This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species). It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties. It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations. Finally, it draws out the implications of this interpretation (...) with the aim of correcting some persistent misunderstandings of the connection between Aquinas's views and those developed by contemporary philosophers of mind. (shrink)

Descartes' Ideentheorie ist in der neueren Forschung immer wieder als Ausgangspunkt des neuzeitlichen "way of ideas" dargestellt worden, der in einen verhängnisvollen Repräsentationalismus mündet. Denn Cartesische Ideen scheinen so etwas wie mentale Objekte in einer "inneren Arena" zu sein. Da wir nur zu diesen mentalen Objekten einen unmittelbaren Zugang haben, können wir höchstens auf die Existenz äußerer Objekte schließen, wir können sie aber nie unmittelbar erkennen. Stets sind wir in unserer inneren Arena gefangen. Gegen diese weit verbreitete Auffassung argumentiert diese (...) Studie, daß Descartes' Ideentheorie im Rahmen einer Theorie der Intentionalität zu verstehen ist: Ideen sind nichts anderes als intentionale Akte, die im Normalfall auf äußere Objekte gerichtet sind und diese Objekte zum Inhalt haben. In der Cartesischen Ontologie gibt es keinen Platz für mysteriöse innere Objekte, die sich gleichsam zwischen den Geist und die äußeren Objekte schieben. Freilich stellen sich dann sogleich die Fragen, (i) wie geistige Akte überhaupt auf Objekte gerichtet sein können, (ii) wie der Inhalt dieser Akte zu bestimmen ist und (iii) wie wir mittels intentionaler Akte eine korrekte Erkenntnis der Außenwelt gewinnen können. -/- Diesen Fragen geht die Studie in ausführlichen Text- und Argumentationsanalysen nach. Sie verdeutlicht, daß im Zentrum der Cartesischen Lehre die These steht, daß wir ganz bestimmte Ideen - nämlich klare und distinkte - benötigen, um wahre Urteile über die äußeren Objekte bilden zu können. Dabei wird die Cartesische Theorie einerseits im historischen Kontext dargestellt, andererseits werden aber auch Bezüge zur gegenwärtigen analytischen Diskussion hergestellt. (shrink)

A completely new translation of the works of Descartes is intended to replace the Haldane and Ross edition, first published in 1911. All material from that edition is translated here, with a number of other texts crucial for understanding Cartesian philosophy.

The book also includes a chronological table of significant events, select bibliography, succinct explanatory notes, and an index--all of which supply ...

The Cambridge History of 17th Century Philosophy offers a uniquely comprehensive and authoritative overview of early-modern philosophy written by an international team of specialists. As with previous Cambridge histories of philosophy the subject is treated by topic and theme, and since history does not come packaged in neat bundles, the subject is also treated with great temporal flexibility, incorporating frequent reference to medieval and Renaissance ideas. The basic structure of the volumes corresponds to the way an educated seventeenth - century (...) European might have organized the domain of philosophy. Thus, the history of science, religious doctrine, and politics feature very prominently. The narrative that unfolds begins with an intellectual world dominated by a synthesis of Aristotelianism and scholastic philosophy, but by the end of the period the mechanistic or "corpuscularian" philosophy has emerged and exerted its full impact on traditional metaphysics, ethics, theology, logic, and epistemology. (shrink)

Descartes claims in the Third Meditation that ideas of sense might be materially false. While an accurate interpretation of this claim has the potential of providing some valuable insights into Descartes's theory of ideas in general and his understanding of the epistemic status of sensations in particular, the explanation Descartes provides of the material falsity of ideas is itself obscure and misleading, making accurate interpretation difficult. In this paper an interpretation of material falsity is offered which identifies the fault of (...) materially false ideas in the logical incoherence of their objective content. The implications of this interpretation are also discussed. (shrink)

I examine Descartes's theory of cognition, taking as a starting point his account of how misperception is possible. In the Third Meditation Descartes introduces the hypothesis that there are ideas (such as the idea of cold) which seem to be of something real but which in fact represent nothing (if, for example, cold is a privation or absence of heat, rather than the presence of a positive quality). I argue, against Margaret Wilson, that Descartes does not think there are any (...) such ideas and that he introduces the hypothesis only in order to formulate an objection to his argument for the existence of God. I argue further that while he agrees with Arnauld in accepting the Aristotelian account of cognition according to which the very objects in the world that we perceive exist in the soul or its ideas objectively, he still has a satisfactory response to Arnauld's objection that since an idea can represent only what it appears to be of, all error must reside solely in our judgment. I claim that Arnauld's objection that an idea represents what it appears to be of is based on the assumption that an idea appears to be of what exists in it objectively. But Descartes makes room for the possibility of misrepresentation by distinguishing between what exists objectively in an idea and what that idea appears to be of. First, he thinks that it is at least coherent to suppose that an idea lacking objective reality could appear to be of something in virtue of its material reality. Since an idea lacking objective reality would not represent any thing that exists in the world, Descartes concedes that it would not misrepresent any actually existing thing, but it could still appear to be of some thing and in that way misrepresent the way the world is. Second, there is reason to claim that like some of his Aristotelian predecessors Descartes holds that what exists in the soul objectively can appear to be other than it is. This interpretation has the implication that Descartes's theory of ideas, in contrast to sense datum theories, is not driven by the motive of finding some entity which is exactly as it appears to serve as the object of immediate awareness. (shrink)

My aim is to arrive at a better understanding of the distinction between direct realism and representationalism by offering a critical analysis of Steven Nadler.

IDEAS. and. MECHANISM. Essays on Early Modern Philosophy MARGARET DAULER WILSON For more than three decades, Margaret Wilson's essays on early modern philosophy have influenced scholarly debate. Many are considered  ...

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

“The Standard Interpretation” of Descartes on material falsity states that Descartes believed that materially false ideas (MFIs) lack “objective reality” [realitas objectiva]. The argument for the Standard Interpretation depends on a statement from the “Third Meditation” that MFIs are caused by nothing. This statement, in conjunction with a causal principle introduced by Descartes, seems to entail that MFIs lack objective reality. However, the Standard Interpretation is incorrect. First, I argue that, despite initial appearances, the manner in which Descartes understands the (...) proposition that MFIs are caused by nothing does not entail that they lack objective reality. Secondly, I argue that Descartes is committed to the objective reality of MFIs because of his quasi-scholastic explanation of MFIs. (shrink)

Las Disputaciones metafísicas de Francisco Suárez se presentan como una reconstrucción de la filosofía fundamental que se organiza no ya según el esquema de la metafísica aristotélica, ni problemáticamente, al estilo del comentario escolástico, sino como un edificio ordenado que expone la noción de la realidad misma. Es la elaboración de un sistema que no sólo respete el orden tradicional de las cuestiones filosóficas, sino que configure una nueva estructura mediante la cual la metafísica, lejos de ser un freno para (...) el desarrollo científico pueda transformarse en el resorte para su progreso. Estamos ante una especie de Enciclopedia del saber filosófico estructurado sistemáticamente, sobre cuya base podrá el pensamiento europeo llevar a cabo su revolución racionalista. La Europa moderna e ilustrada, de Descartes a Kant, buscará, de un modo manifiesto o implícito, en las Disputaciones metafísicas la referencia escolar que precisa para su propia construcción teórica racional y crítica. En suma, la equilibrada doctrina de Suárez constituye el fulcro a partir del que podrán alzarse las más variadas doctrinas sobre el conocimiento humano, la naturaleza, la sociedad y la legitimación del poder político, que aún hoy constituyen la base de nuestra comprensión de la realidad. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Objective Reality in the Cartesian Framework Material Falsity and Its Problems Reading 1: Descartes Abandons Material Falsity Reading 2: Reconciling Material Falsity and Objective Reality Response to the Dilemma of Uncaused Ideas The Identity of Ideas References and Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Falsity Inherent in Sensory Ideas Descartes, Arnauld, and the Notion of Material Falsity Some Leading Interpretations A New Interpretation Conclusion.

Annotation Scholars of medieval scholastic philosophy as well as those who study semiotics will appreciate this side-by-side translation, with introduction, by Doyle (Saint Louis U.) of a late 16th-early 17th century Jesuit text. The text (its name is taken from the U. of Coimbra, in Portugal, where the authors taught) contains commentaries on Aristotle, as part of a course in philosophy, particularly logic. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).

Publie en 1683 comme un preambule a la refutation du Traite de la nature et de la grace de Nicolas Malebranche, l'ouvrage Vraies et fausses idees d'Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) a connu un etonnant destin. Cette defense tres argumentee de la conception cartesienne des idees est peu a peu devenue un texte incontournable dans les debats de philosophie de la connaissance, cite et commente aussi bien par les auteurs classiques que dans les debats anglosaxons contemporains. Ce volume en propose la premiere (...) edition critique annotee en francais. Des annexes apportent en outre quelques outils pour se reperer dans l'important corpus de textes de philosophie de la connaissance rediges par Arnauld. (shrink)

Here I develop an interpretation of Descartes' theory of ideas which differs from the standard reading in that it incorporates a distinction between what an idea appears to represent and what it represents. I argue that this interpretation not only finds support in the texts but also is required to explain a large number of assertions in Descartes which would otherwise appear irremediably obscure or problematic. For example, in my interpretation it is not puzzling that Descartes responds to Arnauld's difficulty (...) concerning the notion of material falsity by drawing a distinction between that to which an idea conforms (that of which the idea truly is) and that to which it refers. Furthermore, my interpretation also explains how Descartes can intelligibly reject the view that saying that something is clear and distinct is equivalent to saying that it is obvious. Finally, I argue that my interpretation allows Descartes' view that we have some sort of internal access to the objects actually represented by an idea. (shrink)

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.

_Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’s Meditations _approaches Descartes’s Meditations as an intellectual journey, wherein Descartes’s views develop and change as he makes new discoveries about self, God and matter. The first book to focus closely on Descartes’s notion of material falsity, it shows how Descartes’s account of material falsity – and correspondingly his account of crucial notions such as truth, falsehood and error – evolves according to the epistemic advances in the Meditations. It also offers important new insights on (...) the crucial role of Descartes’s Third Meditation discussion of material falsity in advancing many subsequent arguments in the Meditations. This book is essential reading for those working on Descartes and early modern philosophy. It presents an independent reading on issues of perennial interest, such as Descartes’s views on error, truth and falsehood. It also makes important contributions to topics that have been the focus of much recent scholarship, such as Descartes’s ethics and his theodicy. Those working on the interface between medieval and modern philosophy will find the discussions on Descartes’s debt to predecessors like Suárez and Augustine invaluable. (shrink)

Foundations of Mind collects the essays which established Tyler Burge as a leading philosopher of mind.

In the first part of this paper I explore the relations among distinctness, separability, number, and non-identity. I argue that Descartes believes plurality in things themselves arises from distinction, so that things distinct in any of the three ways are not identical. The only exception concerns universals which, considered in things themselves, are identical to particulars. I also argue that to be distinct is to be separable. Things distinct by reason are separable only in thought by means of ideas not (...) clear and distinct. In the second part I argue that the notion of separability in Descartes’s account of real distinction between mind and body is subject to five different interpretations. I claim that the heart of Cartesian dualism concerns the separability of the attributes thought and extension. It does not require that mind and body are separable in the sense that each can exist without the other existing. (shrink)

Arnauld's criticisms as "a model of confusion confounded.” In a review of Wilson's book, R. McRae refers to "the difficult and not too coherent subject of material falsity. '' J. Cottingham describes the Descartes-Arnauld debate on the material falsity of adventitious ideas as "an involved and rather inconclusive exchange " and claims that the example of the material falsity of such ideas espoused by Descartes in Meditation III is "needlessly complicated. " A. Kenny, in turn, notes that several things are (...) "confusing in Descartes' account of false ideas. " Later reference is made to the fact that "Descartes appears confused. [...] and that "Descartes, it seems, cannot give a consistent answer. '' As will become clear, I take issue with each of these assessments. When Descartes' position on material falsity is understood in the light of late Scholastic sources, especially Suarez, whence it draws its strength and inspiration, the alleged confusion and incoherency vanishes. .. (shrink)