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Prudence, Morality, and the Prisoner's Dilemma

Oxford: Oxford University Press (1981)

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  1. Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - Philosophia 37 (2):227-243.
    The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; Derek Parfit (...)
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  • Distinguishing Agent-Relativity From Agent-Neutrality.Matthew Hammerton - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):239-250.
    The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is one of the most important in contemporary moral theory. Yet, providing an adequate formal account of it has proven difficult. In this article I defend a new formal account of the distinction, one that avoids various problems faced by other accounts. My account is based on an influential account of the distinction developed by McNaughton and Rawling. I argue that their approach is on the right track but that it succumbs to two serious objections. I then (...)
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  • Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):560-579.
    A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counterintuitive scope issue, an (...)
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  • What is Christianity Good For? Religion as Assurance of Ethical and Economic Action.Peter Koslowski - 2007 - Philosophia Reformata 72 (1):34-52.
    There is a gap between self-interest and morality that is caused not only by individual shortcomings but also by the interdependence of the outcome of individual action with the actions of others. If the others can be expected to be ethical this uncertainty about the others’ behaviour is reduced but not eliminated. Failure of economic motivation will be followed by failure of ethical motivation. Christianity or monotheistic religion in general comes into the picture to assure ethical behaviour of being advantageous (...)
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  • Agent-Relative Consequentialism and Collective Self-Defeat.Matthew Hammerton - forthcoming - Utilitas:1-7.
    Andrew Forcehimes and Luke Semrau argue that agent-relative consequentialism is implausible because in some circumstances it classes an act as impermissible yet holds that the outcome of all agents performing that impermissible act is preferable. I argue that their problem is closely related to Derek Parfit's problem of ‘direct collective self-defeat’ and show how Parfit's plausible solution to his problem can be adapted to solve their problem.
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  • Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2011 - In Sliwinski Rysiek & Svensson Frans (eds.), Neither/Nor - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday. Uppsala Philosophical Studies. pp. 95 - 113.
    Reasons are facts, i.e., they are constituted by facts. Given a popular view that conceives of facts as thin abstract rather than thick concrete entities, the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons is not particularly problematic. It is argued that it would be preferable if we could understand the dichotomy even if we had a thick noton of fact in mind. It would be preferable because it is better if our notion of a reason is consistent with a wider rather (...)
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  • Consecuencialismo y relatividad evaluativa.Francisco Lara Sánchez - 1995 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 14:135.
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  • Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Rysiek Sliwinski - 2011 - Neither/nor-Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday 58:243 - 257.
    The much endorsed idea that reasons are facts, gives raise to several issues, not least when it is applied to the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. The paper distinguish in broad terms between two important views on the nature of facts. Given in particular a view that conceives of facts as abstract entities, the dichotomy is not particularly problematic. We might run into problems when it comes to identifying which facts are reasons and which are not, but the very (...)
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