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  1. All the Difference in the World.Tim Crane - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162):1-25.
    The celebrated "Twin Earth" arguments of Hilary Putnam (1975) and Tyler Burge (1979) aim to establish that some intentional states logically depend on facts external to the subjects of those states. Ascriptions of states of these kinds to a thinker entail that the thinker's environment is a certain way. It is not possible that the thinker could be in those very intentional states unless the environment is that way...
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  • Extrinsic properties.David Lewis - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.
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  • Meaning and intentionality in Wittgenstein's later philosophy.John McDowell - 1992 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):40-52.
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  • (2 other versions)Wittgenstein on following a rule.John McDowell - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):325-364.
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  • Externalism and incomplete understanding.Asa Maria Wikforss - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):287-294.
    Sarah Sawyer has challenged my claim that social externalism depends on the assumption that individuals have an incomplete grasp of their own concepts. Sawyer denies that Burge's later sofa thought-experiment relies on this assumption: the unifying principle behind the thought-experiments supporting social externalism, she argues, is just that referents play a role in the individuation of concepts. I argue that Sawyer fails to show that social externalism need not rely on the assumption of incomplete understanding. To establish the content externalist (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
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  • (1 other version)Other bodies.Tyler Burge - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  • Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
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  • Why meaning intentions are degenerate.Akeel Bilgrami - 2012 - In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)Defining 'intrinsic'.Rae Langton & David Lewis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
    Something could be round even if it were the only thing in the universe, unaccompanied by anything distinct from itself. Jaegwon Kim once suggested that we define an intrinsic property as one that can belong to something unaccompanied. Wrong: unaccompaniment itself is not intrinsic, yet it can belong to something unaccompanied. But there is a better Kim-style definition. Say that P is independent of accompaniment iff four different cases are possible: something accompanied may have P or lack P, something unaccompanied (...)
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  • (1 other version)Meaning, Use and Truth.Paul Horwich - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):355-368.
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  • Externalism and first-person authority.Hans-Johann Glock & John M. Preston - 1995 - The Monist 78 (4):515-33.
    If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of.
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  • Rethinking Burge's thought experiment.Nicholas Georgalis - 1999 - Synthese 118 (2):145-64.
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  • Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
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  • (1 other version)Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Paul Horwich - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):163-171.
    Discussion of Wittgenstein's philosophy has suffered from a scarcity of commentators who understand his work well enough to explain it in their own words. Apart from certain notable exceptions, all too many advocates and critics alike have tended merely to repeat slogans, with approval or ridicule as the case may be. The result has been an unusual degree of polarization and acrimony—some philosophers abandoning normal critical standards, falling under the spell and becoming fanatical supporters; and others taking an equally extreme (...)
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  • Horwich, meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein.Alexander Miller - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):161-174.
    Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical (...)
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  • Wittgenstein on meaning, interpretation and rules.Malcolm Budd - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):303-324.
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  • Social Anti-Individualism, Co-Cognitivism, and Second Person Authority.Jane Heal - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt052.
    We are social primates, for whom language-mediated co-operative thinking (‘co-cognition’) is a central element of our shared life. Psychological concepts may be illuminated by appreciating their role in enriching and improving such co-cognition — a role which is importantly different from that of enabling detailed prediction and control of thoughts and behaviour. This account of the nature of psychological concepts (‘co-cognitivism’) has social anti-individualism about thought content as a natural corollary. The combination of co-cognitivism and anti-individualism further suggests that, in (...)
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  • Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology.Malcolm Budd - 1989 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):87-89.
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  • (1 other version)Mind, Meaning, and Practice.Barry Stroud - 2002 - In Stewart Candlish (ed.), Meaning, Understanding, and Practice. Oxford University Press.
    The first half of the essay contains a discussion of Wittgenstein's views on how we misconstrue the mind. It looks to the conception of meaning as use for resistance to the distorted picture of the mind we get by thinking that something must accompany the sounds or marks we make, or the actions we perform in order to make them appropriately meaningful. The second half addresses Kripke's sceptic, who is someone who claims that there is no such thing as a (...)
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