Parts of the book date back to and some of the concluding remarks on ethics and the will may have been composed still earlier, when Wittgenstein admired ...

This landmark book is now reissued in a new edition that has been vastly rewritten and updated to respond to recent Kantian literature.

When in May 1930, the Council of Trinity College, Cambridge, had to decide whether to renew Wittgenstein's research grant, it turned to Bertrand Russell for an assessment of the work Wittgenstein had been doing over the past year. His verdict: The theories contained in this new work... are novel, very original and indubitably important. Whether they are true, I do not know. As a logician who like simplicity, I should like to think that they are not, but from what I (...) have read of them I am quite sure that he ought to have the opportunity to work them out, since, when completed, they may easily prove to constitute a whole new philosophy. (shrink)

A. W. Moore argues in this bold, unusual, and ambitious book that it is possible to think about the world from no point of view. His argument involves discussion of a very wide range of fundamental philosophical issues, including the nature of persons, the subject-matter of mathematics, realism and anti-realism, value, the inexpressible, and God. The result is a powerful critique of our own finitude.

The author analyzes the inner structure of the philosophy of the Tractatus rather than its relation to the views of other philosophers.

Wittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further by Waismann). Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later called a worldview) (...) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability. (shrink)

This essay examines the role allocated to ostensive definition in the logical empiricist philosophy of the vienna circle. it explains how this characteristic array of doctrines grew out of reflections on the "tractatus". the various theses are distinguished into general principles, logical aspects, normative aspects and psychological theses. a detailed survey of wittgenstein's later analysis of ostensive definition is undertaken. this is then brought to bear on the doctrines of logical empiricism to show that they are incoherent. the essay concludes (...) by sketching out how much of those fallacious doctrines survive explicitly in contemporary philosophy of language. (shrink)