Many scholars in religious ethics and political theory read Augustine's emphasis on pride as tied to a pessimism about politics and human nature as well as a neutralist vision of politics. Against these views, this essay argues that Augustine's vision of political humility is at once tied to a thick, non‐neutralist vision of the good and a limited view of politics' role in achieving this good on its own. To make this argument, I compare Augustine's largely neglected commentary on Genesis (...) with that of Hobbes, a political pessimist with whom Augustine is often compared. While Hobbes's political combatting of pride adheres to a vision of mere “preservation,” Augustine's instead entails a vision of “re‐creation.” Political re‐creation is aspirational, participating in a re‐instantiation of creation's order, but it is also limited, since (re‐)creation is ultimately the work of God. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes tells us that he wrote Leviathan to “absolve the divine laws” of the charge that they justify rebellion. This article interprets the argumentative strategy of the second half of Leviathan in light of this intention. Over the course of his three major political works, Hobbes develops a convergent argument to absolve God’s laws. This strategy of judicial rhetoric relies on using multiple independent claims in the hope that one’s audience finds at least one of them persuasive. This was (...) a risky strategy for Hobbes that angered his critics. The strategy also reveals something about what sort of philosopher Hobbes was and how we ought to approach his work. (shrink)

Hobbes and Rousseau relied heavily upon the time-worn metaphor of the body politic to describe and explain their respective political visions. But while Rousseau’s use of the metaphor is largely ac...

ABSTRACT Berlin and Strauss shared surprisingly compatible views about four matters of great importance. The first is the need for political philosophy, which Berlin traced to value pluralism and Strauss to the inherent incompleteness and contestability of our knowledge of politics, due to its comprehensive nature. Second, Berlin and Strauss each opposed social-scientific positivism: Berlin, because it contradicts human freedom and responsibility; Strauss, because it depends on an untenable and nihilistic distinction between facts and values. Third, both philosophers wished to (...) place, in the ground currently occupied by positivist political science, the study of statecraft, embodied in such figures as Churchill and FDR. Finally, Berlin and Strauss agreed on what characterizes such statesmen: an intuitive, pretheoretical practical judgment of political particulars. (shrink)

While behaviourist psychology had proven its worth to the US military during the Second World War, the 1950s saw behaviourism increasingly associated with a Cold War discourse of ‘totalitarianism’. This article considers the argument made in Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism on totalitarianism as a form of behaviourist control. By connecting Arendt’s Cold War anti-behaviourism both to its discursive antecedents in a Progressive-era critique of industrial labour, and to contemporaneous attacks on behaviourism, this paper aims to answer two interlocking (...) questions: Why was behaviourism overtaken by cognitivism as the dominant theoretical orientation of psychologists in the 1960s, and what role did the concept of language play in this shift? (shrink)

This article reassesses Hobbes’s place in the history of ethics based on the first systematic analysis of his various classifications of formal goodness. The good was traditionally divided into three: profitably good, pleasurably good, and morally good. Across his works, Hobbes replaced the last with pulchrum—a decidedly non-moral form of goodness on his account. I argue that Hobbes’s dismissal of moral goodness was informed by his hedonist conception of the good and accompanied by reinterpretations of right reason and natural law. (...) By dispensing moral goodness and insisting on the hedonist and relational nature of the good, Hobbes moreover recast and rendered more urgent the question of why we should be moral. Hobbes is commonly thought to have raised this question so starkly because of his general insensitivity to the demands of justice. My analysis suggests that it may also, or rather, have been due to his restrictive conception of the good. A comparison with other moral philosophers from the period—including Suárez, Gassendi, Locke, and Pufendorf—indicates how unusual Hobbes’s jettisoning of moral goodness was. (shrink)

Starting from considering how radical Hobbes' rejection of teleology was, this paper presents a coherent reading of Hobbesian reason, as applied to the justification of political obligation, striking a more perspicuous third way between the ‘orthodox’ and the ‘revisionist’ readings. Both families of interpretations are partial to some elements of Hobbes' thought, therefore incapable of providing a coherent reading of its whole. A precise rendering of Hobbes' deontological reason allows a better hermeneutical understanding of his philosophy as well as a (...) keener appreciation of its relevance for past and present political thought. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically review the game-theoretic discussion of Hobbes and to develop a game-theoretic interpretation that gives due attention both to Hobbes's distinction between “moderates” and “dominators” and to what actually initiates conflict in the state of nature, namely, the competition for vital goods. As can be shown, Hobbes's state of nature contains differently structured situations of choice, the game-theoretic representation of which requires the prisoner's dilemma and the assurance game and the so-called assurance dilemma. (...) However, the “state of war” ultimately emerges from situations that cannot be described by any of these games because they represent zero-sum games in which the outcome of mutual cooperation does not exist. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes has recently been cast as one of the forefathers of political realism. This article evaluates his place in the realist tradition by focusing on three key themes: the priority of legitimacy over justice, the relation between ethics and politics, and the place of imagination in politics. The thread uniting these themes is the importance Hobbes placed on achieving a moral consensus around peaceful coexistence, a point which distances him from realists who view the two as competing goals of (...) politics. The article maintains that only a qualified version of the autonomy of the political position can be attributed to Hobbes, while arguing more generally that attending to the relation between ethics and politics is central to assessing his liberal credentials from a realist perspective. Against the prevalent reading of Hobbes as a hypothetical contract theorist, the article proceeds to show that the place of consent in his theory is better understood as part of his wider goal of transforming the imagination of his audience: a goal which is animated by concerns that realists share. (shrink)

