Epistemic relativism has the contemporary academy in its grip. Not merely in the United States, but seemingly everywhere, most scholars working in the humanities and the social sciences seem to subscribe to some form of it. Even where the label is repudiated, the view is embraced. Sometimes the relativism in question concerns truth, sometimes justification. The core impulse appears to be a relativism about knowledge. The suspicion is widespread that what counts as knowledge in one cultural, or broadly ideological, setting (...) need not count as knowledge in another. (shrink)

Kalrnaric. We set out a system T, consisting of normal proofs constructed by means of elegantly symmetrical introduction and elimination rules. In the system T there are two requirements, called ( ) and ()), on applications of discharge rules. T is sound and complete for Kalmaric arguments. ( ) requires nonvacuous discharge of assumptions; ()) requires that the assumption discharged be the sole one available of highest degree. We then consider a 'Duhemian' extension T*, obtained simply by dropping the requirement (...) ()). T* is a proper subsystem of intuitionistic relevant logic. Our main result is that T* is a double negation consistency companion to classical logic. Thus all one needs to add to T* to obtain classical logic is the (intuitionistic) absurdity rule, and the (classical) rule of double nega-. (shrink)