- Language and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of language.Michael Devitt & Kim Sterelny - 1999 - Cambridge: MIT Press. Edited by Kim Sterelny.details
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Monism and Pluralism about Value.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 136-157.details
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Moral relativism is moral realism.Gilbert Harman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):855-863.details
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What of pragmatism with the world here?Richard Boyd - 2012 - In Maria Baghramian (ed.), Reading Putnam. New York: Routledge. pp. 39.details
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From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1996 - Critica 28 (83):3-39.details
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Goodness and Moral Twin Earth.Christopher Freiman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):445-460.details
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Unreliable Intuitions: A New Reply to the Moral Twin-Earth Argument.Jorn Sonderholm - 2012 - Theoria 79 (1):76-88.details
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On The Moral Twin-Earth Challenge to New-Wave Moral Realism.Eric Russert Kraemer - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:467-472.details
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Return to Moral Twin Earth.David Merli - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):207-240.details
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Moore on Twin Earth.Neil Levy - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):137-146.details
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Milk, honey, and the good life on moral twin earth.David Copp - 2000 - Synthese 124 (1-2):113-137.details
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Finite beings, finite goods: The semantics, metaphysics and ethics of naturalist consequentialism, part I.Richard Boyd - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):505–553.details
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Finite beings, finite goods: The semantics, metaphysics and ethics of naturalist consequentialism, part II.Richard Boyd - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):24–47.details
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Noncognitivism about rationality: Benefits, costs, and an alternative.Peter Railton - 1993 - Philosophical Issues 4:36-51.details
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A coherent moral relativism.David Capps, Michael P. Lynch & Daniel Massey - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):413 - 430.details
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Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness.David O. Brink - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):111 – 125.details
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