Modern honor appears to be distinguished by two contradictory impulses, a neglect or even disdain of honor, and an ambition to elevate and promote it as dignity, self-esteem, and recognition. The article argues that these tensions can be traced to a foundational difference regarding the political importance of the passion of honor, evident in the seminal and contending formulations by Machiavelli and Hobbes. In recovering and articulating the bases of these competing modern conceptions of honor and tracing the influence of (...) their divergent trajectories, the article seeks to show the importance of honor for understanding contemporary politics. (shrink)

Este ensayo aborda el tratamiento que Hobbes da a la complejidad de la causalidad en conjunción con su análisis materialista del modo en que el miedo orienta al sujeto en el tiempo con el fin de defender que para Hobbes el miedo es tanto una respuesta como una negación de la imposibilidad de la auto-soberanía. El ensayo argumenta que los movimientos de la memoria y la anticipación que Hobbes describe como centrales en la pasión del miedo transforman el campo causal (...) del sujeto de tal manera que le da un sentido de posible dominio tanto sobre sí como sobre el mundo que la rodea. Al sugerir que el miedo fomenta la ilusión de autonomía en la agencia de los individuos, Hobbes señala la posibilidad de que el inmenso y temible poder atribuido al soberano no sea simplemente una respuesta a la necesidad de sofocar el desenfreno y el desorden, sino también una condición para el sentido de cada individuo de su propia soberanía. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes has recently been cast as one of the forefathers of political realism. This article evaluates his place in the realist tradition by focusing on three key themes: the priority of legit...

The publication in 1975 of Edward O. Wilson's Sociobiology provoked a great controversy, for in that work Wilson claimed that ethics was rooted in human biology. On the first page of the book, he asserted that our deepest intuitions of right and wrong are guided by the emotional control centers of the brain, which evolved via natural selection to help the human animal exploit opportunities and avoid threats in the natural environment. In 1998, the publication of Wilson's Consilience renewed the (...) controversy, as he continued to argue for explaining ethics through the biology of the moral sentiments.Footnotes* I am grateful to the Earhart Foundation for a research grant that supported the writing of this essay. (shrink)

According to a common reading of Thomas Hobbes, fear is the most philosophically important passion, responsible for the founding and sustaining of the commonwealth. I argue that this common reading is incorrect by focusing on the necessary and important role of hope in human action as well as in the founding and sustaining of the commonwealth. Life in the Hobbesian commonwealth, on the reading defended in this paper, is less fearful and more hopeful than scholars have noticed.

There is widespread scholarly disagreement whether Hobbesian passions are or involve a type of cognition (i.e., imagination). This largely overlooked disagreement has implications for our understanding of Hobbesian deliberation. If passions are intrinsically cognitive, then, because Hobbesian deliberation is a series of alternating passions, deliberation would appear to be intrinsically cognitive as well. In this paper, I bring to light this overlooked disagreement and argue for a non-cognitive reading of Hobbesian passions, according to which, a passion is an appetite or (...) aversion caused by, but distinct from, an imagination of a future good or harm. (shrink)

Hobbes is often portrayed as a thinker who anticipated modern constructivist ideas of fiction and representation according to which reality is simply a social construction. This article questions t...

In the introduction to the Leviathan, Hobbes famously defends the anthropological point of departure of his theory of the state by invoking the Delphic injunction ‘Know thyself!’ of which he presents a peculiar reading thereafter. In this paper, I present a reading of the anthropology of the Leviathan that takes this move seriously. In appealing to Delphic injunction, Hobbes wanted to prompt a particular way of reading his anthropology for which it is crucial that the reader relate the presented anthropological (...) views to his self-conception. The anthropology of the Leviathan is thus a kind of manual for a certain kind of self-reflection by which the reader's self-knowledge is to be improved. Furthermore, I will argue that Hobbes' interpretation of the Delphic injunction illuminates several theoretical issues relevant to the epistemology of that kind of ‘self-knowledge’ that was demanded by the Delphic injunction. While Hobbes does not solve all the epistemological problems related with the ideal appealed to by this inscription, he does provide some interesting insights into some general requirements that any epistemological account of Socratic self-knowledge has to meet. (shrink)

