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Collective Intentions and Actions

In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415 (1990)

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  1. Communicative Intentions and Conversational Processes in Human-Human and Human-Computer Dialogue.Matthew Stone - unknown
    This chapter investigates the computational consequences of a broadly Gricean view of language use as intentional activity. In this view, dialogue rests on coordinated reasoning about communicative intentions. The speaker produces each utterance by formulating a suitable communicative intention. The hearer understands it by recognizing the communicative intention behind it. When this coordination is successful, interlocutors succeed in considering the same intentions— that is, the same representations of utterance meaning—as the dialogue proceeds. In this paper, I emphasize that these intentions (...)
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  • Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149-165.
    Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these (...)
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  • Opera Trinitatis Ad Extra and Collective Agency.Adonis Vidu - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (3):27--47.
    This paper assesses the viability of the model of ”collective action’ for the understanding of the doctrine of the inseparability of trinitarian operations, broadly conceived within a Social-Trinitarian framework. I argue that a ”loose’ understanding of this inseparability as ”unity of intention’ is insufficiently monotheistic and that it can be ”tightened’ by an understanding of the ontology of triune operations analogically modelled after collective actions of a ”constitutive’ kind. I also show that attention to the ”description relativity of action ascriptions’ (...)
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  • Fraternity: Why the Market Need Not Be a Morally Free Zone*: Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden.Luigino Bruni - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):35-64.
    This paper reappraises the idea, traceable to Adam Smith, of a fundamental distinction between market transactions and genuinely social relationships. On Smith's account, each party to a market transaction pursues his own interests, subject only to the law of contract. Using the work of Smith's contemporary Antonio Genovesi as our starting point, we reconstruct an alternative understanding of market interactions as instances of a wider class of reciprocal relationships in civil society, characterized by joint intentions for mutual assistance. We consider (...)
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  • Intercorporeity and the first-person plural in Merleau-Ponty.Philip J. Walsh - 2020 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):21-47.
    A theory of the first-person plural occupies a unique place in philosophical investigations into intersubjectivity and social cognition. In order for the referent of the first-person plural—“the We”—to come into existence, it seems there must be a shared ground of communicative possibility, but this requires a non-circular explanation of how this ground could be shared in the absence of a pre-existing context of communicative conventions. Margaret Gilbert’s and John Searle’s theories of collective intentionality capture important aspects of the We, but (...)
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  • Coordinated Rational Choice.Luca Tummolini & Wynn C. Stirling - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):317-327.
    When acting in social contexts, we are often able to voluntarily coordinate our choices with one another. It has been suggested that this ability relies on the adoption of preferences that transcend those of the individuals involved in the social interaction. Conditional game theory provides a formal framework that facilitates the study of coordinated rational choice in a way that disentangles the concepts of individual preference and group agency. We argue that these concepts are complementary: individual preferences are formed in (...)
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  • Explaining Public Action.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):475-485.
    Actions are uncontroversially public. However, the prevailing model of explanation in the debate about the de se seems to conflict with this fact by proposing agent-specific explanations that yield agent-specific types of action—i.e. types of action that no two agents can instantiate. Remarkably, this point affects both proponents and critics of the de se. In this paper, I present this kind of problem, characterise the proper level of analysis for action explanation compatible with the publicity of action—i.e. the agent-bound level—and (...)
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  • Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.
    My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions. I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency. The main point will be that when acting together with others one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions. What exactly this means will become (...)
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  • Modest Sociality: Continuities and Discontinuities.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):17-26.
    A central claim in Michael Bratman’s account of shared agency is that there need be no radical conceptual, metaphysical or normative discontinuity between robust forms of small-scale shared intentional agency, i.e., modest sociality, and individual planning agency. What I propose to do is consider another potential discontinuity, whose existence would throw doubt on his contention that the structure of a robust form of modest sociality is entirely continuous with structures at work in individual planning agency. My main point will be (...)
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  • Team Reasoning and Intentional Cooperation for Mutual Benefit.Robert Sugden - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):143–166.
