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  1. Agnosticism about moral responsibility.Jeremy Byrd - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):411-432.
    Traditionally, incompatibilism has rested on two theses. First, the familiar Principle of Alternative Possibilities says that we cannot be morally responsible for what we do unless we could have done otherwise. Accepting this principle, incompatibilists have then argued that there is no room for such alternative possibilities in a deterministic world. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have argued that incompatibilism about moral responsibility can be defended independently of these traditional theses (Ginet 2005: 604-8; McKenna 2001; Stump 1999: 322-4, 2000 (...)
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  • Sajama, Seppo. Idea, Judgement and Will, University of Turku, Finland, 1983, Reports from the Department of Theoretical Philosophy.John Bishop - 1986 - Theoria 52 (1-2):98-117.
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  • Determinismus und Verantwortung: Was kann das Konsequenzargument?Christoph Jäger - 2009 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1):119-131.
    In his recent book Willensfreiheit Geert Keil defends a version of libertarianism. Yet he criticizes a flagship argument for incompatibilism. Van Inwagen's consequence argument, Keil thinks, relies on an irrelevant premise when it claims that agents have no choice about the remote past. I argue that Keil's charge rests on a misunderstanding. I then sketch why discussions of the consequence argument should focus on the question whether or not a certain version of rule Beta is valid.
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  • Arguments for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Determinism is a claim about the laws of nature: very roughly, it is the claim that everything that happens is determined by antecedent conditions together with the natural laws. Incompatibilism is a philosophical thesis about the relevance of determinism to free will: that the truth of determinism rules out the existence of free will. The incompatibilist believes that if determinism turned out to be true, it would also be true that we don't have, and have never had, free will. The (...)
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  • Personal autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To be autonomous is to be a law to oneself; autonomous agents are self-governing agents. Most of us want to be autonomous because we want to be accountable for what we do, and because it seems that if we are not the ones calling the shots, then we cannot be accountable. More importantly, perhaps, the value of autonomy is tied to the value of self-integration. We don't want to be alien to, or at war with, ourselves; and it seems that (...)
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  • Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    “Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Which sort is the free will sort is what all the fuss is about. (And what a fuss it has been: philosophers have debated this question for over two millenia, and just about every major philosopher has had something to say about it.) Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very (...)
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  • Ability and cognition: A defense of compatibilism.Tomis Kapitan - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (August):231-43.
    The use of predicate and sentential operators to express the practical modalities -- ability, control, openness, etc. -- has given new life to a fatalistic argument against determinist theories of responsible agency. A familiar version employs the following principle: the consequences of what is unavoidable (beyond one's control) are themselves unavoidable. Accordingly, if determinism is true, whatever happens is the consequence of events in the remote past, or, of such events together with the laws of nature. But laws and the (...)
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  • Free will and the modal principle.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (3):213-30.
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  • Arguing about Free Will: Lewis and the Consequence Argument.Danilo Šuster - 2021 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 21 (63):375-403.
    I explore some issues in the logics and dialectics of practical modalities connected with the Consequence Argument (CA) considered as the best argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. According to Lewis (1981) in one of the possible senses of (in)ability, the argument is not valid; however, understood in the other of its possible senses, the argument is not sound. This verdict is based on the assessment of the modal version of the argument, where the crucial notion is (...)
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  • Zdolność reagowania na racje a odpowiedzialność moralna (przeł. Marcin Iwanicki i Joanna Klara Teske).John Martin Fischer, Marcin Iwanicki & Joanna Klara Teske - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (4):467-496.
    The author presents a model of moral responsibility based on the actual sequence and the notion of reason-responsiveness, and draws an analogy between this model and Robert Nozick’s model of knowledge based on the actual sequence. In addition, the concept of semicompatibilism is introduced and explained.
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  • Agent-Causation Revisited: Origination and Contemporary Theories of Free Will.Thad Botham - 2008 - Berlin, Germany: Verlag D Müller.
