The author presents and defends three theses: (1) "the first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology." (2) "the second is that the concepts of obligation, And duty... And of what is morally right and wrong, And of the moral sense of 'ought', Ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible...." (3) "the third thesis is that (...) the differences between the well-Known english writers on moral philosophy from sidgwick to the present day are of little importance." (staff). (shrink)

This essay examines how Michael Walzer and Dietrich Bonhoeffer understand practical moral dilemmas—what Walzer calls the problem of dirty hands—and how both conceive of the solution to the problem in terms of the concept of judgment. Walzer's judgment is strictly political, and tragic; Bonhoeffer's retains this political account but grounds it theologically, so as to overcome its finally tragic element.

Augustine famously defends the justice of killing in certain public contexts such as just wars. He also claims that private citizens who intentionally kill are guilty of murder, regardless of their reasons. Just as famously, Augustine seems to prohibit lying categorically. Analyzing these features of his thought and their connections, I argue that Augustine is best understood as endorsing the justice of lying in certain public contexts, even though he does not explicitly do so. Specifically, I show that parallels between (...) his treatments of killing and lying along with his “agent (auctor)–instrument (minister)” distinction, in which God is the true agent or “author” of certain acts and humans are merely God's instruments, together imply that he would regard certain instances of public lying as permissible and even obligatory. I buttress my argument by examining several key but neglected passages and by responding to various objections and rival interpretations. Throughout, I challenge standard interpretations of Augustine's ethics of killing and lying and seek to deepen our overall understanding of these dimensions of his thought. In so doing, I contribute to ongoing discussions of public and private lying and to the task of relating Augustine's thought to contemporary debate and deliberation on war, killing, and lying. (shrink)

Moral philosophers and theologians have long debated the classic moral dilemma of lying to an intruder in order to save a refugee. This dilemma presents an especially difficult challenge to those who reject consequentialist reasoning. Many contemporary defenders of Thomas Aquinas have argued that lying is never permissible under any circumstances, but none has offered a satisfactory answer to the question of what one ought to do when facing such a dilemma. I argue that there can be no morally satisfying (...) answer to this question, because every possible action will involve some degree of sin, even if lying is the least sinful action. This should not lead us to redefine what it means to tell a lie, nor to say that lying to the intruder is a good or right action; rather, it should lead us to acknowledge the tragic dimension of life in a fallen world. (shrink)

This article investigates the origin and nature of the early medieval Christian practice of imposing penances upon returning warriors. It attempts to show that, contrary to previous assumptions, this penitential practice cannot be understood simply and solely in terms of the sense of guilt resulting from the supposed sinfulness of killing in battle. By linking its use in Christian circles with similar practices elsewhere, the article shows that other factors, like the primitive horror sanguinis, a concern for cultic purity, the (...) Augustinian notion of concupiscence, and especially a sense of shame arising out of the ascetical idealism of the early Middle Ages, must also be taken into account. By thus highlighting the moral complexity of the early medieval treatment of returning warriors, the article tries also to bring into sharper focus the contrast of the latter to the modern therapeutic treatment of soldiers coming home from battle. (shrink)

Augustine's exposition of the image of God in Book 15 of On The Trinity sheds light on multiple issues that arise in scholarly interpretations of Augustine's account of lying. This essay argues against interpretations that posit a uniform account of lying in Augustine—with the same constitutive features, and insisting both that it is never necessary to tell a lie and that lying is absolutely prohibited. Such interpretations regularly employ intertextual reading strategies that elide distinctions and developments in Augustine's ethics of (...) lying. Instead, I show how looking at texts written prior and subsequent to the texts usually consulted suggests a trajectory in Augustine's thought, beginning with an understanding of lies as morally culpable but potentially necessary, and culminating in a vision of lying as the fundamental evil and the origin of every sin. (shrink)

This essay examines what Sartre called the problem of "dirty hands" as it applies to two issues in contemporary Catholic discussions of political morality. Beginning with Michael Walzer's work on dirty hands, the essay next identifies four approaches to this problem characteristic of Christian ethics. These four categories are then applied to analysis of two issues: conflicts of conscience that may confront Catholic politicians as a result of the responsibilities of public office and the church's exclusion of clergy and religious (...) from holding public office. (shrink)