- (1 other version)On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.details
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Hill on mind.Alex Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173:831-39.details
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Against an Inferentialist Dogma.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1397-1421.details
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Rich or thin?Susanna Siegel & Alex Byrne - 2016 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge. pp. 59-80.details
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Frege's Puzzle for Perception.Boyd Millar - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):368-392.details
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Epistemic Modality De Re.Seth Yalcin - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:475-527.details
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Solving Frege's puzzle.Richard Heck - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):728-732.details
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Pictures Have Propositional Content.Alex Grzankowski - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):151-163.details
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The phenomenological directness of perceptual experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.details
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Are Phenomenal Concepts Perspectival?Andreas Elpidorou - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):43-53.details
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The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.details
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A pragmatic solution to Ostertag’s puzzle.Philip Atkins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.details
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On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals.Sarah Moss - 2010 - Noûs 46 (3):561-586.details
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Perceptual Content is Vertically Articulate.John Kulvicki - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):357-369.details
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Concept referentialism and the role of empty concepts.Kevan Edwards - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (1):89-118.details
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Frege's Puzzle and Descriptive Enrichment.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):267-282.details
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Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible.Jeff Speaks - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):339-361.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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On the coherence of inversion.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (2):127-137.details
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A somewhat eliminativist proposal about phenomenal consciousness.Pär Sundström - 2008 - In Hieke And Leitgeb (ed.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences. Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.details
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How representationalism can account for the phenomenal significance of illumination.René Jagnow - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):551-572.details
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Against qualia theory.James John - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):323 - 346.details
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Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of the subjective perceptual experience.Steven Lehar - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):763-764.details
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Colors as explainers?Andrew Botterell - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):785-786.details
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The knowledge argument, the open question argument, and the moral problem.Michael Pelczar - 2009 - Synthese 171 (1):25 - 45.details
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Recovering What Is Said With Empty Names.Gualtiero Piccinini & Sam Scott - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):239-273.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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The problem of puzzling pairs.Michael Nelson - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):319 - 350.details
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Millian descriptivism.Ben Caplan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):181-198.details
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(2 other versions)How do things look to the color-blind?David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne - 2010 - In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Bradford. pp. 259.details
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Why There Are No Token States.Eric Marcus - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:215-241.details
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Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details
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Perceptual content, information, and the primary/secondary quality distinction.John Kulvicki - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):103-131.details
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Color properties and color ascriptions: A relationalist manifesto.Jonathan Cohen - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (4):451-506.details
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Color and the Mind‐Body Problem.Alex Byrne - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.details
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The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness.Simon Prosser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):319 - 349.details
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(2 other versions)Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.details
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Consciousness and nonconceptual content. [REVIEW]Alex Byrne - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):261-274.details
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Against intentionalism.Bernard Nickel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279-304.details
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That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact: Moore on phenomenal relationism.Benj Hellie - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.details
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Externalism about mental content.Joe Lau - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The evolving fortunes of eliminative materialism.Paul M. Churchland - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Phenomenal properties as dummy properties.Richard J. Hall - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):199 - 223.details
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Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.details
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(1 other version)Representationalism about consciousness.William E. Seager & David Bourget - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 261-276.details
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Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationism.Ned Block - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press. pp. 137-142.details
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(1 other version)The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
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(1 other version)An adverbial theory of consciousness.Alan Thomas - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):161-85.details
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The ability hypothesis and the new knowledge-how.Yuri Cath - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):137-156.details
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Motivation as an epistemic ground.Peter Antich - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):775-790.details
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