First published in 1990. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In the fiftieth anniversary of this book’s first release, Winch’s argument remains as crucial as ever. Originally published in 1958, _The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy_ was a landmark exploration of the social sciences, written at a time when that field was still young and had not yet joined the Humanities and the Natural Sciences as the third great domain of the Academy. A passionate defender of the importance of philosophy to a full understanding of (...) 'society' against those who would deem it an irrelevant 'ivory towers' pursuit, Winch draws from the works of such thinkers as Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.S. Mill and Max Weber to make his case. In so doing he addresses the possibility and practice of a comprehensive 'science of society'. (shrink)

Making Social Science Matter presents an exciting new approach to the social and behavioral sciences including theoretical argument, methodological guidelines, and examples of practical application. Why has social science failed in attempts to emulate natural science and produce normal theory? Bent Flyvbjerg argues that the strength of social sciences lies in its rich, reflexive analysis of values and power, essential to the social and economic development of any society. Richly informed, powerfully argued, and clearly written, this book opens up a (...) new future for the social sciences. Its empowering message will make it required reading for students and academics across the social and behavioral sciences. (shrink)

Now in a new edition, this volume updates Davidson's exceptional Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), which set out his enormously influential philosophy of language. The original volume remains a central point of reference, and a focus of controversy, with its impact extending into linguistic theory, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Addressing a central question--what it is for words to mean what they do--and featuring a previously uncollected, additional essay, this work will appeal to a wide audience of philosophers, linguists, (...) and psychologists. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's work remains, undeniably, now, that off one of those few philosophers who will be read by all future generations.

Our question is “Are there Cultural Universals?” I propose a reductio ad absurdum proof for an affirmative answer as follows. Suppose there were no cultural universals. Then inter-cultural communication would be impossible. But there is inter-cultural communication. Therefore, there are cultural universals. Let me now try to unpack this epitome of a proof. I start with the premiss that there is inter-cultural communication. This is too visible in the present-day world to be disputed; what may need arguing is what it (...) implies. But not everything regarding its implications is open to debate. For example, it is tautologically obvious that for any two persons to communicate at all they must share some common medium of communication. In turn this implies that at some level they must share a conceptual scheme, however minimal its dimensions. Any such scheme of concepts is a universal for, at least, the given participants in the communication. The question now is “Is there any scheme of concepts which can be shared by all the cultures of humankind?”. (shrink)

When it is asked if it is ‘possible’ for us to understand alien cultures, a contrast is implied with a certain conception of the understanding we have of our own culture. This contrast has certain parallels with the philosophical ‘problem of other minds’, in which a contrast is also drawn between understanding myself and others. Though these are different questions, they are related — in that somewhat parallel confusion about the notion of ‘understanding’ are involved in both. Our own culture (...) is not in principle transparent to our understanding; neither are other cultures in principle opaque. (shrink)

Peter Winch; I*—The Presidential Address: “Eine Einstellung zur Seele”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 1–16, ht.