experiments showed that children who failed a test of false belief took as long to respond as those who passed, and both groups of children (...) took longer to respond to belief questions than to questions about prior states of reality. These results seem to support the bias theory. (shrink)

Researchers disagree over whether preverbal infants have any true understanding of other minds. There seem to be at least two sources of hesitation among researchers. Some doubt that infants have any concepts as sophisticated as that implied by the term ‘intentionality’. Other researchers simply doubt that infants understand anything in a conceptual way. This chapter provides arguments in favour of infants' abilities in both respects. It describes data from one study in which the method itself was designed to assess conceptual (...) representations abstracted away from perception-action systems. (shrink)

This chapter begins with an overview of the controversy surrounding the study of children and adults with neurodevelopmental disorders, and how these inform theories of neurocognitive architecture. It weighs the arguments for and against what we might learn from studying individuals who have fundamental biological impairments. It then discusses the example of research on theory of mind in two different disorders — autism and Williams syndrome — which has highlighted a number of important aspects of how this core cognitive capacity (...) develops in both normal and atypical populations. (shrink)