The book develops empirical generalizations about the major issues and suggests possible underlying theoretical principles.

Against the traditional view, Alvin Goldman argues that logic, probability theory, and linguistic analysis cannot by themselves delineate principles of rationality or justified belief. The mind's operations must be taken into account.

This first volume contains discussions of the brain, methods for analyzing behavior, thought, consciousness, attention, association, time, and memory.

I wish to advocate a reorientation of epistemology. Lest anyone maintain that the enterprise I urge is not epistemology at all (even part of epistemology), I call this enterprise by a slightly different name: epistemics. Despite this terminological concession, I believe that the inquiry I advocate is significantly continuous with traditional epistemology. Like much of past epistemology, it would seek to regulate or guide our intellectual activities. It would try to lay down principles or suggestions for how to conduct our (...) cognitive affairs. The contrast with traditional epistemology – at least "analytic" epistemology of the twentieth century – would be its close alliance with the psychology of cognition. The basic premise of epistemics is that one cannot give the best advice about intellectual operations without detailed information about mental processes. Since these processes are most illuminatingly studied by cognitive psychology, epistemics would go hand in hand with empirical investigation of our "information-processing" mechanisms. (shrink)

The debate between externalists and internalists in epistemology can be viewed as a disagreement about whether there are epistemic rights without corresponding duties or obligations. Taking an epistemic right to believe P as an authorization to not only accept P as true but to use P as a positive reason for accepting other propositions, the debate is about whether there are unjustified justifiers. It is about whether there are propositions that provide for others what nothing need provide for them—viz., reasons (...) for thinking them true. (shrink)

This textbook on vision reflects the integrated computational approach of modern research scientists, combining psychological, computational and neuroscientific perspectives.

In this paper I explore a brand of scepticism about perceptual experience that takes its start from recent work in psychology and philosophy of mind on change blindness and related phenomena. I argue that the new scepticism rests on a problematic phenomenology of perceptual experience. I then consider a strengthened version of the sceptical challenge that seems to be immune to this criticism. This strengthened sceptical challenge formulates what I call the problem of perceptual presence. I show how this problem (...) can be addressed by drawing on an enactive or sensorimotor approach to perceptual consciousness. Our experience of environmental detail consists in our access to that detail thanks to our possession of practical knowledge of the way in which what we do and sensory stimulation depend on each other. (shrink)

This collection of readings shows how cognitive science can influence most of the primary branches of philosophy, as well as how philosophy critically examines the foundations of cognitive science. Its broad coverage extends beyond current texts that focus mainly on the impact of cognitive science on philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology, to include materials that are relevant to five other branches of philosophy: epistemology, philosophy of science (and mathematics), metaphysics, language, and ethics. The readings are organized by philosophical (...) fields, with selections evenly divided between philosophers and cognitive scientists. They draw on research in numerous areas of cognitive science, including cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, social psychology, psychology of reasoning and judgment, artificial intelligence, linguistics, and neuropsychology. There are timely treatments of current topics and debates such as the innate understanding of number, children's theory of mind, self-knowledge, consciousness, connectionism, and ethics and cognitive science. (shrink)

How we see and how we visualize: why the scientific account differs from our experience.

" In a book that seeks to shift the ground of debate within theory of knowledge, William P. Alston finds that the century-lo.

In this chapter, the impact of “functional blindness” during saccades—rapid point-to-point eye movements—on the current theories of perception is explored. These saccades cause gaps in the visual stream that reaches our mental representation of the environment. A detailed explanation of the phenomenon is provided, from its physical and anatomical causes to its functional effect on perception. Several experiments and studies pertaining to the study are discussed to support the conclusions drawn at the end of the chapter. The chapter posits that (...) this phenomenon supports the assumption that there is an area of the brain responsible for maintaining representations of the visual world, which allows inferences to be made during those visual gaps. These representations are assumed to be based primarily on the general information provided by the stimuli rather than specific details, which allows greater focus on areas of importance to the viewer. (shrink)