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  1. (1 other version)Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Open problems in the philosophy of information.Luciano Floridi - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 35 (4):554-582.
    The philosophy of information (PI) is a new area of research with its own field of investigation and methodology. This article, based on the Herbert A. Simon Lecture of Computing and Philosophy I gave at Carnegie Mellon University in 2001, analyses the eighteen principal open problems in PI. Section 1 introduces the analysis by outlining Herbert Simon's approach to PI. Section 2 discusses some methodological considerations about what counts as a good philosophical problem. The discussion centers on Hilbert's famous analysis (...)
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  • The chinese room argument.David Cole - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Intelligence without representation.Rodney A. Brooks - 1991 - Artificial Intelligence 47 (1--3):139-159.
    Artificial intelligence research has foundered on the issue of representation. When intelligence is approached in an incremental manner, with strict reliance on interfacing to the real world through perception and action, reliance on representation disappears. In this paper we outline our approach to incrementally building complete intelligent Creatures. The fundamental decomposition of the intelligent system is not into independent information processing units which must interface with each other via representations. Instead, the intelligent system is decomposed into independent and parallel activity (...)
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  • (1 other version)Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
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  • (1 other version)Subsymbolic computation and the chinese room.David J. Chalmers - 1992 - In John Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 25--48.
    More than a decade ago, philosopher John Searle started a long-running controversy with his paper “Minds, Brains, and Programs” (Searle, 1980a), an attack on the ambitious claims of artificial intelligence (AI). With his now famous _Chinese Room_ argument, Searle claimed to show that despite the best efforts of AI researchers, a computer could never recreate such vital properties of human mentality as intentionality, subjectivity, and understanding. The AI research program is based on the underlying assumption that all important aspects of (...)
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  • The interaction of explicit and implicit learning: An integrated model.Ron Sun - unknown
    This paper explicates the interaction between the implicit and explicit learning processes in skill acquisition, contrary to the common tendency in the literature of studying each type of learning in isolation. It highlights the interaction between the two types of processes and its various effects on learning, including the synergy effect. This work advocates an integrated model of skill learning that takes into account both implicit and explicit processes; moreover, it embodies a bottom-up approach (first learning implicit knowledge and then (...)
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  • Learning, action, and consciousness: A hybrid approach toward modeling consciousness.Ron Sun - 1997 - Neural Networks 10:1317-33.
    _role, especially in learning, and through devising hybrid neural network models that (in a qualitative manner) approxi-_ _mate characteristics of human consciousness. In doing so, the paper examines explicit and implicit learning in a variety_ _of psychological experiments and delineates the conscious/unconscious distinction in terms of the two types of learning_ _and their respective products. The distinctions are captured in a two-level action-based model C_larion_. Some funda-_ _mental theoretical issues are also clari?ed with the help of the model. Comparisons with (...)
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  • (1 other version)The symbol grounding problem.Stevan Harnad - 1990 - Physica D 42:335-346.
    There has been much discussion recently about the scope and limits of purely symbolic models of the mind and about the proper role of connectionism in cognitive modeling. This paper describes the symbol grounding problem : How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be made intrinsic to the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings in our heads? How can the meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated solely on the basis of their shapes, be grounded (...)
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  • Symbol grounding and the origin of language.Stevan Harnad - 2002 - In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press.
    What language allows us to do is to "steal" categories quickly and effortlessly through hearsay instead of having to earn them the hard way, through risky and time-consuming sensorimotor "toil" (trial-and-error learning, guided by corrective feedback from the consequences of miscategorisation). To make such linguistic "theft" possible, however, some, at least, of the denoting symbols of language must first be grounded in categories that have been earned through sensorimotor toil (or else in categories that have already been "prepared" for us (...)
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  • Symbol grounding is an empirical problem: Neural nets are just a candidate component.Stevan Harnad - 1993
    "Symbol Grounding" is beginning to mean too many things to too many people. My own construal has always been simple: Cognition cannot be just computation, because computation is just the systematically interpretable manipulation of meaningless symbols, whereas the meanings of my thoughts don't depend on their interpretability or interpretation by someone else. On pain of infinite regress, then, symbol meanings must be grounded in something other than just their interpretability if they are to be candidates for what is going on (...)
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  • Symbol grounding: A new look at an old idea.Ron Sun - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):149-172.
    Symbols should be grounded, as has been argued before. But we insist that they should be grounded not only in subsymbolic activities, but also in the interaction between the agent and the world. The point is that concepts are not formed in isolation (from the world), in abstraction, or "objectively." They are formed in relation to the experience of agents, through their perceptual/motor apparatuses, in their world and linked to their goals and actions. This paper takes a detailed look at (...)
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  • The physical symbol grounding problem.Paul Vogt - unknown
    This paper presents an approach to solve the symbol grounding problem within the framework of embodied cognitive science. It will be argued that symbolic structures can be used within the paradigm of embodied cognitive science by adopting an alternative definition of a symbol. In this alternative definition, the symbol may be viewed as a structural coupling between an agent's sensorimotor activations and its environment. A robotic experiment is presented in which mobile robots develop a symbolic structure from scratch by engaging (...)
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  • Computation, reduction, and teleology of consciousness.Ron Sun - 2001 - Cognitive Systems Research 1 (1):241-249.
    This paper aims to explore mechanistic and teleological explanations of consciousness. In terms of mechanistic explanations, it critiques various existing views, especially those embodied by existing computational cognitive models. In this regard, the paper argues in favor of the explanation based on the distinction between localist (symbolic) representation and distributed representation (as formulated in the connectionist literature), which reduces the phenomenological difference to a mechanistic difference. Furthermore, to establish a teleological explanation of consciousness, the paper discusses the issue of the (...)
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