    Sometimes you make a choice. Whether or not you made it was up to you. The choice was free. But how can this be? A scientific view of the world may leave no room for free choice. Free will literature continually explodes. Yet experts still focus on control or on a power to do otherwise. Sadly, they neglect another intuitive feature of free will: being an underived source or ultimate originator. When acting freely, one is a self-determined, self-directed, sole author (...)
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  • The 'Ought' and the 'Can'.Katerina Deligiorgi - 2018 - Con-Textos Kantianos 8:324-347.
    Kant's conception of autonomy presents the following problem. If, following Kant's explicit lead, we consider autonomy as the universal principle of morality and ground of the actions of rational beings (e.g. G 4:452), then self-legislation is best understood as a prescription by reason to itself. Applied to individual cases of willing, the term 'autonomy' describes the bringing of a set of practical attitudes under rational legislation. Agents may count as autonomous then, insofar as and only to the extent that they (...)
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  • The Counterfactual Theory of Free Will: A Genuinely Deterministic Form of Soft Determinism.Rick Repetti - 2010 - Saarbrücken, Germany: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing.
    I argue for a soft compatibilist theory of free will, i.e., such that free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism, directly opposite hard incompatibilism, which holds free will incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism. My intuitions in this book are primarily based on an analysis of meditation, but my arguments are highly syncretic, deriving from many fields, including behaviorism, psychology, conditioning and deconditioning theory, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, simulation theory, etc. I offer a causal/functional analysis of (...)
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  • John Martin Fischer's The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control: Michael S. McKenna.Michael S. McKenna - 1997 - Legal Theory 3 (4):379-397.
    John Martin Fischer's The Metaphysics of Free Will is devoted to two major projects. First, Fischer defends the thesis that determinism is incompatible with a person's control over alternatives to the actual future. Second, Fischer defends the striking thesis that such control is not necessary for moral responsibility. This review essay examines Fischer's arguments for each thesis. Fischer's defense of the incompatibilist thesis is the most innovative to date, and I argue that his formulation restructures the free will debate. To (...)
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  • (1 other version)Free Will and the Burden of Proof.William G. Lycan - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:107-122.
    Here are some things that are widely believed about free will and determinism. Free will is prima facie incompatible with determinism. The incompatibility is logical or at least conceptual or a priori. A compatibilist needs to explain how free will can co-exist with determinism, paradigmatically by offering an analysis of ‘free’ action that is demonstrably compatible with determinism. Free will is not impugned by quantum indeterminism, at least not in the same decisive way that it is impugned by determinism. To (...)
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  • Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions.Magill Kevin - 1997 - London: author open access, originally MacMillan.
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  • Incompatibilism and the Fixity of the Past.Neal A. Tognazzini & John Martin Fischer - 2017 - In John A. Keller (ed.), Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes From the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 140-148.
    A style of argument that calls into question our freedom (in the sense that involves freedom to do otherwise) has been around for millennia; it can be traced back to Origen. The argument-form makes use of the crucial idea that the past is over-and-done-with and thus fixed; we cannot now do anything about the distant past (or, for that matter, the recent past)—it is now too late. Peter van Inwagen has presented this argument (what he calls the Consequence Argument) in (...)
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  • Foreknowledge and Free Will.Linda Zagzebski - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:online.
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  • Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Where Frankfurt and Strawson meet.Michael McKenna - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):163-180.
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  • Some Worries About Deontic Closure.Kevin Kimble - 2024 - Philosophies 9 (6):182.
    The Deontic Principle of Closure (DCL) appears initially to be a highly plausible principle. The DCL is commonly assumed in practical ethical reasoning, as when we make certain inferences about what we (morally) ought to do in particular situations. For example, if I am standing beside a burning house with several victims trapped inside and I have an obligation to rescue them, then if it is necessary for me to open the front door in order for me to lead them (...)
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  • A timid response to the consequence argument.Michael McKenna - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):155-169.
