This volume in the Clarendon Edition of the Works of Thomas Hobbes contains A dialogue between a philosopher and a student, of the common laws of England, edited by Alan Cromartie, supplemented by the important fragment "Questions relative to Hereditary Right," discovered and edited by Quentin Skinner. As a critique of common law by a great philosopher, the Dialogue should be essential reading for anybody interested in English political thought or legal theory. Cromartie has established when and why the work (...) was written and has supplied extensive annotation (along with a substantial introduction) to make the work accessible to the non-specialist reader. The additional piece sees Hobbes mounting a robust defense of hereditary right, in the course of which he also makes some important general observations about the concept of a right. It is also of special interest as it constitutes Hobbes's last word on politics. (shrink)

Hobbesian war primarily arises not because material resources are scarce; or because humans ruthlessly seek survival before all else; or because we are naturally selfish, competitive, or aggressive brutes. Rather, it arises because we are fragile, fearful, impressionable, and psychologically prickly creatures susceptible to ideological manipulation, whose anger can become irrationally inflamed by even trivial slights to our glory. The primary source of war, according to Hobbes, is disagreement, because we read into it the most inflammatory signs of contempt. Both (...) cause and remedy are therefore primarily ideological: The Leviathan's primary function is to settle the meaning of the most controversial words implicated in social life, minimize public disagreement, neutralize glory, magnify the fear of death, and root out subversive doctrines. Managing interstate conflict, in turn, requires not only coercive power, but also the soft power required to shape characters and defuse the effects of status competition. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically review the game-theoretic discussion of Hobbes and to develop a game-theoretic interpretation that gives due attention both to Hobbes's distinction between “moderates” and “dominators” and to what actually initiates conflict in the state of nature, namely, the competition for vital goods. As can be shown, Hobbes's state of nature contains differently structured situations of choice, the game-theoretic representation of which requires the prisoner's dilemma and the assurance game and the so-called assurance dilemma. (...) However, the “state of war” ultimately emerges from situations that cannot be described by any of these games because they represent zero-sum games in which the outcome of mutual cooperation does not exist. (shrink)

In part through correcting mistranslations of key passages in the "de logica" part of his "de corpore," hobbes is shown to have held a theory in which the intention to communicate enters into the definition of signification; and in which speech requires, In addition, (1) socially agreed-Upon correlations between kinds of utterances and kinds of things, And (2) an interrelationship of such utterances (or 'words') in what hobbes calls 'contexture'. It is shown that hobbes did not hold that for a (...) linguistic expression to have meaning is for it to stand for something, Or that what an expression means is what it stands for--Positions commonly, And mistakenly, Attributed to him. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore in what respects Thomas Hobbes may be regarded as foundational in international thought. It is evident that in contemporary international relations theory he has become emblematic of a realist tradition, but as David Armitage suggests this was not always the case. I want to suggest that it is only in a very limited sense that he may be regarded as a foundational thinker in international relations, and for reasons very different from those (...) for which he has become infamous. In the early histories of international thought Hobbes is a cameo figure completely eclipsed by Grotius. In early histories of political literature, the classic jurists were often acknowledged for their remarkable contributions to international relations, but Hobbes is referred to exclusively as a philosopher of a positvist ethics and absolute sovereignty. It is among the jurists themselves that Hobbes is believed to have made important conceptual moves which set the problems for international thought for the next three centuries. He conflates natural law and the law of nations, arguing that they differ only in their subjects—the former individuals, the latter nations or states. This entailed transforming the sovereign into an artificial man, not in the Roman Law sense of an entity capable of suing and being sued; rather, as a subject not party to a contract, but created by a contract among individuals who confer upon it authority. This subject is not constrained by the contractors, but is, as individuals were in the state of nature, constrained by the equivalent of natural law, the law of nations in the international context. Throughout, the methodological implications are drawn for modern historians of political thought and political philosophers who venture to theorise about international relations. (shrink)

Hobbes’s account of the commonwealth is standardly interpreted to be primarily a theory of contract, whereby the archetypal manner of forming a political community is via an act of mutual agreement between suspicious individuals of equal power. By examining Hobbes’s theories of the pre-political family, and what he says about the role of real history in the development of political societies, I conclude that this standard interpretation is untenable. Rather, Hobbes’s conception of commonwealth ‘by institution’ is a hypothetical model used (...) to illustrate the mechanics of sovereignty, and to reconcile men to the conditions of subjection to absolute political power. In practice, all sovereignty is originally by ‘acquisition’. Realizing this casts serious doubt on the possibility that Hobbes is a fundamentally democratic thinker. In turn, we are invited to reconsider the history of political thought after Hobbes, in particular by seeing his theory of the family and of history as a genealogical ancestor of Scottish Enlightenment political theory. (shrink)

A company of buccaneers invites comparison with states founded on the social contracts of Hobbes and Locke. These companies were formed by an explicit contract, the articles of agreement, and transgressors risked being marooned in a literal state of nature. Buccaneers were relatively powerful and their authority structure and share system was relatively democratic. The role of venture capitalists in organizing buccaneering may explain why parallels with Locke's social contract are particularly striking. Matthew Tindall attempted to exclude pirates and include (...) privateers in the social contract, but conceded that sufficiently powerful pirates themselves formed states. These comparisons highlight the problem of basing human rights on contract theory. (shrink)

Hobbes' philosophy is one of the high points of a century of great philosophical achievement and Leviathan is recognized as one of the great classics of political theory. But the response from Hobbes's contemporaries to his secular analysis of society demonstrated the challenging nature of his ideas. This collection of many of the major contemporary responses to his thought by leading figures, mostly never republished, provides an outstanding source for assessing his immediate impact and the long-term importance of his work.

Scholars are currently divided on the issue of whether, according to Hobbes, social collectivities such ascommonwealths or corporations are agents in their own right. In this paper I clarify Hobbes’s position onthe question of whether groups are agents. After distinguishing between several kinds of collective action, Ishow that Hobbes is not committed to the view that groups are agents in their own right. As an analysis ofthe terms “artificial person,” “actor,” and “sovereign” reveals, Hobbes is committed only to the view (...) thatsome social collectivities simulate agency. I then argue that Hobbes’s theory of voluntary action isinconsistent with the claim that groups engage in voluntary actions. Finally, I consider how Hobbes’stheory of simulated collective agency might contribute to contemporary philosophical debates on the natureof collective action. I suggest that Hobbes’s theory could be most effectively applied to apparent cases ofcollective action for which current philosophical theories are inadequate. (shrink)