Switch to: Citations

References in:

How to think about satisficing

Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1365-1384 (2017)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Satisficing Consequentialism.Michael Slote & Philip Pettit - 1984 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 58 (1):139-176.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • Satisficing and Virtue.Christine Swanton - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):33-48.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. [REVIEW]Rem B. Edwards - 1986 - International Studies in Philosophy 18 (3):90-92.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Resting Content: Sensible Satisficing?Patricia Greenspan - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):305 - 317.
    Suppose I am now making plans for next summer’s vacation. I can spend a week in Rome or on the Riviera, but not both. Either choice would be excellent, but after weighing various pros and cons, I decide that for my purposes Rome would be better. If I am rational, then, I must choose Rome. It is an assumption of standard decision theory that rationality requires maximizing: trying to get the maximum amount of whatever form of value we are after (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason.Michael Byron (ed.) - 2004 - New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    How do we think about what we plan to do? One dominant answer is that we select the best possible option available. However, a growing number of philosophers would offer a different answer: since we are not equipped to maximize we often choose the next best alternative, one that is no more than satisfactory. This strategy choice is called satisficing. This collection of essays explores both these accounts of practical reason, examining the consequences for adopting one or the other for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Rational Choice and Moral Agency.Daniel M. Farrell - 1995 - Ethics 107 (3):522-526.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Brute Requirements: Critical Notice. [REVIEW]Sergio Tenenbaum - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):153-171.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Brute Requirements: Critical Notice. [REVIEW]Sergio Tenenbaum - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):153-173.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Reply to Tenenbaum.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):463-476.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Response to Gert on Practical Reason.Alan H. Goldman - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):35-37.
    This is a response to Joshua Gert’s criticisms of my book Reasons from Within and defense of his own contrasting position.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion).Chris Tucker - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):127-143.
    In replying to certain objections to the existence of God, Robert Adams, Bruce Langtry, and Peter van Inwagen assume that God can appropriately choose a suboptimal world, a world less good than some other world God could have chosen. A number of philosophers, such as Michael Slote and Klaas Kraay, claim that these theistic replies are therefore committed to the claim that satisficing can be appropriate. Kraay argues that this commitment is a significant liability. I argue, however, that the relevant (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Is Genuine Satisficing Rational?Edmund Henden - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):339-352.
    There have been different interpretations of satisficing rationality. A common view is that it is sometimes rationally permitted to choose an option one judges is good enough even when one does not know that it is the best option. But there is available a more radical view of satisficing. On this view, it is rationally permitted to choose an option one judges is good enough even when a better option is known to be available. In this paper I distinguish between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Two Kinds of Satisficing.Thomas Hurka - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (1):107 - 111.
    Michael Slote has defended a moral view that he calls "satisficing consequentialism." Less demanding than maximizing consequentialism, it requires only that agents bring about consequences that are "good enough." I argue that Slote's characterization of satisficing is ambiguous. His idea of consequences' being "good enough" admits of two interpretations, with different implications in (some) particular cases. One interpretation I call "absolute-level" satisficing, the other "comparative" satisficing. Once distinguished, these versions of satisficing appear in a very different light. Absolute-level satisficing is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Originless Sin: Rational Dilemmas for Satisficers.Roy Sorensen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):213 - 223.
    Suppose you have an infinite past. If you had banked the spare dollar you have always had, then the interest would have made you rich by now. Your procrastination is inexcusable. But what should you have done? At any time at which you invest the dollar you would regret not investing it earlier. Satisficers can solve prospective puzzles involving infinite choice but cannot solve this retrospective puzzle about regret. A moral version of the puzzle suggests that there can be inevitable (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • In Defense of a Version of Satisficing Consequentialism.Jason Rogers - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (2):198-221.
    In this paper, I develop, motivate and offer a qualified defense of a version of satisficing consequentialism (SC). I develop the view primarily in light of objections to other versions of SC recently posed by Ben Bradley. I motivate the view by showing that it (1) accommodates the intuitions apparently supporting those objections, (2) is supported by certain ‘common sense’ moral intuitions about specific cases, and (3) captures the central ideas expressed by satisficing consequentialists in the recent literature. Finally, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • God, the Best, and Evil.Bruce Langtry - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    God, the Best, and Evil is an original treatment of notable problems about God and his actions towards human beings. Bruce Langtry examines implications of divine omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness for God's providence; the apparent fact that God could have created a better world than this one; and the problem of evil.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Satisficing and Optimality.Michael Byron - 1998 - Ethics 109 (1):67-93.
    It is common, though perhaps not correct, to think that practical rationality is strictly instrumental.1 The functions of instrumental reason include finding suitable means to our determinate ends, helping to determine our indeterminate ends, and implementing our principles in appropriate actions. One reason that might be given for adopting instrumentalism with respect to rationality might be that our best scientific evidence offers little support for the idea that our brains have powers to detect good and bad as such in persons, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Restrictive Consequentialism.Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):438 – 455.
    paper offers both explication and defence. Standard consequentialism is a theory of decision. It attempts to identify, for any set of alternative options, that which it is right that an agent should..
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Beyond Optimizing: A Study of Rational Choice.Michael A. Slote - 1989 - Harvard University Press.
    Argues that rather than pursuing every optimizing choice, individuals use common sense in making decisions, and includes real-life examples.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Against Satisficing Consequentialism.Ben Bradley - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (2):97-108.
    The move to satisficing has been thought to help consequentialists avoid the problem of demandingness. But this is a mistake. In this article I formulate several versions of satisficing consequentialism. I show that every version is unacceptable, because every version permits agents to bring about a submaximal outcome in order to prevent a better outcome from obtaining. Some satisficers try to avoid this problem by incorporating a notion of personal sacrifice into the view. I show that these attempts are unsuccessful. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • How Do You Maximize Expectation Value?John L. Pollock - 1983 - Noûs 17 (3):409-421.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • A New Defense of Satisficing.Michael Weber - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 77--106.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Satisficing Consequentialism.Michael Slote & Philip Pettit - 1984 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 58:139-176.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn't.James Dreier - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing. Cambridge University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Morality and Reasonable Partiality.Samuel Scheffler - 2010 - In Brian Feltham & John Cottingham (eds.), Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism (June 30, 2008).Peter Vallentyne - 2006 - In James Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theories. Blackwell. pp. 6--21.
    Maximizing act consequentialism holds that actions are morally permissible if and only if they maximize the value of consequences—if and only if, that is, no alternative action in the given choice situation has more valuable consequences.[i] It is subject to two main objections. One is that it fails to recognize that morality imposes certain constraints on how we may promote value. Maximizing act consequentialism fails to recognize, I shall argue, that the ends do not always justify the means. Actions with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Practical Rationality, Morality, and Purely Justificatory Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2000 - American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (3):227 - 243.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Satisficing as a Humanly Rational Strategy.David Schmidtz - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 30--59.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Satisficing: Not Good Enough.Henry S. Richardson - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 106--130.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Maxificing: Life on a Budget; or, If You Would Maximize, Then Satisfice!Jan Narveson - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 59--70.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Partiality, Favouritism and Morality.John Cottingham - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (144):357-373.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations