This title, first published in 1973, brings together a variety of papers by Israel Scheffler, one of America’s leading educational philosophers. The essays each stress the importance of critical thought and independent judgement to the organization of educational activities. In the first section, Scheffler adopts a metaphilosophical approach, emphasizing the role of philosophy in educational thought. A number of key concepts are dealt with next, including the study of education and its relation to theoretical disciplines, philosophical interpretations of teaching, and (...) the education of teachers. The final section is critical, and deals with the writings of several key thinkers in the field. A broad and authoritative study, this reissue will provide any Philosophy student with an essential background to the criticism and theories surrounding the philosophy of education. (shrink)

The traditional views of science as the possessor of a special method, and as the epitome or apex of rationality, have come under severe challenges for a variety of historical, psychological, sociological, political, and philosophical reasons. As a result, many philosophers are either denying science its claim to rationality, or else casting about for a new account of its rationality. In this paper a defense of the traditional view is offered. It is argued that contemporary philosophical discussion regarding the rationality (...) of science is plagued by a failure to distinguish among three different questions, all taken to be "the" question of the rationality of science. Once these questions are delineated, it becomes possible to answer one of them in such a way that the traditional link between science's rationality and its method is reestablished--although the scientific method is itself given a non-traditional rendering. In short, it is argued that there is a feature of science which is appropriately characterized as its method; that this method does in fact secure science's rationality; and that science is therefore correctly construed as preeminently rational. It is suggested in addition that the philosophy of science is itself best seen as a primarily epistemological activity, and consequently that a correction from the excessively historicist conception of recent philosophy of science is in order. (shrink)

Unlike more standard non-normative naturalizations of epistemology and philosophy of science, Larry Laudan's naturalized philosophy of science explicitly maintains a normative dimension. This paper critically assesses Laudan's normative naturalism. After summarizing Laudan's position, the paper examines (1) Laudan's construal of methodological rules as 'instrumentalities' connecting methodological means and cognitive ends; (2) Laudan's instrumental conception of scientific rationality; (3) Laudan's naturalistic account of the axiology of science; and (4) the extent to which a normative philosophy of science can be naturalized. It (...) is concluded that Laudan's normative naturalism is as problematic as its non-normative naturalist cousins. (shrink)

This article points out an internal tension, or even conflict, in the conceptual foundations of Harvey Siegel’s conception of critical thinking. Siegel justifies critical thinking, or critically rational autonomy, as an educational ideal first and foremost by an appeal to the Kantian principle of respect for persons. It is made explicit that this fundamental moral principle is ultimately grounded in the Kantian conception of autonomous practical reason as normatively and motivationally robust. Yet this Kantian conception openly conflicts with Siegel’s own (...) two-component theory of critical thinking, which on close inspection turns out to be a version of the Humean conception of instrumental practical reason as normatively and motivationally powerless. It is concluded that Siegel cannot have it both ways: he cannot appeal both to means-end and to robust rationality. Siegel’s Kantian justification of the critical thinking educational ideal is, therefore, found wanting in terms of his own Humean premises. (shrink)

In two recent papers, I criticized Ronald N. Giere's and Larry Laudan's arguments for 'naturalizing' the philosophy of science (Siegel 1989, 1990). Both Giere and Laudan replied to my criticisms (Giere 1989, Laudan 1990b). The key issue arising in both interchanges is these naturalists' embrace of instrumental conceptions of rationality, and their concomitant rejection of non-instrumental conceptions of that key normative notion. In this reply I argue that their accounts of science's rationality as exclusively instrumental fail, and consequently that their (...) cases for 'normatively naturalizing' the philosophy of science fail as well. (shrink)

Objective: To review the principles and practice of the use of conscious sedation for IVF.Design: The pertinent literature was reviewed and recommendations are provided.Result(s): Conscious sedation appears to be the most commonly used method of pain relief for transvaginal retrieval of oocytes. Conscious sedation does not require the presence of an anesthesiologist and can be done in freestanding clinics. Agents commonly used include opioids in combination with benzodiazepines. This combination minimizes pain, decreases anxiety, and provides sedation and some amnesia Adjuvants (...) such as promethazine and hydroxyzine can also be used but often are not needed. Conscious sedation is well tolerated by patients and does not require highly specialized equipment. However, there are specific safeguards that should be followed. Only a few toxicity studies have been performed, but they are reassuring because they have not found significant effects on fertilization or cleavage.Conclusion(s): Conscious sedation appears to be a safe and cost-effective method of providing analgesia and anesthesia for transvaginal retrieval of oocytes. (shrink)