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Incompatibilism and the Fixity of the Past

In John A. Keller (ed.), Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes From the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 140-148 (2017)

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  1. .Peter van Inwagen - 1988
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  • (1 other version)Are we free to break the laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.
    I insist that I was able to raise my hand, and I acknowledge that a law would have been broken had I done so, but I deny that I am therefore able to break a law. To uphold my instance of soft determinism, I need not claim any incredible powers. To uphold the compatibilism that I actually believe, I need not claim that such powers are even possible. My incompatibilist opponent is a creature of fiction, but he has his prototypes (...)
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  • (1 other version)Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • How to Think about the Problem of Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):327 - 341.
    In this essay I present what is, I contend, the free-will problem properly thought through, or at least presented in a form in which it is possible to think about it without being constantly led astray by bad terminology and confused ideas. Bad terminology and confused ideas are not uncommon in current discussions of the problem. The worst such pieces of terminology are "libertarian free will" and "compatibilist free will." The essay consists partly of a defense of the thesis that (...)
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  • (1 other version)Towards a reasonable libertarianism.David Wiggins - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Boston,: Routledge. pp. 31.
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  • Might We Have No Choice.Carl Ginet - 1966 - In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Contributors: Roderick M. Chisholm And Others. New York,: Random House. pp. 87--104.
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  • Selective necessity and the free will problem.Michael Slote - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (January):5-24.
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  • (1 other version)Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism.David Wiggins - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Freedom and the Fixity of the Past.Wesley H. Holliday - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):179-207.
    According to the Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), no one can now do anything that would require the past to have unfolded differently than it actually did, for the past is fixed, over and done with. Why might doing something in the future require the past to be different? Because if determinism is true—if the laws of nature and the initial conditions of the Big Bang determined a unique future for our universe—then doing anything other than what (...)
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