    This paper proposes a concept of intentional cooperation for mutual benefit. This concept uses a form of team reasoning in which team members aim to achieve common interests, rather than maximising a common utility function, and in which team reasoners can coordinate their behaviour by following pre-existing practices. I argue that a market transaction can express intentions for mutually beneficial cooperation even if, extensionally, participation in the transaction promotes each party’s self-interest.
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  • On Commitments and Other Uncertainty Reduction Tools in Joint Action.John Michael & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):89–120.
    In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are many other ways in which uncertainty (...)
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  • The irreducibility of collective obligations.Allard Tamminga & Frank Hindriks - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1085-1109.
    Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the collective’s members. Collectivists deny this. We set out to discover who is right by way of a deontic logic of collective action that models collective actions, abilities, obligations, and their interrelations. On the basis of our formal analysis, we argue that when assessing the obligations of an individual agent, we need to distinguish individual obligations from member obligations. If a collective has a collective obligation to bring about (...)
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  • Shared Health Governance.Jennifer Prah Ruger - 2011 - American Journal of Bioethics 11 (7):32 - 45.
    Health and Social Justice (Ruger 2009a) developed the ?health capability paradigm,? a conception of justice and health in domestic societies. This idea undergirds an alternative framework of social cooperation called ?shared health governance? (SHG). SHG puts forth a set of moral responsibilities, motivational aspirations, and institutional arrangements, and apportions roles for implementation in striving for health justice. This article develops further the SHG framework and explains its importance and implications for governing health domestically.
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  • Can Brains in Vats Think as a Team?Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):201-217.
    The specter of the ‘group mind’ or ‘collective subject’ plays a crucial and fateful role in the current debate on collective intentionality. Fear of the group mind is one important reason why philosophers of collective intentionality resort to individualism. It is argued here that this measure taken against the group mind is as unnecessary as it is detrimental to our understanding of what it means to share an intention. A non-individualistic concept of shared intentionality does not necessarily have to get (...)
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  • The Logic of Team Reasoning.Robert Sugden - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):165 – 181.
    Abstract Orthodox decision theory presupposes that agency is invested in individuals. An opposing literature allows team agency to be invested in teams whose members use distinctive modes of team reasoning. This paper offers a new conceptual framework, inspired by David Lewis's analysis of common reasons for belief, within which team reasoning can be represented. It shows how individuals can independently endorse a principle of team reasoning which prescribes acting as a team member conditional on assurance that others have endorsed the (...)
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  • Introduction.Frank Hindriks & Anthonie Meijers - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):161 – 164.
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  • In Search of Sociality.Margaret Gilbert - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (3):233 – 241.
    This paper reviews some of the growing body of work in the analytic philosophy of social phenomena, with special reference to the question whether adequate accounts of particular social phenomena can be given in terms that are individualistic in a sense that is specified. The discussion focusses on accounts of what have come to be known as shared intention and action. There is also some consideration of accounts of social convention and collective belief. Particular attention is paid to the need (...)
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  • How Rational Can a Polemic Across the Analytic -Continental 'Divide' Be?Marcelo Dascal - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (3):313 – 339.
    In spite of the widespread belief that there is (or at least there was) a clearcut and deep opposition between two forms of philosophizing vaguely characterized as 'continental' and 'analytic', it is not easy to find actual examples of debates between philosophers that clearly belong to the opposed camps. Perhaps the reason is that, on the assumption that the alleged 'divide' is so deep, each side feels that there is no point in arguing against the other, for argumentation would quickly (...)
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  • Unintentional Collective Action.Sara Rachel Chant - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):245 – 256.
    In this paper, I examine the manner in which analyses of the action of single agents have been pressed into service for constructing accounts of collective action. Specifically, I argue that the best analogy to collective action is a class of individual action that Carl Ginet has called 'aggregate action.' Furthermore, once we use aggregate action as a model of collective action, then we see that existing accounts of collective action have failed to accommodate an important class of (what I (...)
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  • Intentions and Potential Intentions Revisited.Xiaocong Fan & John Yen - 2012 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (3):203-230.
