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  1. Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory.Michael Bacharach - 2006 - Princeton University Press.
    This is a revision of game theory which takes account of agents' own descriptions of their situations, and which allows people to reason as members of groups.
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  • Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
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  • On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Routledge.
    This book offers original accounts of a number of central social phenomena, many of which have received little if any prior philosophical attention. These phenomena include social groups, group languages, acting together, collective belief, mutual recognition, and social convention. In the course of developing her analyses Gilbert discusses the work of Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, David Lewis, among others.
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  • The Self-Fulfilling Property of Trust: An Experimental Study. [REVIEW]Michael Bacharach, Gerardo Guerra & Daniel John Zizzo - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (4):349-388.
    A person is said to be ‘trust responsive’ if she fulfils trust because she believes the truster trusts her. The experiment we report was designed to test for trust responsiveness and its robustness across payoff structures, and to discriminate it from other possible factors making for trustworthiness, including perceived kindness, perceived need and inequality aversion. We elicit the truster’s confidence that the trustee will fulfil, and the trustee’s belief about the truster’s confidence after the trustee receives evidence relevant to this. (...)
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  • Fraternity: Why the Market Need Not Be a Morally Free Zone.Luigino Bruni - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):35-64.
    This paper reappraises the idea, traceable to Adam Smith, of a fundamental distinction between market transactions and genuinely social relationships. On Smith's account, each party to a market transaction pursues his own interests, subject only to the law of contract. Using the work of Smith's contemporary Antonio Genovesi as our starting point, we reconstruct an alternative understanding of market interactions as instances of a wider class of reciprocal relationships in civil society, characterized by joint intentions for mutual assistance. We consider (...)
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  • Group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Philip Pettit.
    Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individuals that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should explain the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable on the model of individual agents. Group Agency offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, to a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences. (...)
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  • The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author.Thomas C. Schelling - 1960 - Harvard University Press.
    Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.
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  • Rationalizing Focal Points.Maarten C. W. Janssen - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (2):119-148.
    Focal points seem to be important in helping players coordinate their strategies in coordination problems. Game theory lacks, however, a formal theory of focal points. This paper proposes a theory of focal points that is based on individual rationality considerations. The two principles upon which the theory rest are the Principle of Insufficient Reason (IR) and a Principle of Individual Team Member Rationality. The way IR is modelled combines the classic notion of description symmetry and a new notion of pay-off (...)
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  • (15 other versions)Leviathan.Thomas Hobbes - 1904 - Harmondsworth,: Penguin Books. Edited by C. B. Macpherson.
    v. 1. Editorial introduction -- v. 2. The English and Latin texts (i) -- v. 3. The English and Latin texts (ii).
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  • (1 other version)An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.Adam Smith - 1976 - Oxford University Press. Edited by R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner & W. B. Todd.
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  • Common knowledge, salience and convention: A reconstruction of David Lewis' game theory.Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden - 2003 - Economics and Philosophy 19 (2):175-210.
    David Lewis is widely credited with the first formulation of common knowledge and the first rigorous analysis of convention. However, common knowledge and convention entered mainstream game theory only when they were formulated, later and independently, by other theorists. As a result, some of the most distinctive and valuable features of Lewis' game theory have been overlooked. We re-examine this theory by reconstructing key parts in a more formal way, extending it, and showing how it differs from more recent game (...)
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  • (1 other version)Shared intention.Michael E. Bratman - 1993 - Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
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  • (6 other versions)A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40).David Hume - 1739 - Mineola, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner.
    A key to modern studies of 18th century Western philosophy, the Treatise considers numerous classic philosophical issues, including causation, existence, freedom and necessity and morality. This abridged edition has an introduction which explain's Hume's thought and places it in the context of its times.
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  • (6 other versions)A treatise of human nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1739 - Oxford,: Clarendon press. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge.
    One of Hume's most well-known works and a masterpiece of philosophy, A Treatise of Human Nature is indubitably worth taking the time to read.
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  • (6 other versions)Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
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  • We-Intentions.Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (3):367-389.
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  • On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Ethics 102 (4):853-856.
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  • Collective Intentions And Team Agency.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.
    In the literature of collective intentions, the ‘we-intentions’ that lie behind cooperative actions are analysed in terms of individual mental states. The core forms of these analyses imply that all Nash equilibrium behaviour is the result of collective intentions, even though not all Nash equilibria are cooperative actions. Unsatisfactorily, the latter cases have to be excluded either by stipulation or by the addition of further, problematic conditions. We contend that the cooperative aspect of collective intentions is not a property of (...)
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  • Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    _ Convention_ was immediately recognized as a major contribution to the subject and its significance has remained undiminished since its first publication in 1969. Lewis analyzes social conventions as regularities in the resolution of recurring coordination problems-situations characterized by interdependent decision processes in which common interests are at stake. Conventions are contrasted with other kinds of regularity, and conventions governing systems of communication are given special attention.
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  • Consequences of utilitarianism: a study in normative ethics and legal theory.David H. Hodgson - 1967 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  • (1 other version)Value in ethics and economics.Elizabeth Anderson - 1993 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Women as commercial baby factories, nature as an economic resource, life as one big shopping mall: This is what we get when we use the market as a common ...
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  • (3 other versions)Leviathan.Thomas Hobbes - 2007 - In Aloysius Martinich, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Early Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Thomas Hobbes took a new look at the ways in which society should function, and he ended up formulating the concept of political science. His crowning achievement, Leviathan, remains among the greatest works in the history of ideas. Written during a moment in English history when the political and social structures as well as methods of science were in flux and open to interpretation, Leviathan played an essential role in the development of the modern world. This edition of Hobbes' landmark (...)
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  • (2 other versions)A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
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  • (1 other version)Utilitarianism and Cooperation.Donald Regan - 1983 - Law and Philosophy 2 (2):251-256.
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  • Value in Ethics and Economics.[author unknown] - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (1):133-136.
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  • On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy.Nicholas Bardsley - 2007 - Synthese 157 (2):141-159.
    Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of (...)
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  • (6 other versions)Convention: A Philosophical Study.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (2):137-138.
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  • (1 other version)Convention: A Philosophical Study. [REVIEW]Richard E. Grandy - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):129-139.
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  • (1 other version)Shared intention.E. Bratman Michael - 1994 - In Peter Singer (ed.), Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 104.
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  • (1 other version)Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior.Robert Sugden - 1993 - Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):69-89.
    For most of the problems that economists consider, the assumption that agents are self-interested works well enough, generating predictions that are broadly consistent with observation. In some significant cases, however, we find economic behavior that seems to be inconsistent with self-interest. In particular, we find that some public goods and some charitable ventures are financed by the independent voluntary contributions of many thousands of individuals. In Britain, for example, the lifeboat service is entirely financed by voluntary contributions. In all rich (...)
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  • Utilitarianism and Co-operation.G. W. Harrison - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (133):412-413.
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  • Liberty, Preference, and Choice.Robert Sugden - 1985 - Economics and Philosophy 1 (2):213-229.
    Ever since its first publication in 1970, Amartya Sen's paper “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal” has served as the starting point for almost all discussions of liberty in social choice theory. However, a number of people, myself included, have argued that Sen's theorem rests on a misleading characterization of liberty . In a recent paper, addressed to a philosophical audience, Sen has provided a careful defence of his theorem against this charge. I shall argue that this defence does not (...)
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  • Social choice and Individual liberties.Robert Sugden - 1985 - In Peter Koslowski (ed.), Economics and philosophy. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. pp. 1--213.
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