The fundamental importance of theology in the work of Carl Schmitt has been the subject of much recent literature on this controversial figure. However, there has been little consensus on the precise nature of Schmitt's own political theologydecisionisminstitutional thinking,” in order to reveal the theological basis for his understanding of the new regime. I will then argue that Schmitt's institutional approach had in fact always been central to his earlier, better-known writings on law and the state. Schmitt's concept of the (...) institution, which had roots in French legal theory, grounded a political theology that was in the end less a metaphysical approach to the state than one that drew on the concrete example of the legal institutional order of the Catholic Church. (shrink)

Carl Schmitt sees the 1933 Nazi seizure of power as a revolution that inaugurates an entirely new era of political-legal order. Analyzing Schmitt’s rarer Nazi-texts, diaries, and correspondence, I argue that from 1933 to 1936 Schmitt attempts to theorize the Nazi revolution by developing an entirely new political language of Nazism, cleansed from non-German ways of thinking, especially nineteenth-century liberalism. I focus on three conceptual transformations through which Schmitt understands the remaking of the German state: The shift from the liberal (...) democratic neutral state to a new one-party state or a Führer-state dominated by a movement – a shift symbolized by the “death of Hegel”; the transformation of sovereign power into Führertum, represented by the symbolical deaths of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, whose thought cannot comprehend the totality of the Nazi movement, and the perversion of the liberal-democratic equality before the law to the völkisch equality of the race as the basis of all Nazi political–legal life. Criticizing previous interpretations of Schmitt’s Nazi thinking, I demonstrate that when Schmitt abandons his own decicionist thought in favor of concrete order thinking in 1933/1934 the idea of race becomes the basis of his political–legal thought. (shrink)

Carl Schmitt’s theory of emergency powers has garnered substantial attention in the aftermath of terrorist attacks on the US, UK, and Spain. Against those who underscore apparent discontinuities in Schmitt’s view of emergency government, or see him as advocating law-based and/or a constitutional model of emergency government, this chapter revisits three key historical and intellectual contexts—the First World War, the Weimar debate about Article 48, and the disintegration of Weimar democracy after 1930— to offer an alternative interpretation. The radical anti-legal (...) character of Schmitt’s position, along with its underlying continuities, is emphasized. Three recent post 9/11 employments of Schmitt’s ideas about emergency power are then examined. Each is found inadequate, in part because each accepts too much of the underlying logic of Schmitt’s theory and thus becomes vulnerable to its normative and political frailties. (shrink)

This chapter offers a longitudinal analysis of Carl Schmitt’s institutional theory. It draws a detailed road map for the period under investigation, examining critical junctures and theoretical turns along the way. Two principal arguments are advanced. First, the chapter departs from conventional analyses according to which Schmitt only embarked on an “institutional turn” in the early 1930s. Instead of conceiving of Schmitt’s institutionalism as an intellectual stage of his thought, the chapter posits that it constituted—as his predominant theoretical approach—its essence. (...) Second, the chapter argues and demonstrates that Schmitt’s institutional theory underwent a gradual transformation, from pragmatist institutionalism to extremist institutionalism. Taking a leaf from the late Hans Mommsen, the chapter argues that the development of Schmitt’s institutional theory was subject to a cumulative radicalization. (shrink)