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  1. When do we simulate non-human agents? Dissociating communicative and non-communicative actions.Roman Liepelt, Wolfgang Prinz & Marcel Brass - 2010 - Cognition 115 (3):426-434.
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  • World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki.[author unknown] - 1991 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 19 (3-4):264-265.
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  • Biological movement increases acceptance of humanoid robots as human partners in motor interaction.Aleksandra Kupferberg, Stefan Glasauer, Markus Huber, Markus Rickert, Alois Knoll & Thomas Brandt - 2011 - AI and Society 26 (4):339-345.
    The automatic tendency to anthropomorphize our interaction partners and make use of experience acquired in earlier interaction scenarios leads to the suggestion that social interaction with humanoid robots is more pleasant and intuitive than that with industrial robots. An objective method applied to evaluate the quality of human–robot interaction is based on the phenomenon of motor interference (MI). It claims that a face-to-face observation of a different (incongruent) movement of another individual leads to a higher variance in one’s own movement (...)
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  • Infants’ understanding of everyday social interactions: A dual process account.Gustaf Gredebäck & Annika Melinder - 2010 - Cognition 114 (2):197-206.
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  • Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach.A. Woodward - 1998 - Cognition 69 (1):1-34.
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  • A unifying view of the basis of social cognition.Vittorio Gallese, Christian Keysers & Giacomo Rizzolatti - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (9):396-403.
    In this article we provide a unifying neural hypothesis on how individuals understand the actions and emotions of others. Our main claim is that the fundamental mechanism at the basis of the experiential understanding of others' actions is the activation of the mirror neuron system. A similar mechanism, but involving the activation of viscero-motor centers, underlies the experiential understanding of the emotions of others.
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