This paper assesses the complex debt of Machiavelli’s moral and political thought to Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition, especially in its Scholastic variant. My claim is that Machiavelli’s attitude vis-à-vis Aristotle is twofold because it reflects two different aspects of Aristotle’s moral and political theory that are closely intertwined and that were selectively developed by subsequent Aristotelian Scholastic commentators: a teleological and a realist aspect. On one hand, Machiavelli provides a model that dramatically breaks with Aristotle on, for example, the (...) question of the origin of human society and the moral prudence of rulers. On the other hand, Machiavelli’s engagement with Aristotle amounts to something more complex than a simple rejection. The Florentine appears to read Aristotle rather selectively, and emphasizes the realist dimension of certain Aristotelian ideas that suit his own original overturning of classical moral and political ideas. I use two paradigmatic themes in which the Aristotelian teleological-realist divide is most evident, i.e. the account of the origin of human society and the case of prudence, in order to prove the dual relationship of Machiavelli’s thought with Aristotelianism. (shrink)

In the following essay I shall propose a reading of Lordship and Bondage that follows what Robert Pippin termed a ‘practical turn’ (Pippin 2011: 28). I shall further argue that this turn ought to be qualified as Hegel's first philosophy. Starting with a reading that evinces the connection between the practical achievement of Self-Consciousness and the notion of Spirit as exhibiting a concentric relation, Spirit will be revealed to have its centre in the practical achievement of Self-Consciousness. I will then (...) offer a commentary on the notion of a complex desideratum as a way of attaining the concept of desire at work in the Phenomenology. The commentary will show that Hegel frames the satisfaction of this desire as a distinctive problem that will in turn necessitate a proper practical solution. This leads us to the implicit critique of contractualism, that may—in the terms of Hegel's argument—function as an impediment to the proper philosophical understanding of reciprocity. To conclude I shall propose a reading within the intrasubjective family of readings. We will find that the critique of both contractualism and the apprehension of the complex desideratum offers us the rationale for interpreting the peculiar absence of fear in Hegel's allegory of life-and-death struggle. I shall offer a detailed reading of the Lord and Bondsman trope and interpret these two figures as two aspects of one self-conscious individual in the process of apprehending their practical nature, thus making explicit a tripartite structure of practical self-consciousness. This will be suggested as the solution to the initial orectic problem and the beginning of an argument towards the practical attainment of Spirit. (shrink)

This article explores the origins of the problematic of political community by considering it in relation to the founding principles of `modern thought'. These principles are identified with the extirpation of moral values and ends from nature, in keeping with the rise of a `disenchanted' and mechanical scientific world-view. The transition from an `ancient' to a `modern' world-view is elaborated by drawing upon the work of Hans Blumenberg and Leo Strauss. The `demoralization' of nature, it is claimed, projects the formation (...) of the political commons into the space of history, a space within which community must be produced via artifice on the part of the willing subject. This Leitbild of modern community is examined through a reading of Hobbes's Leviathan which, it is claimed, stands as the founding attempt to remember the political commons from the sphere of human immanence, without recourse to natural or theological externality. However, it is argued, nature occupies an intermediary and ambiguous position in Hobbes's thought, at once transcended and reinscribed into political life as a `hedonist anthropology' that defines the human animal. Further, Hobbes's insistence that conventionally produced standards need be misrecognized as necessary and non-contingent undermines their legitimacy from the standpoint of human autonomy. This failure to break decisively with the appeal to nature leads to a political community that is at best a simulacrum, far removed from the vision of ethical unity that characterizes the classical conception of the polis and political life. Yet, it is argued, Hobbes's strategy nevertheless presents the key to subsequent attempts to complete a political `revolt' against nature, as developed in the thought of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper we deal with Hobbes’s elucidation of the political conflict caused by rebellious groups. First of all, we attempt to prove that groups are important characters in Hobbesian antagonisms. Secondly, it will be argued that the isomorphic structure that underlies all associations is vital to account for these disputes. To wit, the fact that minor corporate bodies are ‘similar’ vis à vis the State leaves a lengthy flank open to rebellion, since this homology may encourage their leaders (...) to compare themselves with the sovereign and to challenge his or her power. Whereas the inclusion of this trait may seem at face value paradoxical to Hobbes’s absolute order project, we shall contend that it is actually a way of ascribing responsibility to the leaders of rebellious groups. Furthermore, as a subsidiary hypothesis, it will be claimed that the centrality of the theory of represented corporations is a result of Hobbes’s aim to erase, not rebellion as such, but only its tumultuous setup. (shrink)