    The importance of potential intentions has been demonstrated both in the construction of agent systems and in the formalisation of teamwork behaviour. However, there still lacks an adequate semantics for the notion of potential intentions as introduced by Grosz and Kraus in their SharedPlans framework. In this paper, we give a formal semantics to intentions and potential intentions, drawing upon both the representationalist approach and the accessibility-based approach. The model captures the dynamic relationship among intentions and potential intentions by providing (...)
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  • Why We Did It: An Anscombian Account of Collective Action.Axel Seemann - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (5):637-655.
    In this paper, I am concerned with persons' capacity for joint action. I start by suggesting that approaches which seek to account for that capacity in terms of collective intentionality face a problem: there are actions that clearly seem to qualify as collective even though the involved persons cannot be said to entertain an overarching 'We'-intention (however one characterizes this notion). I then go on to develop an alternative account of action that loosely draws on Elizabeth Anscombe's action theory and (...)
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  • The Significance of Liturgical Singing.Terence Cuneo - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):411-429.
    This is an essay on two topics—singing and liturgy—that lie well outside the standard repertoire of topics that form the subject matter of contemporary philosophy of religion, let alone Anglo-American philosophy more generally. Nonetheless, I maintain that thinking through the topic of liturgical singing can bear philosophical fruit. My discussion takes as its starting point the striking fact that the liturgies of Eastern Christianity are almost entirely sung. I explore the question why this would be especially fitting. The answer I (...)
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  • Exploring the Relation Between the Sense of Other and the Sense of Us: Core Agency Cognition, Emergent Coordination, and the Sense of Agency.Judith Martens - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):38-60.
    It has been claimed that a sense of us is presupposed for shared intentions to be possible. Searle introduced this notion together with the notion of the sense of the other. in joint action. It argues that the sense of the other is a necessary condition for a sense of us. Whereas thisarticle distinguishes between the “sense of the other” and the “sense of us” and elaborates on their role the sense of the other is immediate and automatic, the sense (...)
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  • Love, Plural Subjects & Normative Constraint.Joseph Kisolo-Ssonko - 2012 - Phenomenology and Mind (3).
    Andrea Westlund's account of love involves lovers becoming a Plural Subject mirroring Margaret Gilbert's Plural Subject Theory. However, while for Gilbert the creation of a plural will involves individuals jointly committing to pool their wills and the plural will directly normatively constraining those individuals, Westlund, in contrast, sees the creation of a plural will as a continual process thus rejecting the possibility of such direct normative constraint. This rejection appears to be required to explain the flexibility that allows for a (...)
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  • Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if (...)
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  • Autonomous Driving and Perverse Incentives.Wulf Loh & Catrin Misselhorn - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (4):575-590.
    This paper discusses the ethical implications of perverse incentives with regard to autonomous driving. We define perverse incentives as a feature of an action, technology, or social policy that invites behavior which negates the primary goal of the actors initiating the action, introducing a certain technology, or implementing a social policy. As a special form of means-end-irrationality, perverse incentives are to be avoided from a prudential standpoint, as they prove to be directly self-defeating: They are not just a form of (...)
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  • The Borg–eye and the We–I. The production of a collective living body through wearable computers.Nicola Liberati - 2020 - AI and Society 35 (1):39-49.
    The aim of this work is to analyze the constitution of a new collective subject thanks to wearable computers. Wearable computers are emerging technologies which are supposed to become pervasively used in the near future. They are devices designed to be on us every single moment of our life and to capture every experience we have. Therefore, we need to be prepared to such intrusive devices and to analyze potential effect they will have on us and our society. Thanks to (...)
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  • The Normativity of Lewis Conventions.Francesco Guala - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3107-3122.
    David Lewis famously proposed to model conventions as solutions to coordination games, where equilibrium selection is driven by precedence, or the history of play. A characteristic feature of Lewis Conventions is that they are intrinsically non-normative. Some philosophers have argued that for this reason they miss a crucial aspect of our folk notion of convention. It is doubtful however that Lewis was merely analysing a folk concept. I illustrate how his theory can (and must) be assessed using empirical data, and (...)
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  • A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):271–302.
    In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose (...)
