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  1. Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry.Helen E. Longino - 1990 - Princeton University Press.
    This is an important book precisely because there is none other quite like it.
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  • Statistics, pragmatics, induction.C. West Churchman - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (3):249-268.
    1. Deductive and Inductive Inference. Within the traditional treatments of scientific method, e.g., in and, it was customary to divide scientific inference into two parts: deductive and inductive. Deductive inference was taken to mean the activity of deducing theorems from postulates and definitions, whereas inductive inference represented the activity of constructing a general statement from a set of particular “facts.” Deductive inference was relegated to the mathematical sciences, and inductive inference to the empirical sciences. As a consequence, the whole of (...)
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  • The Error Is in the Gap: Synthesizing Accounts for Societal Values in Science.Christopher ChoGlueck - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (4):704-725.
    Kevin Elliott and others separate two common arguments for the legitimacy of societal values in scientific reasoning as the gap and the error arguments. This article poses two questions: How are these two arguments related, and what can we learn from their interrelation? I contend that we can better understand the error argument as nested within the gap because the error is a limited case of the gap with narrower features. Furthermore, this nestedness provides philosophers with conceptual tools for analyzing (...)
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  • What Does Good Science-Based Advice to Politics Look Like?Martin Carrier - 2021 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (1):5-21.
    I address options for providing scientific policy advice and explore the relation between scientific knowledge and political, economic and moral values. I argue that such nonepistemic values are essential for establishing the significance of questions and the relevance of evidence, while, on the other hand, such social choices are the prerogative of society. This tension can be resolved by recognizing social values and identifying them as separate premises or as commissions while withholding commitment to them, and by elaborating a plurality (...)
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  • Values in Science.Kevin C. Elliott - 2022 - Cambridge University Press.
    This Element introduces the philosophical literature on values in science by examining four questions: How do values influence science? Should we actively incorporate values in science? How can we manage values in science responsibly? What are some next steps for those who want to help promote responsible roles for values in science? It explores arguments for and against the “value-free ideal” for science and concludes that it should be rejected. Nonetheless, this does not mean that value influences are always acceptable. (...)
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  • “Empiricism all the way down”: a defense of the value-neutrality of science in response to Helen Longino's contextual empiricism.Stéphanie Ruphy - 2006 - Perspectives on Science 14 (2):189-214.
    : A central claim of Longino's contextual empiricism is that scientific inquiry, even when "properly conducted", lacks the capacity to screen out the influence of contextual values on its results. I'll show first that Longino's attack against the epistemic integrity of science suffers from fatal empirical weaknesses. Second I'll explain why Longino's practical proposition for suppressing biases in science, drawn from her contextual empiricism, is too demanding and, therefore, unable to serve its purpose. Finally, drawing on Bourdieu's sociological analysis of (...)
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  • The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
    The question of the relationship of the making of value judgments in a typically ethical sense to the methods and procedures of science has been discussed in the literature at least to that point which e. e. cummings somewhere refers to as “The Mystical Moment of Dullness.” Nevertheless, albeit with some trepidation, I feel that something more may fruitfully be said on the subject.
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  • A Tapestry of Values: An Introduction to Values in Science.Kevin Christopher Elliott - 2017 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    The role of values in scientific research has become an important topic of discussion in both scholarly and popular debates. Pundits across the political spectrum worry that research on topics like climate change, evolutionary theory, vaccine safety, and genetically modified foods has become overly politicized. At the same time, it is clear that values play an important role in science by limiting unethical forms of research and by deciding what areas of research have the greatest relevance for society. Deciding how (...)
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  • The aim and structure of applied research.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (1):1 - 21.
    The distinction between basic and applied research is notoriously vague, despite its frequent use in science studies and in science policy. In most cases it is based on such pragmatic factors as the knowledge and intentions of the investigator or the type of research institute. Sometimes the validity of the distinction is denied altogether. This paper suggests that there are two ways of distinguishing systematically between basic and applied research: (i) in terms of the utilities that define the aims of (...)
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  • Heather Douglas: Is science value-free? (Science, policy, and the value-free ideal). [REVIEW]Gregory J. Morgan - 2010 - Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (2):423-426.
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  • Science and the social order.Robert K. Merton - 1938 - Philosophy of Science 5 (3):321-337.
    Forty-three years ago Max Weber observed that “the belief in the value of scientific truth is not derived from nature but is a product of definite cultures.” We may now add: and this belief is readily transmuted into doubt or disbelief. The persistent development of science occurs only in societies of a certain order, subject to a peculiar complex of tacit presuppositions and institutional constraints. What is for us a normal phenomenon which demands no explanation and secures many ‘self-evident’ cultural (...)
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  • Values in Science.Ernan McMullin - 2017 - In W. H. Newton‐Smith (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 550–560.
    A century ago, nearly all of those who wrote about the nature of science would have been in agreement that science ought to be “value‐free.” This had been a particular emphasis on the part of the first positivists, as it would later be on the part of their twentieth‐century successors. Science, so it was said, deals with facts, and facts and values are irreducibly distinct. Facts are objective; they are what we seek in our knowledge of the world. Values are (...)
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  • Must the scientist make value judgments?Isaac Levi - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (11):345-357.
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  • Philosophy inside out.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):248-260.
