Practical Reason and Norms focuses on three problems: In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? All three questions are answered by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity. Rules are a structure of reasons to perform the required act (...) and an exclusionary reason not to follow some competing reasons. Exclusionary reasons are explained, and used to unlock the secrets of orders, promises, and decisions as well as rules. Games are used to exemplify normative systems. Inevitably, the analysis extends to some aspects of normative discourse, which is truth-apt, but with a diminished assertoric force. (shrink)

This book offers the fullest and most sophisticated account of Gert's influential moral theory, a model first articulated in the classic work The Moral Rules: A New Rational Foundation for Morality, published in 1970. In this final revision, Gert makes clear that the moral rules are only one part of an informal system that does not provide unique answers to every moral question but does always provide a range of morally acceptable options. A new chapter on reasons includes an account (...) of what makes one reason better than another and a second new chapter is devoted to the question of justifying violations of the rules. Moral impartiality, the moral ideals, and virtue and vice, are all treated in greater detail. Throughout, Gert attempts to answer all of the challenges that his work has provoked. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Principles of Biomedical Ethics. By Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXI, Number 1, April 1995, pp. 57-74 Does Hume Have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason? JEAN HAMPTON Many philosophers and social scientists regard the instrumental theory of practical reason as highly plausible, and standardly credit David Hume as the first philosopher to formulate this conception of reason clearly. Yet I will argue in this paper that Hume does not advocate the instrumental conception of practical (...) reason as that conception is normally understood by contemporary theorists who endorse it. Although it is often thought that Hume's position on reason is the "common-sense" one, I will argue that in a very fundamental way, his view of reason defies common-sense. The Instrumental Conception of Reason Consider the following definition of an instrumental theory of reason, understood normatively: 1) An action is rational to the extent that an agent believes (reasonably)1 that it furthers the attainment of an end; and 2) Human reasoning involves the determination of means to achieve ends, in a way described by the theory (I will say, henceforth, that using reason to determine the extent to which an action is a means to an end is an instrumental use of reason); and 3) These ends are in no way fixed by reason operating non-instrumentally; i.e., what makes them our ends is something other than reason. Jean Hampton is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tuscon, AZ 85721 USA. 58 Jean Hampton In this article I will consider as instrumental all and only theories that accept these three theses.2 Thesis 3 is normally understood as the hallmark of the instrumental theory. Hume's famous remark "Reason is...the slave of the passions" (T 415) is a clear endorsement of this thesis. In contrast, theories of reason that do not count as instrumental maintain that reason not only pursues means to ends, but also defines ends of action, thereby denying thesis 3. On this sort of view, it is reason that is, at least sometimes, the master. For example, Kant portrays reason as concerned both with the efficiency and the morality of an action, and as that faculty which determines whether any proposed course of action is acceptable. So for Kant, reason "constructs" the ends of action insofar as it picks out from among the goals proposed by our desires those which are appropriate for us to pursue: it is the final determiner of what our ends of action ought to be. Moreover, after approving these ends, Kant says that reason provides a motivation to achieve them in virtue of the fact that it has approved them, a motivation which, if it directs a moral action, is always sufficient to determine that action, if the agent chooses to let it.3 So on Kant's view, practical reason is a master that issues directives, provides the impetus for obeying them, and calculates how best to do so. There are two reasons why philosophers have been troubled by the Kantian type of view. First, it is a conception of reason that seems unacceptable from the standpoint of science. What special "sight" or access to normative reality can we realistically ascribe to human reason, such that it can tell us our ends in life? And how does a scientific world view permit us to believe that there are unmotivated ends which we are rationally compelled to pursue? Science, after all, does not recognize such objects or properties with inherent prescriptive power. J. L. Mackie calls such objects and properties "queer"—indeed, too queer, given the strictures of science, for us to believe they obtain.4 Moreover, no scientific description of human beings has identified a rational capacity within us that can determine these objects, respond to their inherent prescriptivity, and motivate action in compliance with their requirements. The other problem facing any non-instrumental account of reason concerns motivation. Most theorists believe that whereas the question "Why be moral?" is deeply troubling, the question "Why be rational?" does not seem to be. Yet if reason is developed along Kantian lines, it becomes so expansive, and its directives so wide-ranging and divergent from interests the individual is readily able to... (shrink)

The Ethics Code of the American Psychological Association is a bedrock of the profession. The contextual factors of society affect the Ethics Code of the APA, resulting in an ever-changing document. The context of the reorganization of the APA after World War II created an initial impetus toward a formalized code. A key contextual feature of the Code's development was the use of the Critical Incident Technique, which was based in the empirical aspirations of the psychological field. This article explores (...) the historical context around the APA's decision to draft an ethics code, reviews its development, and discusses its role for psychologists today. (shrink)

If explicit cognition about morality promotes moral behavior then one might expect ethics professors to behave particularly well. However, professional ethicists' behavior has never been empirically studied. The present research examined the rates at which ethics books are missing from leading academic libraries, compared to other philosophy books similar in age and popularity. Study 1 found that relatively obscure, contemporary ethics books of the sort likely to be borrowed mainly by professors and advanced students of philosophy were actually about 50% (...) more likely to be missing than non-ethics books. Study 2 found that classic (pre-1900) ethics books were about twice as likely to be missing. (shrink)

This paper attempts to provide a conceptual underpinning for codes of ethics in business and the professions. Rule-utilitarianism is a theory of ethics which I believe can successfully do this. Business persons and professionals, hopefully, will be able to develop codes of ethics in a manner consistent with a well-formulated general ethical theory. This will help enable codes of ethics to be a bridge between general ethical theory and specific ethical decisions made in business and the professions.

While the focus on business ethics is increasing in business school curricula, there has been little systematic scholarly research on the forces which bring about ethical behavior. This article is intended as a first step toward that research by creating a catalogue of hypotheses concerning the efficacy of corporate codes of ethics. The hypotheses are drawn from studies of compliance with law and court decisions and theories of legitimacy, authority, public policy making and individual behavior. Hypotheses are proposed based on (...) the structure of the organization, the source of the code of ethics within the organization, the content of the code, sanctions for noncompliance, protections for refusal to engage in unethical behavior, and rewards for compliance. (shrink)

This study explored the experiences and views of Dutch nurses on the content, function, dissemination and implementation of their codes of ethics. A total of 39 participants, who differed in age, qualifications, length of work experience and health care setting, took part in focus groups. The findings revealed common unfamiliarity with and a rather implicit use of codes, and negative comments on the growing number of codes available in the Netherlands. Limited dissemination, implementation and functioning of codes of ethics were (...) also identified. The findings were discussed using concepts from the literature, nursing practice and personal experience. (shrink)