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  1. Knowledge, Truth, and Duty.Marian David - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • ``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief".John Greco - 2003 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual virtue: perspectives from ethics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 111-134.
    The paper begins by reviewing two problems for fallibilism: the lottery problem, or the problem of explaining why fallible evidence, though otherwise excellent, is not enough to know that one will lose the lottery, and Gettier problems. It is then argued that both problems can be resolved if we note an important illocutionary force of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the person credit for getting things right. Alternatively, to say that a (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):12-28.
    Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this “the value problem.” I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is (...)
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  • (1 other version)In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    A comprehensive defence of the rationalist view that insight independent of experience is a genuine basis for knowledge.
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  • Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. In defending this thesis, Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. Since a (...)
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  • Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and Lotteries is organized around an epistemological puzzle: in many cases, we seem consistently inclined to deny that we know a certain class of propositions, while crediting ourselves with knowledge of propositions that imply them. In its starkest form, the puzzle is this: we do not think we know that a given lottery ticket will be a loser, yet we normally count ourselves as knowing all sorts of ordinary things that entail that its holder will not suddenly acquire a (...)
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  • Intellectual virtue: perspectives from ethics and epistemology.Michael Raymond DePaul & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.) - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The idea of a virtue has traditionally been important in ethics, but only recently has gained attention as an idea that can explain how we ought to form beliefs as well as how we ought to act. Moral philosophers and epistemologists have different approaches to the idea of intellectual virtue; here, Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski bring work from both fields together for the first time to address all of the important issues. It will be required reading for anyone working (...)
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  • Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.
    In these challenging pages, Unger argues for the extreme skeptical view that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have any reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot ever have any emotions about anything: no one can ever be happy or sad about anything. Finally, in this reduction to absurdity of virtually all our supposed thought, he argues that no one can ever believe, or even say, that anything is (...)
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  • The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    1 Knowledge and Justification This book is an investigation of one central problem which arises in the attempt to give a philosophical account of empirical ...
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  • (1 other version)Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.
    This paper aims to identify the constitutive rule of assertion, conceived by analogy with the rules of a game. That assertion has such rules is by no means obvious; perhaps it is more like a natural phenomenon than it seems. One way to find out is by supposing that it has such rules, in order to see where the hypothesis leads and what it explains. That will be done here. The hypothesis is not perfectly clear, of course, but we have (...)
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  • Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
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  • (1 other version)Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    This paper uses the knowledge account of assertion (KAA) in defense of epistemological contextualism. Part 1 explores the main problem afflicting contextualism, what I call the "Generality Objection." Part 2 presents and defends both KAA and a powerful new positive argument that it provides for contextualism. Part 3 uses KAA to answer the Generality Objection, and also casts other shadows over the prospects for anti-contextualism.
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  • Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
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  • (2 other versions)A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge, volume I * by Ernest Sosa. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Analysis 69 (2):382-385.
    Ernest Sosa's A Virtue Epistemology, Vol. I is arguably the single-most important monograph to be published in analytic epistemology in the last ten years. Sosa, the first in the field to employ the notion of intellectual virtue – in his ground-breaking ‘The Raft and the Pyramid’– is the leading proponent of reliabilist versions of virtue epistemology. In A Virtue Epistemology, he deftly defends an externalist account of animal knowledge as apt belief, argues for a distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Virtues of the mind: an inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge.William Alston - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):197–201.
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  • Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge.Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - 1996 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    Almost all theories of knowledge and justified belief employ moral concepts and forms of argument borrowed from moral theories, but none of them pay attention to the current renaissance in virtue ethics. This remarkable book is the first attempt to establish a theory of knowledge based on the model of virtue theory in ethics. The book develops the concept of an intellectual virtue, and then shows how the concept can be used to give an account of the major concepts in (...)
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  • The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, (...)
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  • Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.John Greco - 2003 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual virtue: perspectives from ethics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 111-134.
    The paper begins by reviewing two problems for fallibilism: the lottery problem, or the problem of explaining why fallible evidence, though otherwise excellent, is not enough to know that one will lose the lottery, and Gettier problems. It is then argued that both problems can be resolved if we note an important illocutionary force of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the person credit for getting things right. Alternatively, to say that a (...)
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  • Intellectual motivation and the good of truth.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual virtue: perspectives from ethics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 135--154.
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  • (1 other version)Knowledge is Merely True Belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2):157-165.
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  • Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.
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  • (1 other version)Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles.Ernest Sosa - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (8):410.
    According to Moore, his argument meets three conditions for being a proof: first, the premiss is different from the conclusion; second, he knows the premiss to be the case; and, third, the conclusion follows deductively.2 Further conditions may be required, but he evidently thinks his proof would satisfy these as well. As Moore is well aware, many philosophers will feel he has not given “...any satisfactory proof of the point in question."3 Some, he believes, will want the premiss itself proved. (...)
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  • Knowing how to believe with justification.Steven L. Reynolds - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (3):273-292.
    Non-propositional experiences can help justify beliefs, contrary to recent claims made by Donald Davidson and Laurence Bonjour. It is argued that a perceptual belief is justified if there are no undermining beliefs and it was arrived at in response to an experience through an adequate exercise of properly learned recognitional skills.
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  • (1 other version)``Knowing and Asserting".Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.
    Assertions are praised as true, informative, relevant, sincere, warranted, well-phrased, or polite. They are criticized as false, uninformative, irrelevant, insincere, unwarranted, ill-phrased, or rude. Sometimes they deserve such praise or criticism. If any respect in which performances of an act can deserve praise or criticism is a norm for that act, then the speech act of assertion has many norms. So has almost any act; jumps can deserve praise as long or brave, criticism as short or cowardly. But it is (...)
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  • (1 other version)``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    This paper brings together two positions that for the most part have been developed and defended independently of one another: contextualism about knowledge attributions and the knowledge account of assertion.
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  • (1 other version)Why knowledge is merely true belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167-180.
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  • Beyond truth and falsehood: The real value of knowing that P.Wayne D. Riggs - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (1):87--108.
    Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations.On such a view, (call it the TG view) the only evaluationsthat count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluatesomething (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitivetrait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to thesetwo goods. In particular, this view implies that all theepistemic value of knowledge must be derived from thevalue of the two goals cited in TG. I argue (...)
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  • The value of truth.Paul Horwich - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):347–360.
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  • In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification.T. Crane - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is concerned with the alleged capacity of the human mind to arrive at beliefs and knowledge about the world on the basis of pure reason without any dependence on sensory experience. Most recent philosophers reject the view and argue that all substantive knowledge must be sensory in origin. Laurence BonJour provocatively reopens the debate by presenting the most comprehensive exposition and defence of the rationalist view that a priori insight is a genuine basis for knowledge. This important book (...)
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  • The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):763-766.
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  • Epistemological Nonfactualism and the a Prioricity of Logic.Hartry Field - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (1):1-24.
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  • Testimony, knowledge, and epistemic goals.Steven L. Reynolds - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):139 - 161.
    Various considerations are adduced toshow that we require that a testifier know hertestimony. Such a requirement apparentlyimproves testimony. It is argued that the aimof improving testimony explains why we have anduse our concept of knowledge. If we were tointroduce a term of praise for testimony, usingit at first to praise testimony that apparentlyhelped us in our practical projects, it wouldcome to be used as we now use the word``know''.
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