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  1. The retreat of reason: a dilemma in the philosophy of life.Ingmar Persson - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The Retreat of Reason brings back to philosophy the ambition of offering a broad vision of the human condition. One of the main original aims of philosophy was to give people guidance about how to live their lives. Ingmar Persson resumes this practical project, which has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy, but his conclusions are very different from those of the ancient Greeks. They typically argued that a life led in accordance with reason, a rational life, would also be (...)
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  • The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..
    Just as there are rational requirements on thought, there are rational requirements on action. This book defends a conception of ethics, and a related conception of human nature, according to which altruism is included among the basic rational requirements on desire and action. Altruism itself depends on the recognition of the reality of other persons, and on the equivalent capacity to regard oneself as merely one individual among many.
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  • Principled ethics: generalism as a regulative ideal.Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Michael R. Ridge.
    Moral philosophy has long been dominated by the aim of understanding morality and the virtues in terms of principles. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists, who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. In Principled Ethics, Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever meet the particularist challenge head-on, and defend a distinctive view they call "generalism as a regulative (...)
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  • Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this much-anticipated book, Jonathan Dancy offers the only available full-scale treatment of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. Dancy now presents particularism as the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. He grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining (...)
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  • Moral reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
    This book attempts to place a realist view of ethics (the claim that there are facts of the matter in ethics as elsewhere) within a broader context. It starts with a discussion of why we should mind about the difference between right and wrong, asks what account we should give of our ability to learn from our moral experience, and looks in some detail at the different sorts of ways in which moral reasons can combine to show us what we (...)
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  • Consequentialism and its critics.Samuel Scheffler (ed.) - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this anthology, distinguished scholars--Thomas Nagel, T.M. Scanlon, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Samuela Scheffler, Conrad D. Johnson, Bernard Williams, Peter Railton, Amartya Sen, Philippa Foot, and Derek Parfit-- debate arguments for and against the moral doctrine of consequentialism to present a complete view of this important topic in moral philosophy.
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  • Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  • The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Human beings have the unique ability to view the world in a detached way: We can think about the world in terms that transcend our own experience or interest, and consider the world from a vantage point that is, in Nagel's words, "nowhere in particular". At the same time, each of us is a particular person in a particular place, each with his own "personal" view of the world, a view that we can recognize as just one aspect of the (...)
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  • Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
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  • (5 other versions)The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.
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  • Prudence, Morality, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma‹.Derek Parfit - 1981 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    "From the Proceedings of the British Academy, London, volume LXV (1979)" - title page. Series: Henrietta Hertz Trust annual philosophical lecture -- 1978 Other Titles: Proceedings of the British Academy. Vol.65: 1979.
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  • Reasons.John Broome - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Clarendon Press. pp. 2004--28.
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  • The truth in particularism.Joseph Raz - 2000 - In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral particularism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 48--78.
    Particularism's model of explanation is challenged on the ground that a sensible intelligibility principle requires that there must be an explanation for the difference between a good and a bad action. Raz is concerned with what it is to be guided by reason, as well as with the results of the fact that reason can often undermine particular outcomes. What determines the moral status of an action must extend beyond what the agent's reason for acting is. It is argued that (...)
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  • Skorupski on Agent-Neutrality.John Broome - 1995 - Utilitas 7 (2):315.
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  • (2 other versions)Particularism and Supervenience.Caj Strandberg - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    One of our most fundamental notions of morality is that in so far as objects have moral properties, they have non-moral properties that make them have moral properties. Similarly, objects have moral properties in virtue of or because of having non-moral properties, and moral properties depend on non-moral properties. In ethics it has generally been assumed that this relation can be accounted for by the supervenience of moral properties on non-moral properties. However, this assumption is put into doubt by an (...)
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  • Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Philosophy 69 (267):114-116.
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  • What are the Options?Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - In Ethics without principles. New York: Oxford University Press.
    An introductory chapter that maps the possible views about the relation between moral thought and moral principles, showing how extreme the particularist position is. Particularism is contrasted with Rossian intuitionism and its use of prima facie principles; and the particularist account of moral reasoning is contrasted with non-monotonic theories, and with the views of Kagan and Scanlon.
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  • Particularizing particularism.Roger Crisp - 2000 - In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral particularism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 23--47.
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  • McNaughton and Rawling on the Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction.Douglas Portmore - 2001 - Utilitas 13 (3):350-356.
    In this paper, I criticize David McNaughton and Piers Rawling's formalization of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. I argue that their formalization is unable to accommodate an important ethical distinction between two types of conditional obligations. I then suggest a way of revising their formalization so as to fix the problem.
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  • (2 other versions)Particularism and Supervenience.Caj Strandberg - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Iii. Oxford University Press.
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  • (5 other versions)The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):280-281.
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  • The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life.Ingmar Persson - 2008 - Critica 40 (119):84-93.
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  • Analysing Personal Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2007 - The Journal of Ethics 11 (4):405-435.
    It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake. One benefit with it is its wide range: different kinds of values are analysable by the same general formula. Moreover, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude rather than (...)
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  • Conditional and Conditioned Reasons.David McNaughton & Piers Rawling - 2002 - Utilitas 14 (2):240.
    This paper is a brief reponse to some of Douglas Portmore's criticisms of our version of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction.
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  • Agent-Neutrality, Consequentialism, Utilitarianism … A Terminological Note.John Skorupski - 1995 - Utilitas 7 (1):49.
    It seems common at the moment to make agent-neutrality a necessary condition of ‘consequentialism” and to hold that deontological ethics are agent-relative. This note argues that both these tendencies regrettably obscure useful terms and distinctions. It concludes by considering what it would be best, now, to mean by ‘utilitarianism” and making a proposal.
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  • Climbing the Mountain.Derek Parfit - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
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  • Consequentialism and its critics.Samuel Scheffler - 1989 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 179 (1):129-130.
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  • The Paradox of Loyalty.Philip Pettit - 1988 - American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (2):163 - 171.
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  • Deontology and Agency.Piers Rawling - 1993 - The Monist 76 (1):81-100.
    Any adequate account of the distinction between consequentialist and deontological moral systems must take account of the central place given to constraints in the latter. Constraints place limits on what each of us may do in the pursuit of any goal, including the maximisation of the good. There is some debate, however, both over how constraints are to be characterised, and over the rationale for their inclusion in a moral system. Some authors view constraints as agent-relative: a constraint supplies an (...)
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  • Agent-Neutral Vs. Agent-Relative Reasons.Michael Ridge - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Universalizability without utilitarianism.Philip Pettit - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):74-82.
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  • The View From Nowhere.A. W. Moore - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148):323-327.
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  • Agent-Relativity and the Doing- Happening Distinction‹.David McNaughton & Piers Rawling - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (2):167 - 185.
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  • (5 other versions)The view from nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (2):221-222.
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  • The trouble with particularism (Dancy's version). [REVIEW]Joseph Raz - 2006 - Mind 115 (457):99-120.
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  • (1 other version)Moral Reasons.Mark Van Roojen - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):118-120.
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  • (1 other version)Review of Jonathan Dancy: Moral Reasons[REVIEW]Donald C. Hubin - 1995 - Ethics 106 (1):187-189.
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  • (2 other versions)Particularism and Supervenience.Caj Strandberg - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:129-158.
    One of our most fundamental notions of morality is that in so far as objects have moral properties, they have non-moral properties that make them have moral properties. Similarly, objects have moral properties in virtue of or because of having non-moral properties, and moral properties depend on non-moral properties. In ethics it has generally been assumed that this relation can be accounted for by the supervenience of moral properties on non-moral properties. However, this assumption is put into doubt by an (...)
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