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Coordination, Triangulation, and Language Use.Josh Armstrong - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):80-112.details
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Lucky joint action.Julius Schönherr - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):123-142.details
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Shared Intentions, Loose Groups and Pooled Knowledge.Olivier Roy & Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2019 - Synthese (5):4523-4541.details
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Salience reasoning in coordination games.Julius Schönherr - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6601-6620.details
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A strawson–lewis defence of social preferences.Jelle de Boer - 2012 - Economics and Philosophy 28 (3):291-310.details
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A stag hunt with signalling and mutual beliefs.Jelle de Boer - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):559-576.details
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Common reasoning in games: A Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality.Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):285-329.details
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The paradox of social interaction: Shared intentionality, we-reasoning, and virtual bargaining.Nick Chater, Hossam Zeitoun & Tigran Melkonyan - 2022 - Psychological Review 129 (3):415-437.details
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Frames, reasoning, and the emergence of conventions.Nicola Campigotto - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (3):383-400.details
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Practical Conservatism.Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin - 2016 - The Monist 99 (4):336-351.details
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On the Uses and Abuses of Celebrity Epistemic Power.Alfred Archer, Mark Alfano & Matthew Dennis - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.details
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From self-regarding to other-regarding agents in strategic games: a logical analysis.Emiliano Lorini - 2011 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21 (3-4):443-475.details
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Who’s afraid of common knowledge?Giorgio Sbardolini - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):859-877.details
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Team Reasoning: Theory and Evidence.Jurgis Karpus & Natalie Gold - 2016 - In Julian Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. New York: Routledge. pp. 400-417.details
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Reasoning with reasons: Lewis on common knowledge.Huub Vromen - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-22.details
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When and why Conventions cannot Be Social Institutions.Vojtěch Zachník - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1235-1254.details
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Introduction: Interactive Epistemology.Paul Weirich - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):201-208.details
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Convention: An interdisciplinary study.Luca Tummolini - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):1-3.details
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The Role of Higher-order Expectations in David Lewis's Theory of Convention.Haruka Tsutsui - 2010 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 37 (2):59-66.details
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Team Reasoning and Intentional Cooperation for Mutual Benefit.Robert Sugden - 2014 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):143–166.details
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On David Gauthier’s Theories of Coordination and Cooperation.Robert Sugden - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (4):713-737.details
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Hume’s theory of justice and Vanderschraaf’s vulnerablity objection.Robert Sugden - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1719-1729.details
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Rule-following as coordination: a game-theoretic approach.Giacomo Sillari - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):871-890.details
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Quantified logic of awareness and impossible possible worlds.Giacomo Sillari - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):514-529.details
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Common Knowledge and Convention.Giacomo Sillari - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):29-39.details
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A Logical Framework for Convention.Giacomo Sillari - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):379-400.details
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Salience Reasoning.Gerald J. Postema - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):41-55.details
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Rules as the Impetus of Cultural Evolution.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):531-545.details
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Une forme minimale de coopération.Cédric Paternotte - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (2):235-267.details
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The Fragility of Common Knowledge.Cédric Paternotte - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):451-472.details
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The epistemic core of weak joint action.Cedric Paternotte - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (1):1-24.details
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Minimal Cooperation.Cédric Paternotte - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1):0048393112457428.details
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Being realistic about common knowledge: a Lewisian approach.Cedric Paternotte - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):249-276.details
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Dynamic Epistemic Logic I: Modeling Knowledge and Belief.Eric Pacuit - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (9):798-814.details
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Intension, extension, and the model of belief and knowledge in economics.Ivan Moscati - 2012 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 5 (2):1.details
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Uncommon Knowledge.Harvey Lederman - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1069-1105.details
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Conventionalism, coordination, and mental models: from Poincaré to Simon.Rouslan Koumakhov - 2014 - Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (3):251-272.details
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How Much Rationality Do We Need to Explain Conventions?Simon M. Huttegger - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (1):11-21.details
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Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives.Simon M. Huttegger - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):409-436.details
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Evolution and the explanation of meaning.Simon M. Huttegger - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (1):1-27.details
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A framework for community-based salience: Common knowledge, common understanding and community membership.Cyril Hédoin - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):365-395.details
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Collective intentionality in economics: making Searle's theory of institutional facts relevant for game theory.Cyril Hédoin - 2013 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 6 (1):1.details
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How to Interpret Belief Hierarchies in Bayesian Game Theory: A Dilemma for the Epistemic Program.Cyril Hédoin - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):1-22.details
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How to Interpret Belief Hierarchies in Bayesian Game Theory: A Dilemma for the Epistemic Program.Cyril Hédoin - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):419-440.details
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Institutions, rule-following and game theory.Cyril Hédoin - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (1):43-72.details
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The Philosophy of Social Science: Metaphysical and Empirical.Francesco Guala - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):954-980.details
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Collective Intentions And Team Agency.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.details
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The Unconventional, but Conventionalist, Legacy of Lewis’s “Convention”.Olivier Favereau - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):115-126.details
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A Broomean Model of Rationality and Reasoning.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (11):585-614.details
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