    In this paper, I challenge the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism by arguing that the inference principle it relies upon is not well motivated. The sorts of non-question-begging instances that might be offered in support of it fall short.
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  • Laws of Nature and Free Will.Pedro Merlussi - 2017 - Dissertation, Durham University
    This thesis investigates the conceptual relationship between laws of nature and free will. In order to clarify the discussion, I begin by distinguishing several questions with respect to the nature of a law: i) do the laws of nature cover everything that happens? ii) are they deterministic? iii) can there be exceptions to universal and deterministic laws? iv) do the laws of nature govern everything in the world? In order to answer these questions I look at three widely endorsed accounts (...)
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  • modality and meaning.William G. Lycan - 1994 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    MEANING POSTULATES REINSTATED If I am right in agreeing with Cresswell that the "logicarrlexicaT distinction is one of degree rather than one of kind, that in turn impugns the distinction between the official truth-rules that define logical ...
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  • The Lessons of Prior’s Master Argument.Michael J. White - 1999 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 2 (1):225-238.
    A Master-like argument, in the usage of the present paper, is an argument that employs a reductio ad impossibile principle to transmit the necessity of what are or become past truths to the remainder of time by means of necessary conditionals of some sort. The conclusion of such an argument is some no-unactualized-possibilities principle. This paper argues that the formulation of a Master-like argument by A. N. Prior in a mixed modal temporal propositional logic introduces certain artifacts into the logical (...)
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  • Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525.
    Peter van Inwagen has presented a compelling argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism, which he calls “the Consequence Argument.” This argument depends on a controversial inference rule, “rule beta,” which says.
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  • Incompatibilism and the logic of transfer.Danilo šuster - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):45-54.
    Modal arguments for incompatibility of freedom and determinism are typically based on the “transfer principle” for inability to act otherwise (Beta). The principle of agglomerativity (closure under conjunction introduction) is derivable from Beta. The most convincing counterexample to Beta is based on the denial of Agglomeration. The defender of the modal argument has two ways to block counterexamples to Beta: (i) use a notion of inability to act otherwise which is immune to the counterexample to agglomerativity; (ii) replace Beta with (...)
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  • Saying good-bye to the direct argument the right way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.
    Peter van Inwagen contends that nonresponsibility transfers across deterministic relations. Suppose it does. If the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every truth about what one does, and no one is even in part morally responsible for the past and the laws, then no one is even in part morally responsible for what one does. This argument, the Direct Argument, has drawn various critics, who have attempted to produce counterexamples to its core inference principle. This article (...)
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  • In defense of incompatibilism.Carl Ginet - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (November):391-400.
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  • In defense of flip-flopping.Andrew M. Bailey & Amy Seymour - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13907-13924.
    Some incompatibilists about free will or moral responsibility and determinism would abandon their incompatibilism were they to learn that determinism is true. But is it reasonable to flip-flop in this way? In this article, we contend that it is and show what follows. The result is both a defense of a particular incompatibilist strategy and a general framework for assessing other cases of flip-flopping.
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  • The Incompatibility of Determinism and Moral Obligation.Neil Schaefer - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    From an indeterminist's perspective, I support and defined the following argument for deontic incompatibilism: If determinism is true, then no one ever can do otherwise than he does. If no one ever can do otherwise than he does, then nothing anyone does is ever right, wrong, or obligatory. Therefore, if determinism is true, then nothing anyone does is ever right, wrong, or obligatory. ;They sense of 'can' I use in this argument is what I call "the power-'can' of ordinary language." (...)
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  • Fatalism, incompatibilism, and the power to do otherwise.Penelope Mackie - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):672-689.
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  • Compatibilism and the consequence argument.Terence Horgan - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (May):339-56.
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  • The libertarian predicament: a plea for action theory.Niels van Miltenburg & Dawa Ometto - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):161-178.
