- Are Phenomenal Concepts Perspectival?Andreas Elpidorou - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):43-53.details
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Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.details
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Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details
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Rich or thin?Susanna Siegel & Alex Byrne - 2016 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge. pp. 59-80.details
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Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):41-59.details
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Introspective Availability.John Kulvicki - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):208-228.details
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Concepts, Belief, and Perception.Alex Byrne - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schroder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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Pictures Have Propositional Content.Alex Grzankowski - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):151-163.details
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Epistemic Modality De Re.Seth Yalcin - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:475-527.details
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Determinability of Perception as Homogeneity of Representation.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):33-47.details
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Shoemaker on phenomenal content.Brad Thompson - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):307--334.details
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An adverbial theory of consciousness.Alan Thomas - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):161-85.details
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On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now.Pär Sundström - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-12.details
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On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.details
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The Regress Objection to Reflexive Theories of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):293-308.details
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Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible.Jeff Speaks - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):339-361.details
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Frege's Puzzle and Descriptive Enrichment.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):267-282.details
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Reticence of visual phenomenal character: A spatial interpretation of transparency.Robert Schroer - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):393-414.details
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Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia.Işık Sarıhan - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (1):5-32.details
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Perceptual Co-Reference.Michael Rescorla - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):569-589.details
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Against an Inferentialist Dogma.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1397-1421.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness.Simon Prosser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):319 - 349.details
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Recovering What Is Said With Empty Names.Gualtiero Piccinini & Sam Scott - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):239-273.details
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Cognitive self-management requires the phenomenal registration of intrinsic state properties.Frederic Peters - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1113-1135.details
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The knowledge argument, the open question argument, and the moral problem.Michael Pelczar - 2009 - Synthese 171 (1):25 - 45.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Against intentionalism.Bernard Nickel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279-304.details
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The problem of puzzling pairs.Michael Nelson - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):319 - 350.details
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On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals.Sarah Moss - 2010 - Noûs 46 (3):561-586.details
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Chess and the conscious mind: Why Dreyfus and McDowell got it wrong.Barbara Gail Montero - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (3):376-392.details
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The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.details
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The phenomenological directness of perceptual experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.details
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Frege's Puzzle for Perception.Boyd Millar - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):368-392.details
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Why There Are No Token States.Eric Marcus - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:215-241.details
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Imperative Transparency.Manolo Martínez - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):585-601.details
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On the coherence of inversion.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (2):127-137.details
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Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of the subjective perceptual experience.Steven Lehar - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):763-764.details
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Perceptual content, information, and the primary/secondary quality distinction.John Kulvicki - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):103-131.details
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Perception as a propositional attitude.Daniel Kalpokas - forthcoming - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science.details
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Color pluralism.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):563-601.details
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Against qualia theory.James John - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):323 - 346.details
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How representationalism can account for the phenomenal significance of illumination.René Jagnow - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):551-572.details
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Do Experiences Represent?Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):87-103.details
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Colour for representationalists.Frank Jackson - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):169--85.details
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The knowledge argument and objectivity.Robert J. Howell - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):145-177.details
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How do things look to the color-blind?David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne - 2010 - In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press. pp. 259.details
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That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact: Moore on phenomenal relationism.Benj Hellie - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.details
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Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.details
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