- (1 other version)The Last Word.Simon Blackburn & Thomas Nagel - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):653.details
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Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it.Ronald Dworkin - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (2):87-139.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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(1 other version)An outline of an argument for robust metanormative realism.David Enoch - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:21-50.details
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(1 other version)Robust ethical realism, non-naturalism, and normativity.William Joseph FitzPatrick - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:159-205.details
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(1 other version)Moral Discourse and Descriptive Properties.Brad Majors - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):475 - 494.details
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The Last Word.Thomas Nagel - 1997 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Doubts about the Supervenience of the Evaluative.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 53-92.details
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Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience.Alvin Plantinga - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (3):247-272.details
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Why Logically Equivalent Predicates May Pick out Different Properties.Elliott Sober - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (2):183-189.details
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Justice for hedgehogs.Ronald Dworkin - 2011 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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Value, reality, and desire.Graham Oddie - 2005 - New York: Clarendon Press.details
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Against quietist normative realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.details
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(2 other versions)A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism.Campbell Brown - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 205-18.details
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Are normative properties descriptive properties?Bart Streumer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):325 - 348.details
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(2 other versions)Causality and properties.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. D. Reidel. pp. 109-35.details
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Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?Bart Streumer - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):537-561.details
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Moral functionalism, supervenience and reductionism.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):82-86.details
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Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Responses. [REVIEW]Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):653-664.details
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(1 other version)Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism, and Normativity.William FitzPatrick - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Iii. Oxford University Press.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.details
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Ethics, supervenience and Ramsey sentences. [REVIEW]Timothy Williamson - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):625–630.details
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(1 other version)Moral discourse and descriptive properties.Brad Majors - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):475–494.details
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(2 other versions)Causality and Properties.Sidney Shoemaker - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism.David Enoch - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press.details
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(1 other version)Moral Realism: A Defense. [REVIEW]Mark Timmons - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):265-269.details
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(1 other version)On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.details
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(1 other version)I—David McNaughton and Piers Rawling: Descriptivism, Normativity and the Metaphysics of Reasons.David McNaughton & Piers Rawling - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):23-45.details
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Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew H. Kramer - 2009 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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(1 other version)Non-Naturalism: The Jackson Challenge.Jussi Suikkanen - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 87-110.details
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(1 other version)How Objectivity Matters.David Enoch - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:111-52.details
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(1 other version)How Objectivity Matters.David Enoch - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 5. Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.details
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Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Philosophy 69 (267):114-116.details
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Moral functionalism and moral reductionism.Mark van Roojen - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):77-81.details
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Nonnaturalism.Jonathan Dancy - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Moral Reasons.Mark Van Roojen - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):118-120.details
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(1 other version)The Last Word.Thomas Nagel - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):529-536.details
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