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  • Situating Norms and Jointness of Social Interaction.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2013 - Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 9 (1):225-248.
    The paper argues that contexts of interaction are structured in a way that coordinates part actions into normatively guided joint action without agents having common knowledge or mutual beliefs about intentions, beliefs, or commitments to part actions. The argument shows earlier analyses of joint action to be fundamentally flawed because they have not taken contextual influences on joint action properly into account. Specific completion of earlier analyses is proposed. It is concluded that attention to features distributed in context of interaction (...)
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  • Intencionalidade: mecanismo e interacção.Porfírio Silva - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (2):255-278.
    In this essay we try an answer to the question has intentionality to be reduced to anything? We propose that it is possible to reduce any variety of intentionality to a specification of mechanisms (internal organization of the items involved in a given intentional phenomenon) and a historical pattern of interaction (structure of mutual significant relations historically acquired by different items involved in the same intentional phenomenon). We first clarify the meaning of this proposal having recourse to the Ruth Millikan’s (...)
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  • Collective Intentions And Team Agency.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.
    In the literature of collective intentions, the ‘we-intentions’ that lie behind cooperative actions are analysed in terms of individual mental states. The core forms of these analyses imply that all Nash equilibrium behaviour is the result of collective intentions, even though not all Nash equilibria are cooperative actions. Unsatisfactorily, the latter cases have to be excluded either by stipulation or by the addition of further, problematic conditions. We contend that the cooperative aspect of collective intentions is not a property of (...)
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  • Deviance as Inauthenticity: An Ontological Perspective.Mortaza Zare - 2016 - Philosophy of Management 15 (2):151-159.
    While organizational deviance has become a popular research topic in the past two decades, deviant behavior remains a contested concept, with several research studies being done to better define the term. As a result, researchers have introduced various definitions and constructs which seem to overlap one another. Such proliferation might backfire and could lead to more confusion. Looking at deviance from an ontological aspect, therefore, will help to decrease such confusion among researchers. Another advantage to ontologically viewing deviance is that (...)
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  • Collective Mental Time Travel: Remembering the Past and Imagining the Future Together.Kourken Michaelian & John Sutton - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4933-4960.
    Bringing research on collective memory together with research on episodic future thought, Szpunar and Szpunar :376–389, 2016) have recently developed the concept of collective future thought. Individual memory and individual future thought are increasingly seen as two forms of individual mental time travel, and it is natural to see collective memory and collective future thought as forms of collective mental time travel. But how seriously should the notion of collective mental time travel be taken? This article argues that, while collective (...)
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  • Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of framing, (...)
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  • Interacting Mindreaders.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863.
    Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader’s target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions (...)
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  • Communication and Shared Information.Marija Jankovic - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):489-508.
    Strawson style counterexamples to Grice’s account of communication show that a communicative intention has to be overt. Saying what overtness consists in has proven to be difficult for Gricean accounts. In this paper, I show that a common explanation of overtness, one that construes it in terms of a network of shared beliefs or knowledge, is mistaken. I offer an alternative, collectivist, model of communication. This model takes the utterer’s communicative intention to be a we-intention, a kind of intention with (...)
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  • Thinking Things and Feeling Things: On an Alleged Discontinuity in Folk Metaphysics of Mind.Mark Phelan, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):703-725.
    According to the discontinuity view, people recognize a deep discontinuity between phenomenal and intentional states, such that they refrain from attributing feelings and experiences to entities that do not have the right kind of body, though they may attribute thoughts to entities that lack a biological body, like corporations, robots, and disembodied souls. We examine some of the research that has been used to motivate the discontinuity view. Specifically, we focus on experiments that examine people's aptness judgments for various mental (...)
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  • Making Our Ends Meet: Shared Intention, Goal Adoption and the Third-Person Perspective.Luca Tummolini - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):75-98.
    Mind reading (i.e. the ability to infer the mental state of another agent) is taken to be the main cognitive ability required to share an intention and to collaborate. In this paper, I argue that another cognitive ability is also necessary to collaborate: representing others’ and ones’ own goals from a third-person perspective (other-centred or allocentric representation of goals). I argue that allocentric mind reading enables the cognitive ability of goal adoption, i.e. having the goal that another agent’s achieve p (...)