    Libertarians in the contemporary free will debate find themselves under attack from two angles. They face the challenge of defending the necessity of indeterminism for freedom against the philosophical mainstream position of compatibilism. And second, they are increasingly forced to argue for the very possibility of indeterministic free will, in the face of the so-called luck objection. Many contemporary libertarians try to overcome the second problem by adopting the causal theory of action. We argue that this move at the same (...)
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  • The modal argument for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (March):227-44.
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  • Is agent-causality a conceptal primitive?John Bishop - 1986 - Synthese 67 (May):225-47.
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  • Frankfurt-pairs and varieties of blameworthiness: Epistemic morals. [REVIEW]Ishtiyaque Haji - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (3):351-377.
    I start by using “Frankfurt-type” examples to cast preliminary doubt on the “Objective View” - that one is blameworthy for an action only if that action is objectively wrong, and follow by providing further arguments against this view. Then I sketch a replacement for the Objective View whose core is that one is to blame for performing an action, A, only if one has the belief that it is morally wrong for one to do A, and this belief plays an (...)
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  • A Contextualist Reply to the Direct Argument.Matthew H. Slater - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (1):115-137.
    The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism is designed to side-step complaints given by compatibilist critiques of the so-called Transfer Argument. I argue that while it represents an improvement over the Transfer Argument, it loses some of its plausibility when we reflect on some metalogical issues about normal modal modeling and the semantics of natural language. More specifically, the crucial principle on which the Direct Argument depends appears doubtful where context plays a role in evaluation of (...)
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  • (1 other version)``Freedom and Foreknowledge".Michael Tooley - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):212-224.
    In her book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, Linda Zagzebski suggests that among the strongest ways of supporting the thesis that libertarian free will is incompatible with divine foreknowledge is what she refers to as the Accidental Necessity argument. Zagzebski contends, however, that at least three satisfactory responses to that argument are available.I argue that two of the proposed solutions are open to strong objections, and that the third, although it may very well handle the specific versions of the (...)
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  • Assessing reasons - responsive compatibilism.Micheal S. McKenna - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (1):89 – 114.
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  • Remarks on the modal logic of Henry Bradford Smith.Mary C. MacLeod & Peter K. Schotch - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (6):603-615.
    H. B. Smith, Professor of Philosophy at the influential 'Pennsylvania School' was (roughly) a contemporary of C. I. Lewis who was similarly interested in a proper account of 'implication'. His research also led him into the study of modal logic but in a different direction than Lewis was led. His account of modal logic does not lend itself as readily as Lewis' to the received 'possible worlds' semantics, so that the Smith approach was a casualty rather than a beneficiary of (...)
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  • Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology.Hugh J. McCann (ed.) - 2016 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    The articles in the present collection deal with the religious dimension of the problem of free will. All of the papers also have implications for broader philosophical and theological issues, and will thus be of interest to a wide variety of scholars, both religious and secular. Together they provide a historical and contemporary overview of problems in the theology of freedom, together with recent work by some important philosophers in the field aimed at resolving those problems. The chapters are divided (...)
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  • Moral responsibility.Thomas W. Smythe - 1999 - Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (4):493-506.
    [From introduction:] A theory of moral responsibility sets out the conditions under which we believe that an individual is a rational candidate for praise and blame on account of his behaviour. Such a theory needs to be supplemented by a further moral theory that specifies which morally responsible agents ought to be praised or blamed for their actions. We will focus here on the first sort of theory only. The theory present here will be similar to theories held by others.
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  • The Dialectical Advantage of the Direct Argument.Jeremy Byrd - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):431-444.
    Traditionally, incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism claim that we cannot be morally responsible unless we could have done otherwise and that we cannot do otherwise if we are determined. The Direct Argument for incompatibilism supposedly offers its defenders a dialectical advantage over this traditional approach insofar as it does not appear to rely on either of these controversial claims. Recently, though, David Widerker has argued against this supposition and urged that it is time to say farewell to the Direct (...)
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  • The Range of Options.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1990 - American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (4):345 - 355.
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