    Abstract: Philosophy is often conceived in the Anglophone world today as a subject that focuses on questions in particular “core areas,” pre-eminently epistemology and metaphysics. This article argues that the contemporary conception is a new version of the scholastic “self-indulgence for the few” of which Dewey complained nearly a century ago. Philosophical questions evolve, and a first task for philosophers is to address issues that arise for their own times. The article suggests that a renewal of philosophy today should turn (...)
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  • The structure of science.Felix Kaufmann - 1941 - Journal of Philosophy 38 (11):281-293.
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  • Mind the gap.Stephen John - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):218-220.
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  • Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling.Kristen Intemann - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):217-232.
    While it is widely acknowledged that science is not “free” of non-epistemic values, there is disagreement about the roles that values can appropriately play. Several have argued that non-epistemic values can play important roles in modeling decisions, particularly in addressing uncertainties ; Risbey 2007; Biddle and Winsberg 2010; Winsberg : 111-137, 2012); van der Sluijs 359-389, 2012). On the other hand, such values can lead to bias ; Bray ; Oreskes and Conway 2010). Thus, it is important to identify when (...)
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  • The new demarcation problem.Bennett Holman & Torsten Wilholt - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 91 (C):211-220.
    There is now a general consensus amongst philosophers in the values in science literature that values necessarily play a role in core areas of scientific inquiry. We argue that attention should now be turned from debating the value-free ideal to delineating legitimate from illegitimate influences of values in science, a project we dub “The New Demarcation Problem.” First, we review past attempts to demarcate the uses of values and propose a categorization of the strategies by where they seek to draw (...)
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  • A new direction for science and values.Daniel J. Hicks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3271-95.
    The controversy over the old ideal of “value-free science” has cooled significantly over the past decade. Many philosophers of science now agree that even ethical and political values may play a substantial role in all aspects of scientific inquiry. Consequently, in the last few years, work in science and values has become more specific: Which values may influence science, and in which ways? Or, how do we distinguish illegitimate from illegitimate kinds of influence? In this paper, I argue that this (...)
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  • Turns in the evolution of the problem of induction.Carl G. Hempel - 1981 - Synthese 46 (3):389 - 404.
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  • Inductive inconsistencies.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1960 - Synthese 12 (4):439-69.
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  • Bayesian decision theory, subjective and objective probabilities, and acceptance of empirical hypotheses.John C. Harsanyi - 1983 - Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365.
    It is argued that we need a richer version of Bayesian decision theory, admitting both subjective and objective probabilities and providing rational criteria for choice of our prior probabilities. We also need a theory of tentative acceptance of empirical hypotheses. There is a discussion of subjective and of objective probabilities and of the relationship between them, as well as a discussion of the criteria used in choosing our prior probabilities, such as the principles of indifference and of maximum entropy, and (...)
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  • What is technological science?Sven Ove Hansson - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (3):523-527.
    The technological sciences have at least six defining characteristics that distinguish them from the other sciences. They have human-made rather than natural objects as their study objects, include the practice of engineering design, define their study objects in functional terms, evaluate these study objects with category-specified value statements, employ less far-reaching idealizations than the natural sciences, and do not need an exact mathematical solution when a sufficiently close approximation is available. In combination, the six characteristics are sufficient to show that (...)
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  • Values in pure and applied science.Sven Ove Hansson - 2007 - Foundations of Science 12 (3):257-268.
    In pure science, the standard approach to non-epistemic values is to exclude them as far as possible from scientific deliberations. When science is applied to practical decisions, non-epistemic values cannot be excluded. Instead, they have to be combined with scientific information in a way that leads to practically optimal decisions. A normative model is proposed for the processing of information in both pure and applied science. A general-purpose corpus of scientific knowledge, with high entry requirements, has a central role in (...)
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  • Scientists as experts: A distinct role?Torbjørn Gundersen - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 69:52-59.
    The role of scientists as experts is crucial to public policymaking. However, the expert role is contested and unsettled in both public and scholarly discourse. In this paper, I provide a systematic account of the role of scientists as experts in policymaking by examining whether there are any normatively relevant differences between this role and the role of scientists as researchers. Two different interpretations can be given of how the two roles relate to each other. The separability view states that (...)
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  • Douglas on values: From indirect roles to multiple goals.Kevin C. Elliott - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):375-383.
    In recent papers and a book, Heather Douglas has expanded on the well-known argument from inductive risk, thereby launching an influential contemporary critique of the value-free ideal for science. This paper distills Douglas’s critique into four major claims. The first three claims provide a significant challenge to the value-free ideal for science. However, the fourth claim, which delineates her positive proposal to regulate values in science by distinguishing direct and indirect roles for values, is ambiguous between two interpretations, and both (...)
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  • Current Controversies in Values and Science.Kevin Christopher Elliott & Daniel Steel (eds.) - 2016 - New York: Routledge.
    _Current Controversies in Values and Science_ asks ten philosophers to debate five questions that are driving contemporary work in this important area of philosophy of science. The book is perfect for the advanced student, building up her knowledge of the foundations of the field while also engaging its most cutting-edge questions. Introductions and annotated bibliographies for each debate, preliminary descriptions of each chapter, study questions, and a supplemental guide to further controversies involving values in science help provide clearer and richer (...)
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  • Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Douglas proposes a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, protecting the integrity and objectivity of science.
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  • Philosophy of Science After Feminism.Janet A. Kourany - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press.
    A feminist primer for philosophers of science -- The legacy of twentieth century philosophy of science -- What feminist science studies can offer -- Challenges from every direction -- The prospects of twenty-first century philosophy of science.
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  • Changing the Scientific Corpus.Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 43.
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