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  • How to Share a Mind: Reconsidering the Group Mind Thesis.Thomas Szanto - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):99-120.
    Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. Somewhat surprisingly, (...)
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  • Interpersonal Responsibilities and Communicative Intentions.Antonella Carassa & Marco Colombetti - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):145-159.
    When they interact in everyday situations, people constantly create new fragments of social reality: they do so when they make promises or agreements, but also when they submit requests or answer questions, when they greet each other or express gratitude. This type of social reality ‘in the small,’ that we call interpersonal reality, is deontic in nature as all other kinds of social reality; what makes it somewhat special is that its deontology applies to the very same persons who create (...)
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  • Joint Action and Recursive Consciousness of Consciousness.Sebastian Rödl - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):769-779.
    In a series of essays, Bratman defines a concept, which we may call the concept of Bratmanian action by many. Our discussion of this concept, in section 1, reveals that it is not the one called to mind by the usual examples of joint action. Section 2 lays alongside it a different concept of doing something together. According to it, many are doing A together if and only if the principle of the actions in which they are doing A is (...)
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  • The Social Roots of Normativity.Glenda Satne - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):673-682.
    This paper introduces the Special Issue: ‘The Roots of Normativity. Developmental, Comparative and Conceptual issues’. The contributions collected in this volume aim to present a picture of contemporary accounts of normativity that integrate philosophy and developmental and comparative psychology and purport to provide the reader with new insights regarding a classical debate about what makes us human: being governed by norms and being able to orient ourselves in the light of them. This introduction presents a broad picture of the issues (...)
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  • The Subject of “We Intend”.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):231-243.
    This paper examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind and the plural kind are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that “I intend” is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent differences, (...)
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  • ‘Common Purpose’: The Crowd and the Public.Ulrike Kistner - 2015 - Law and Critique 26 (1):27-43.
    The legal doctrine of ‘common purpose’ in South African criminal law considers all parties liable who have been in implicit or explicit agreement to commit an unlawful act, and associated with each other for that purpose, even if the consequential act has been carried out by one of them. It relieves the prosecution of proving the causal link between the conduct of an individual member of a group acting in common purpose, and the ultimate consequence caused by the action of (...)
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  • On Being a ‘We’: Edith Stein’s Contribution to the Intentionalism Debate.Timothy Burns - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):529-547.
    It is commonplace to speak of social groups as if they were capable of the same sorts of activities as individuals. We say, “Germany won the World Cup”; “The United States invaded Iraq”; and “The world mourned the passing of Nelson Mandela”. In so doing, we attribute agency, belief, and emotional states to groups themselves. In recent years, much literature devoted to analyzing such statements and their implications has emerged. Within this literature, the issue of “intentionalism,” whether individuals must have (...)
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  • Kirk Ludwig: From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action, Volume I: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Hardback € 60,98 336 Pp.Mattias Gunnemyr - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):915-918.
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  • Using Proper Names as Intermediaries Between Labelled Entity Representations.Hans Kamp - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):263-312.
    This paper studies the uses of proper names within a communication-theoretic setting, looking at both the conditions that govern the use of a name by a speaker and those involved in the correct interpretation of the name by her audience. The setting in which these conditions are investigated is provided by an extension of Discourse Representation Theory, MSDRT, in which mental states are represented as combinations of propositional attitudes and entity representations . The first half of the paper presents the (...)
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  • Group Virtue Epistemology.Jesper Kallestrup - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    According to Sosa, knowledge is apt belief, where a belief is apt when accurate because adroit. Sosa :465–475, 2010; Judgment and agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) adds to his triple-A analysis of knowledge, a triple-S analysis of competence, where a complete competence combines its seat, shape and situation. Much of Sosa’s influential work assumes that epistemic agents are individuals who acquire knowledge when they hit the truth through exercising their own individual skills in appropriate shapes and situations. This paper (...)
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  • Subject, Mode and Content in We-Intentions.Michael Wilby - 2012 - Phenomenology and Mind.
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