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  1. The Moral Problem.[author unknown] - 1994 - Wiley.
    Chapter 5 contains a classic response to Williams. Smith does not disagree concerning the existence of external reasons, but about deliberation’s power to move us from our starting positions, and about the likely degree of convergence in deliberators’ conclusions about their own reasons.
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  • Abolishing Morality.Richard Garner - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):499-513.
    Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper I (...)
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  • What is the Frege-Geach Problem?Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720.
    In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as the Frege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the problem has since occupied a great deal of the (...)
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  • Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
    First published in 1903, this volume revolutionized philosophy and forever altered the direction of ethical studies. A philosopher’s philosopher, G. E. Moore was the idol of the Bloomsbury group, and Lytton Strachey declared that Principia Ethica marked the rebirth of the Age of Reason. This work clarifies some of moral philosophy’s most common confusions and redefines the science’s terminology. Six chapters explore: the subject matter of ethics, naturalistic ethics, hedonism, metaphysical ethics, ethics in relation to conduct, and the ideal. Moore's (...)
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  • Principia Ethica.G. Moore - 1905 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 13 (3):7-9.
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  • Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
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  • The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce argues that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. At the heart of ordinary moral judgements is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended. Joyce argues that natural selection is to blame, in that it has provided us with a tendency to invest the world with values that it does not contain, and demands that it does not make. Should we therefore do away with morality, as we (...)
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  • Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
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  • Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong.J. L. Mackie - 1977 - Erkenntnis 18 (3):425-430.
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  • Fictionalism.Matti Eklund - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Might All Normativity Be Queer?Matthew S. Bedke - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):41-58.
    Here I discuss the conceptual structure and core semantic commitments of reason-involving thought and discourse needed to underwrite the claim that ethical normativity is not uniquely queer. This deflates a primary source of ethical scepticism and it vindicates so-called partner in crime arguments. When it comes to queerness objections, all reason-implicating normative claims?including those concerning Humean reasons to pursue one's ends, and epistemic reasons to form true beliefs?stand or fall together.
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  • Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):536-539.
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  • Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn Out of Frege’s Abyss?Bob Hale - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):144-149.
    An early objection to Simon Blackburn’s first attempts to breathe new life into expressivism—by solving the Frege-Geach problem—was that whilst viewing compound sentences featuring moral components as expressive of attitudes towards combinations of attitudes might enable one to make out that a thinker who, to take the usual example, asserts the premisses but will not accept the conclusion of a moral modus ponens is at fault because they are involved in a “clash of attitudes”, this does no justice to the (...)
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  • Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reason.Simon Blackburn - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):110-114.
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  • Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Mind 111 (442):373-380.
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  • Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):307 – 330.
    In this paper we introduce a distinct metaethical position, fictionalism about morality. We clarify and defend the position, showing that it is a way to save the 'moral phenomena' while agreeing that there is no genuine objective prescriptivity to be described by moral terms. In particular, we distinguish moral fictionalism from moral quasi-realism, and we show that fictionalism possesses the virtues of quasi-realism about morality, but avoids its vices.
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  • Getting Real About Moral Fictionalism.Jonas Olson - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6. Oxford University Press.
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  • Meta‐Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism.James Dreier - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44.
    This is a paper about the problem of realism in meta-ethics (and, I hope, also in other areas, but that hope is so far pretty speculative). But it is not about the problem of whether realism is true. It is about the problem of what realism is. More specifically, it is about the question of what divides meta-ethical realists from irrealists. I start with a potted history of the Good Old Days.
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  • Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Synthese 91 (3):319-335.
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  • Revolutionary Expressivism.Sebastian Köhler & Michael Ridge - 2013 - Ratio 26 (4):428-449.
    While the meta-ethical error theory has been of philosophical interest for some time now, only recently a debate has emerged about the question what is to be done if the error theory turns out to be true. This paper argues for a novel answer to this question, namely revolutionary expressivism: if the error theory is true, we should become expressivists. Additionally, the paper explores certain important but largely ignored methodological issues that arise for reforming definitions generally and with a vengeance (...)
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  • Can We Believe the Error Theory?Bart Streumer - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):194-212.
    According to the error theory, normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, I argue that we cannot believe the error theory, and that this means that there is no reason for us to believe this theory. It may be thought that this is a problem for the error theory, but I argue that it is not. Instead, I argue, our inability to believe the error theory undermines many objections that (...)
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  • Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.Arthur Ripstein & Allan Gibbard - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):934.
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  • Imperative and Deontic Logic.Peter Geach - 1957 - Analysis 18 (3):49-56.
    The author contends that moral utterances and imperatives have different logical features. He discusses r m hare's "language of morals" in terms of his distinction between plain imperatives and deontic utterances. (staff).
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  • Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire.David Sobel & Copp - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):44-53.
    The authors argue against direction of fit accounts of the distinction between belief and desire.
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  • Getting Real About Moral Fictionalism1.Jonas Olson - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:181.
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  • Ethics and Language.DeWitt H. Parker & Charles L. Stevenson - 1946 - Philosophical Review 55 (6):704.
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  • Principia Ethica.Evander Bradley McGilvary & George Edward Moore - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (3):351.
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  • The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Mind 113 (452):760-763.
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  • Moral Fictionalism.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):145-148.
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  • E Xpressivism and E Pistemology: E Pistemology for E Cumenical E Xpressivists.Michael Ridge - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):83-108.
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  • Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1992
    In Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Alan Gibbard explores a central question in ethics: what content our moral judgements carry in relation to the `norms' of society which have shaped our views and opinions. Gibbard develops a philosophically sophisticated answer to this, taking ideas from a wide background, - modern psychology, game theory, and evolutionary biology, - and applying them to ethics for the first time.
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  • Moral Fictionalism.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2006 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (2):412-413.
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  • Meta‐ethics and The Problem of Creeping Minimalism.James Dreier - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23-44.
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  • Language, Truth and Logic.Alfred J. Ayer - 1937 - Erkenntnis 7:123-125.
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  • .Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
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  • Spreading the world.Simon Blackburn - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (3):385-387.
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