- Does Hallucinating involve Perceiving?Rami Ali - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):601-627.details
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Consciousness and Cognition.Michael Thau - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Representationalism, perceptual distortion and the limits of phenomenal concepts.David Bourget - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.details
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(1 other version)Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Attention and mental paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.details
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(2 other versions)Proof of an external world.George Edward Moore - 1939 - Proceedings of the British Academy 25 (5):273--300.details
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Do visual experiences have contents?Susanna Siegel - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Pain.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.details
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Color as a secondary quality.Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman - 1989 - Mind 98 (January):81-103.details
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Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Waterfall Illusion.Tim Crane - 1988 - Analysis 48 (June):142-47.details
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Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Between instrumentalism and brain-writing.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - In Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations. Oxford University Press.details
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How to believe in qualia.Amy Kind - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 285--298.details
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Environmental representationalists on afterimages and phosphenes: Putting our best foot forward.Robert Schroer - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):531-546.details
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(1 other version)The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
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Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.details
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(1 other version)Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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Concepts in Perception.Tim Crane - 1988 - Analysis 48 (3):150-153.details
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Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1987 - MIT Press.details
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Proof of an External World.G. E. Moore - 1939 - H. Milford.details
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Spectrum inversion.Michael Thau - 2002 - In Consciousness and Cognition. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness, Color and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.details
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Afterimages and Sensation.Ian Phillips - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):417-453.details
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Critical Notice.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.details
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(2 other versions)The Philosopher’s Projective Error.Bernard W. Kobes - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):581-593.details
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Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):640-642.details
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Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent.Laura Gow - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):412-425.details
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Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities: New problems for representationalism.Michael Tye - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Crane's Waterfall Illusion.D. H. Mellor - 1988 - Analysis 48 (3):147-150.details
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