The central philosophical task posed by conventions is to analyze what they are and how they differ from mere regularities of action and cognition. Subsidiary questions include: How do conventions arise? How are they sustained? How do we select between alternative conventions? Why should one conform to convention? What social good, if any, do conventions serve? How does convention relate to such notions as rule, norm, custom, practice, institution, and social contract? Apart from its intrinsic interest, convention is important because (...) philosophers frequently invoke it when discussing other topics. A favorite philosophical gambit is to argue that, perhaps despite appearances to the contrary, some phenomenon ultimately results from convention. Notable candidates include: property, government, justice, law, morality, linguistic meaning, necessity, ontology, mathematics, and logic. (shrink)

Scientific narratives about cosmology often present black holes as frightening objects of both creation and destruction, the centres of which are concealed behind event horizons. According to studies, black holes are capable of distorting time and tearing apart anything that plunges toward them. This article asks what the latest knowledge about the properties of black holes can contribute to philosophical understandings of being and time. Drawing on both scientific and narrative constructions of black holes in books written by physicists, the (...) article analyzes black holes in relation to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of ontology in Being and Time. The article argues that the topics of concealment, time, and mortality form interrelated points of intersection among scientific constructions of black holes and Heidegger’s philosophy. First, scientific commentaries on the concealment of singularities speak to Heidegger’s interpretation of the ways being is concealed in modern society. Second, with regard to time, the phenomenon of gravitational redshift invokes Heidegger’s criticisms of clock time and, by extension, notions of infinitude. On the other hand, theories about Hawking radiation and the decay of black holes also invoke Heidegger’s thesis that time subsists predominantly as a passing away toward the cessation of existence. Third and finally, Heidegger’s renowned and controversial explication of mortality helps frame black holes symbolically as forward-projections toward the impossibility of existence. Bringing these three subjects together, the article concludes that, as Heideggerian symbols of being and time, black holes represent projections toward the possibility of impossible modes and forms of existence. In this sense, black holes emblematize a relationship between being and time that marks the potential limits of existence, as humanity and science understand it. (shrink)

Plato's Cratylus is a brilliant but enigmatic dialogue. It bears on a topic, the relation of language to knowledge, which has never ceased to be of central philosophical importance, but tackles it in ways which at times look alien to us. In this reappraisal of the dialogue, Professor Sedley argues that the etymologies which take up well over half of it are not an embarrassing lapse or semi-private joke on Plato's part. On the contrary, if taken seriously as they should (...) be, they are the key to understanding both the dialogue itself and Plato's linguistic philosophy more broadly. The book's main argument is so formulated as to be intelligible to readers with no knowledge of Greek, and will have a significant impact both on the study of Plato and on the history of linguistic thought. (shrink)

This engaging and accessible introduction to the philosophy of language provides an important guide to one of the liveliest and most challenging areas of study in philosophy. Interweaving the historical development of the subject with a thematic overview of the different approaches to meaning, the book provides students with the tools necessary to understand contemporary analytical philosophy. The second edition includes new material on: Chomsky, Wittgenstein and Davidson as well as new chapters on the causal theory of reference, possible worlds (...) semantics and semantic externalism. (shrink)

_ Convention_ was immediately recognized as a major contribution to the subject and its significance has remained undiminished since its first publication in 1969. Lewis analyzes social conventions as regularities in the resolution of recurring coordination problems-situations characterized by interdependent decision processes in which common interests are at stake. Conventions are contrasted with other kinds of regularity, and conventions governing systems of communication are given special attention.

Context: More than 20 years ago Varela initiated a research program to advance in the scientific study of consciousness, neurophenomenology. Problem: Has Varela’s neurophenomenology, the solution to the “hard problem,” been successful? Which issues remain unresolved, and why? Method: This introduction sketches the progress that has been made since then and links it to the contributions to this special issue. Results: Instead of a unified research field, today we find a variety of different interpretations and implementations of neurophenomenology. We argue (...) that neurophenomenology needs to give additional attention to its experiential dimension by addressing first-person methods’ specific challenges and by rethinking the relationship between the frameworks of the first- and third-person approaches. (shrink)

