Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):763-766.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   278 citations  
  • Being and Nothingness.Frederick A. Olafson, Jean-Paul Sartre & Hazel E. Barnes - 1958 - Philosophical Review 67 (2):276.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   395 citations  
  • Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   447 citations  
  • Book Review: Unprincipled Virtue by Nomy Arpaly. [REVIEW]Manuel Vargas - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (2):201-204.
    Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   185 citations  
  • Epistemic Value and the Primacy of What We Care About.Linda Zagzebski - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (3):353-377.
    Abstract In this paper I argue that to understand the ethics of belief we need to put it in a context of what we care about. Epistemic values always arise from something we care about and they arise only from something we care about. It is caring that gives rise to the demand to be epistemically conscientious. The reason morality puts epistemic demands on us is that we care about morality. But there may be a (small) class of beliefs which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Epistemic Normativity.Stephen Grimm - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264.
    In this article, from the 2009 Oxford University Press collection Epistemic Value, I criticize existing accounts of epistemic normativity by Alston, Goldman, and Sosa, and then offer a new view.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  • The Place of Truth in Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2003 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual virtue: perspectives from ethics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 155-180.
    ... With those who identify happiness [faring happily or well] with virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   109 citations  
  • Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   428 citations  
  • Weakness of will and rational action.Robert Audi - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):270 – 281.
    Weakness of will has been widely discussed from at least three points of view. It has been examined historically, with Aristotle recently occupying centre stage. It has been analysed conceptually, with the question of its nature and possibility in the forefront. It has been considered normatively in relation to both rational action and moral character. My concern is not historical and is only secondarily conceptual: while I hope to clarify what constitutes weakness of will, I presuppose, rather than construct, an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • (1 other version)True to Life: Why Truth Matters.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Philosophy 80 (314):601-604.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   107 citations  
  • Equality and respect.Harry Frankfurt - 1998 - In Harry G. Frankfurt (ed.), Necessity, Volition, and Love. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  • Epistemic normativity.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376.
    This paper examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? A semantic approach to this question, due to Alvin Goldman, is examined and found unacceptable. Instead, accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires are argued to be most promising. All of these accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. It is argued that such an account may be offered, grounding our epistemic norms in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   104 citations  
  • (1 other version)Virtues of the mind: an inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge.William Alston - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):197–201.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   355 citations  
  • Intellectual motivation and the good of truth.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual virtue: perspectives from ethics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 135--154.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Necessity, Volition and Love.Harry G. Frankfurt - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):114-116.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   182 citations  
  • (1 other version)True to Life: Why Truth Matters.Michael Lynch & Maria Baghramian - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):137-140.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • (1 other version)What's Bad About Bad Faith?Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):50-73.
    : Contemporary common sense holds that authenticity is an ethical ideal: that there is something bad about inauthenticity, and something good about authenticity. Here we criticize the view that authenticity is bad because it detracts from the wellbeing of the inauthentic person, and propose an alternative moral account of the badness of inauthenticity, based on the idea that inauthentic behaviour is potentially misleading.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value. [REVIEW]Rosalind Hursthouse - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):418-422.
    This book has an ambitious aim—to make convincing the rejection of the hard and fast cognitive–conative divide currently so prevalent in philosophy of mind and moral psychology. Only such a rejection, Helm believes, can solve—or dissolve—the two major problems of practical reason. The ‘motivational problem’ is ‘a puzzle about the connection between our choosing something as the outcome of deliberation and our being motivated to pursue it’ (p. 1); the ‘deliberative problem’ concerns ‘how deliberation about value is possible’ (p. 11) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations