Critics of Hannah Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy argue that Arendt fails to address the most important problem of political judgment, namely, validity. This essay shows that Arendt does indeed have an answer to the problem that preoccupies her critics, with one important caveat: she does not think that validity is the all-important problem of political judgment--the affirmation of human freedom is.

In this essay, the author examines the tensions that emerge between the practice of essay writing and a commitment to philosophical justification as themodel for political argument in contemporary political thought. He focuses on Jürgen Habermas’s adoption of the performative contradiction as an ideal for communicative exchange and shows the unacknowledged role that sincerity plays in Habermas’s argument. He then links this account to his explorations of the rise of aesthetic criticism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and its contribution (...) to democratic thought. Turning to one of the key literary and political critics of the period, William Hazlitt, the author shows how his theory of essay composition lends itself to a radical democratic imaginary that complicates the account of political argument Habermas sets out. Hazlitt’s essays, the author concludes, are exemplary in their embracing of contradiction as a condition of democratic life. (shrink)

One argument for deliberative democracy is that public deliberation enhances a sincere concern for the common good. Most of the theories of deliberative democracy fail to give a satisfying account of this process. One of the causes for this state of affairs is a preoccupation with autonomy, which tends to obscure that public deliberation is deliberation with others who are actually present. On such an interpretation of publicity, shame, or a concern for reputation, plays a crucial motivational role. Aristotle, by (...) acknowledging this role, is capable of constructing an account of the formation of deliberative character that is far more realistic than the standard answer of deliberative democrats. In particular, it is shown that public deliberation cannot discharge its edifying or civilizing function all by itself. To have the desired effect, the development of the deliberative capacity requires the acquisition of the virtues of character, especially that of truthfulness. (shrink)

In certain contemporary theories of the politics of shame, shame is considered a pernicious emotion that we need to avoid in, or a salutary emotion that serves as an infallible guide to, democratic deliberation. The author argues that both positions arise out of an inadequate notion of the structure of shame and an oversimplistic opposition between shame and shamelessness. Plato's dialogue, the Gorgias, actually helps to address these problems because it supplies a deeper understanding of the place of shame in (...) democratic politics in ways that address our contemporary dilemmas. It does this first, by avoiding the simple opposition between shame and shamelessness and secondly, by articulating three different kinds of "politics of shame" that can characterize democratic deliberations. Finally, Plato's treatment of shame extends upon contemporary ethical and psychoanalytic notions of shame in ways that are directly relevant to the our contemporary political situation. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV V VI.

One argument for deliberative democracy is that public deliberation enhances a sincere concern for the common good. Most of the theories of deliberative democracy fail to give a satisfying account of this process. One of the causes for this state of affairs is a preoccupation with autonomy, which tends to obscure that public deliberation is deliberation with others who are actually present. On such an interpretation of publicity, shame, or a concern for reputation, plays a crucial motivational role. Aristotle, by (...) acknowledging this role, is capable of constructing an account of the formation of deliberative character that is far more realistic than the standard answer of deliberative democrats. In particular, it is shown that public deliberation cannot discharge its edifying or civilizing function all by itself. To have the desired effect, the development of the deliberative capacity requires the acquisition of the virtues of character, especially that of truthfulness. (shrink)