Almost everything that we know about Zeno of Elea is to be found in the opening pages of Plato's Parmenides. There we learn that Zeno was nearly 40 years old when Socrates was a young man, say 20. Since Socrates was born in 469 BC we can estimate a birth date for Zeno around 490 BC. Beyond this, really all we know is that he was close to Parmenides (Plato reports the gossip that they were lovers when Zeno was young), (...) and that he wrote a book of paradoxes defending Parmenides' philosophy. Sadly this book has not survived, and what we know of his arguments is second-hand, principally through Aristotle and his commentators (here I have drawn particularly on Simplicius, who, though writing a thousand years after Zeno, apparently possessed at least some of his book). There were apparently 40 ‘paradoxes of plurality’, attempting to show that ontological pluralism — a belief in the existence of many things rather than only one — leads to absurd conclusions; of these paradoxes only two definitely survive, though a third argument can probably be attributed to Zeno. Aristotle speaks of a further four arguments against motion (and by extension change generally), all of which he gives and attempts to refute. In addition Aristotle attributes two other paradoxes to Zeno. Sadly again, almost none of these paradoxes are quoted in Zeno's original words by their various commentators, but in paraphrase. (shrink)

Scientific narratives about cosmology often present black holes as frightening objects of both creation and destruction, the centres of which are concealed behind event horizons. According to studies, black holes are capable of distorting time and tearing apart anything that plunges toward them. This article asks what the latest knowledge about the properties of black holes can contribute to philosophical understandings of being and time. Drawing on both scientific and narrative constructions of black holes in books written by physicists, the (...) article analyzes black holes in relation to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of ontology in Being and Time. The article argues that the topics of concealment, time, and mortality form interrelated points of intersection among scientific constructions of black holes and Heidegger’s philosophy. First, scientific commentaries on the concealment of singularities speak to Heidegger’s interpretation of the ways being is concealed in modern society. Second, with regard to time, the phenomenon of gravitational redshift invokes Heidegger’s criticisms of clock time and, by extension, notions of infinitude. On the other hand, theories about Hawking radiation and the decay of black holes also invoke Heidegger’s thesis that time subsists predominantly as a passing away toward the cessation of existence. Third and finally, Heidegger’s renowned and controversial explication of mortality helps frame black holes symbolically as forward-projections toward the impossibility of existence. Bringing these three subjects together, the article concludes that, as Heideggerian symbols of being and time, black holes represent projections toward the possibility of impossible modes and forms of existence. In this sense, black holes emblematize a relationship between being and time that marks the potential limits of existence, as humanity and science understand it. (shrink)

How can philosophy or science claim to discover objective truth when their arguments originate from subjective beings? In _Intentionality and Semiotics_, John Deely offers a controversial solution to the problem of subjectivity in inquiry. He creates an interface between semiotics and the concept of intentionality, as it appears in Aquinas’s work, to demonstrate that every sign is irrevocably linked to the reality of relations. In the process, Deely builds a bridge between classical thinkers such as Aristotle and modernists such as (...) Heidegger and Peirce in this innovative volume. (shrink)

"It is... remarkable that Reeve's is the first new English translation since Fowler's Loeb edition of 1926. Fortunately, Reeve has done an excellent job. His version is not slavishly literal but is in general very accurate. It is also very clear and readable. Reeve is particularly to be congratulated for having produced versions of some of the more torturous passages, which are not only faithful to the text but also make good sense in English. The long and detailed introduction is (...) worth reading in its own right." --R. F. Stalley, _The Classical Review_. (shrink)

Russell's paradox represents either of two interrelated logical antinomies. The most commonly discussed form is a contradiction arising in the logic of sets or classes. Some classes (or sets) seem to be members of themselves, while some do not. The class of all classes is itself a class, and so it seems to be in itself. The null or empty class, however, must not be a member of itself. However, suppose that we can form a class of all classes (or (...) sets) that, like the null class, are not included in themselves. The paradox arises from asking the question of whether this class is in itself. It is if and only if it is not. The other form is a contradiction involving properties. Some properties seem to apply to themselves, while others do not. The property of being a property is itself a property, while the property of being a cat is not itself a cat. Consider the property that something has just in case it is a property (like that of being a cat ) that does not apply to itself. Does this property apply to itself? Once again, from either assumption, the opposite follows. The paradox was named after Bertrand Russell, who discovered it in 1901. (shrink)