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  1. There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
    It has long been widely agreed that some concepts can be possessed only by those who have undergone a certain type of phenomenal experience. Orthodoxy among contemporary philosophers of mind has it that these phenomenal concepts provide the key to understanding many disputes between physicalists and their opponents, and in particular offer an explanation of Mary’s predicament in the situation exploited by Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. I reject the orthodox view; I deny that there are phenomenal concepts. My arguments exploit (...)
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  • A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
    When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space (...)
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  • (1 other version)Phenomenal knowledge.Earl Conee - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.
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  • Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance.Laurence Nemirow - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and cognition: a reader. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
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  • A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.Lynne Rudder Baker & Paul M. Churchland - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):906.
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  • (1 other version)XIII*—Styles of Mental Representation.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83 (1):213-226.
    Daniel C. Dennett; XIII*—Styles of Mental Representation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 213–226, https://doi.o.
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